Economists for Ukraine

Working Paper Series

Editorial Committee: Tatyana Deryugina, Anastassia Fedyk, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, James Hodson, and Ilona Sologoub
Submit papers here

Economists for Ukraine are launching a new working paper series on Ukraine-related issues. The initiative aims to disseminate and promote research, build research networks, and  inform policymakers on matters regarding Ukraine. 

The format and process will largely follow leading working series such as NBER WP and CEPR DP. The editorial committee will review submissions for falling within the scope of the series and for meeting basic quality standards. Submissions can be in either English or Ukrainian (with a non-technical summary in English). There is no submission fee. All papers must be original, but publishing papers in the series does not preclude the authors from publishing their work elsewhere. 

Papers accepted into the series gain visibility and targeted exposure. Each paper will be shared on our website and mailing list, directly reaching our membership and subscribers. We also promote new papers on social media, reaching a readership especially interested in Ukraine-related research—including scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. 

Abstract

After three years of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, what is the total value of U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine? The U.S. Government on various occasions has claimed that the United States has spent upwards of $350B to sustain Ukraine’s military efforts and fiscal budget. Open source trackers place the contribution at around $125B based on announcements and Congressional releases. We find that the true value of assistance delivered to Ukraine in the first three years of war has been much closer to $50 billion. The impact on domestic spending capacity and on the US Defense budget has been negligible, at roughly $11 per taxpayer per year.

Citation

Fedyk, A., Hodson, J., Marshall, E., Gorodnichenko, Y., Deryugina, T., & Sologoub, I. (2025). A HIMARS in the hand is worth two in the bush: Measuring the real economic value of U.S. support for Ukraine (Working Paper No. 1). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No1.pdf

Abstract

We analyze how military events, civilian fatalities, and media coverage influence same-day donations to a major Ukrainian nonprofit providing lethal aid during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a unique setting, we exploit random variation in attacks on civilians across time to estimate that one additional civilian fatality causes between $4,354 and $6,015 in same-day donations, and leads to at least $8,169 in cumulative donations. Disentangling the effects of events and media coverage, we estimate that a 1% increase in media mentions of military activity leads to a $2,906 increase in same-day donations and an $8,083 increase in cumulative donations.

Citation

Klymak, M., Kosenko, A., Korenok, O., Mykhailyshyna, D., & Vasilaky, K. (2025). Charitable Giving in Wartime: Evidence from Ukraine’s War Fundraising (Working Paper No. 2). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No2.pdf

Abstract

I propose partial-equilibrium models that describe the dynamics of global wheat and corn markets. These models extend the classic competitive storage framework by incorporating nonstationary variables. They are calibrated using data from Ukraine and key importing and exporting countries. The models enable the endogenous estimation of price trends, based on the observed movements in the underlying variables. This framework provides insights into how involuntary reductions in Ukraine’s global market presence, triggered by russia’s invasion, could have affected trend prices.

Citation

Bondarenko, O. (2025). Shockwaves from Ukraine: Trends and Gaps in Agricultural Commodity Prices (Working Paper No. 3). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No3.pdf

Abstract

On February 24, 2022, as Russia invaded, the National Bank of Ukraine switched from a flexible to a fixed exchange rate regime. Was this policy response optimal? To answer this, we develop an open-economy model with both nominal rigidities and frictions in borrowing on international financial markets. We find that the carefully calibrated model can rationalize the NBU’s decision: the optimal response to small shocks is to allow exchange rate flexibility, whereas in response to large shocks—such as an invasion—currency depreciation is suboptimal. For robustness, we consider tradable endowment, risk-premium, and non-tradable supply shocks, and add subsistence consumption.

