Publications

Justifying their stay in Russia by “provision of essential goods” is a poor excuse. In reality, companies that claim this are protecting their market share.

We use a unique high-frequency Russian customs data to evaluate the impact of international sanctions on Russia. We focus on Russian crude oil and oil products exports, as they are the key sources of export revenues and government finances. We find that Russia was able to redirect crude oil exports from Europe to alternative markets such as India, China, and Turkey with no loss of volumes. In particular, we find that Russian oil exports from Pacific Ocean ports, which are critical for trade with China, do not comply with the G7 price cap.

By Tania Babina, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Oleg Itskhoki, Maxim Mironov, and Elina Ribakova

The EU has banned most of Russia’s oil exports, but little action has been taken on natural gas trade. This column argues for a disclosure requirement targeted at gas traders, detailing the share of gas they buy from Russian sources. Such a measure would address the information deficit for consumers and empower supportive citizens and businesses to switch away from Russian gas. As an additional benefit, this measure would accelerate the clean energy transition in Europe.

By Iryna Sikora and Boris Vallee

Russia is one of the top three fossil fuel producers in the world, and its economy relies heavily on revenues from oil and natural gas. A full embargo on Russian energy today by the EU alone would already decrease its GDP per capita by 1,500-2,500 USD (or 10 to 25%), a significant reduction to weaken Moscow’s capacity to sustain its aggression against Ukraine.
By Kevin Berry and Iryna Sikora

Since Feb. 21, unprecedented sanctions have not only targeted important sectors of the Russian economy but also frozen Russian central bank reserves. The idea was to impose severe economic pain on Russia and indirectly affect its ability to sustain a prolonged war. But today, the situation has reversed, and Russia is self-sanctioning by restricting its gas supplies to the EU. Instead of reaping the revenue from the gas sale over the long term, Russia is choosing to cut the gas flow.
By Oleg Korenok and Swapnil Singh

With the Russian ruble now trading at 55 rubles per dollar, well above where it was prior to the invasion, and Russia’s economic output not having collapsed, the initial optimism about the effectiveness of the unprecedented sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies has started to fade. Does that mean the sanctions regime has been a failure? We do not believe so.
By Oleg Korenok, Swapnil Singh, and Stan Veuger

A growing number of U.S. and European firms have chosen to voluntarily cease or suspend their operations in Russia. Are these firms’ managers deciding to divest to help Ukraine and punish Russia? Or are they divesting to help their own firms, under pressure from investors? Our results suggest the latter.
By Anastassia Fedyk & Tetyana Balyuk