Citation

de Groot, O. & Skok, Y. (2025). Foreign Exchange Regimes in (Normal Times and) Times of War: Insights from Ukraine (Working Paper No. 4). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No4.pdf

Abstract

To reduce Russia’s funding for its Ukraine invasion, Western governments imposed, after a delay, a price ceiling on Russian seaborne oil exports utilizing Western services. To evade that ceiling, Russia developed a “shadow fleet” using no such services. We simulate a calibrated model driven by this fleet’s expansion to assess various sanctions. Mainly, sanctions—from a price ceiling to its extreme service ban version—significantly reduce the present value of Russia’s profits. However, tighter price caps will not necessarily harm Russia if they raise the world price. Shortening the delay between sanctions announcement and implementation can harm Russia more.

Citation

Cardoso, D. S., Salant, S. W., & Daubanes, J. (2025). The Dynamics of Evasion: The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports and the Amassing of the Shadow Fleet (Working Paper No. 5). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No5.pdf

Abstract

Using short- and long-term macroeconomic forecasts, we estimate the cost of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine for countries in Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Shortly after the Russian attack, the projected cost (cumulative over six years) stood at $2.44 trillion for the region. Professional forecasters predicted a dramatic increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, significant spillover effects, some hysteresis effects as well as a changing nature of business cycles. We also use the war shock to study how professional forecasters acquire and process information. Our results point to state dependence as well as an important role of forward information in shaping macroeconomic outlook of professional forecasters.

Citation

Gorodnichenko, Y. & Vasudevan, V. (2025). Macroeconomic Expectations in a War (Working Paper No. 6). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No6.pdf

Abstract

Refugees’ decisions to return after conflict carry significant political and economic implications for the origin and host countries. We examine how conflict resolution, security, economic conditions, and corruption influence return decisions. To estimate the causal effect of post-war conditions, we conducted a single-profile conjoint experiment among 2543 Ukrainian refugees across 30 European countries. Respondents were asked how likely they would be to return to Ukraine under different hypothetical scenarios. Results show that territorial integrity and security guarantees are critical, while economic prospects and combating corruption also play an important role. Refugees planning to return are more responsive to different post-war scenarios, and younger respondents are particularly influenced by income opportunities, job prospects, and potential EU accession. Our findings suggest that targeted political and economic reconstruction policies can substantially influence post-conflict return. In the most optimistic scenario, the expected return rate is 47%; in the most pessimistic scenario, only 3%.

Citation

Adema, J., Chargaziia, L., Giesing, Y., Necker, S., & Poutvaara, P. (2025). What Drives Refugees’ Return After Conflict? (Working Paper No. 7). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No7.pdf

Abstract

In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the global scientific community launched a range of support offers for displaced Ukrainian scientists. In this work, we seek to understand the characteristics of the help offers that received the most interest from Ukrainian scholars. We conduct a survey of hosts offering 2,417 support opportunities registered in the #ScienceForUkraine database (22% participation rate). More than 70% of support offers received at least one application, 48% of them helped at least one Ukrainian scientist. Our analysis reveals that scholarships were more in demand than positions, joint applications for funding or access to resources, and that offers connected to the Social Sciences and/or the Humanities were in demand. For hosts, solidarity was the primary motivation to come up with offers, but the existence of suitable funding was the second most common reason to offer help. More than 70% of support offers received at least one application, 47.5% of all the offers helped at least one scientist. Focusing on future policy design, our findings imply that support programmes for displaced scientists play a role in the hosts’ motivation to help refugee scholars, and these programmes should emphasise flexibility and consider the disciplinary composition of the affected academic community in order to be effective.

Citation

Rose, M.E., Juríková, K., Pelepets, M., Slivko, O., & Yereshko, J. (2025). Shelter in Scholarship: Evidence from a Global Survey of Hosts for Displaced Ukrainian Scientists (Working Paper No. 8). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No8.pdf

Abstract

Using household survey data on expenditures and incomes, we construct an objective measure of corruption in the public sector for a broad spectrum of countries. Specifically, we focus on the consumption-income gap for public sector workers relative to private sector workers to gauge the extent of hidden income (bribes) in the government. After validating our data and documenting properties of the consumption-income gap, we compare our measure with popular corruption perception indices. We find that i) the relationship between our measure and the alternatives is nonlinear; ii) available indices appear to be only weakly (and sometimes “wrongly”) correlated with the consumption-income gap at high frequencies; iii) the available indices appear to have a low weight on the relative consumptionincome gap in the public sector.

Citation

Sarullo, N., Gorodnichenko, Y., Deryugina, T., Hodson, J., Sologoub, I., & Fedyk, A. (2025). Measuring Corruption From Household Income and Consumption Micro-Data: An International Perspective (Working Paper No. 9). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No9.pdf

Abstract

As Ukraine emerges from the devastation of war, it faces a historic opportunity to engineer its own Wirtschaftswunder-a productivity-driven economic transformation akin to post-war West Germany. While investment-led growth may offer quick wins, it is efficiency, innovation, and institutional reform that will determine Ukraine’s long-term economic trajectory. Drawing on rich micro-level firm data spanning 25 years, this paper uncovers deep structural distortions that have suppressed creative destruction and productivity in Ukraine. It finds that business dynamism is on the decline, alongside rising market concentration among incumbent businesses, including low productivity state owned enterprises. To inform priorities for reviving business dynamism, this study develops a model of creative destruction drawing on Acemoglu et al. (2018) and Akcigit et al. (2021). The quantitative assessment highlights that policies that discipline entrenched incumbents are the bedrock for reviving business dynamism and engineer Ukraine’s Wirtschaftswunder. Policies targeting specific types of firms have limited efficacy when incumbents run wild.

Citation

Akcigit, U., Furkan, K.,  Lall, S., &  Shpak, S. (2025). Engineering Ukraine’s Wirtschaftswunder (Working Paper No. 10). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No10.pdf

Abstract

Bellicose theories of state formation suggest that wars enable the emergence of strong states via the mechanism of increased war-time taxation. We explore the hitherto littleanalysed micro-level foundations of this claim. Does the experience of war increase public support for higher taxation? Furthermore, is this support limited to only defensive purposes, or does it extend to other warrelated but forward-looking goals, like postwar reconstruction and cohesion-building? We implement a survey experiment during the ongoing war in Ukraine to address the above questions. We find that war changes citizen support for taxation at the intensive but not the extensive margin: war-related primes do not affect the proportion of respondents willing to pay more tax, however, among those ready to do so, defence and cohesion-related purposes increase the amount and duration of tax hikes considered acceptable. Our findings complement conventional elite-centric models of warrelated state-building and ongoing debates about Ukraine’s postwar governance.

Citation

Daniels, L. &  Wietzke, F. (2025). “Are you willing to Pay?” War and Citizens’ Readiness to Pay Tax: The Case of Ukraine (Working Paper No. 11). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No11.pdf

 

Abstract

We develop a novel, scalable method for assessing the quality of public procurement systems using standard administrative data. Our approach compares the distribution of procurement opportunities to the distribution of contract awards across firms. We first derive a simple theoretical benchmark that relates the expected distribution of contract value winning firms, measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), to the distribution of auction values, measured as a respective HHI, and the number of winning firms. Significant deviations of winning firms’ HHI from this benchmark indicate potential governance failures such as corruption or unchecked collusion. Our method requires no subjective input, is transparent and reproducible, and allows for meaningful comparisons across countries, industry sectors, and over time. We use procurement data from Ukraine and EU member states in 2018-2021 to assess the performance of five large sectors. Results indicate that Ukraine’s procurement performance in four of the five sectors is comparable to many other European countries. However, Ukraine’s construction sector consistently displays the largest excess concentration among all countries considered, consistent with anecdotal evidence of corruption in this sector. Overall, with minimal data requirements, our method offers a practical tool for cross-sector and cross-country assessment of procurement systems.

Citation

Deryugina, T., Zaldokas, A., Fedyk, A., Gorodnichenko, Y., Hodson, J.,  &  Sologoub, I. (2025). Rating Government Procurement Markers (Working Paper No. 12). Economists for Ukraine. https://econ4ua.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Econ4UA-Working-Paper-No12.pdf

 

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