To: The future German chancellor
From: Economists For Ukraine
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Dear Chancellor,
Congratulations on taking the helm of the Federal Republic of Germany!
You are in a perfect storm, and Germany must rise to the occasion. Russia continues to wage a war of aggression on Ukraine and to threaten Europe’s security. The German economy faces difficult times. Your key ally across the Atlantic just gave the EU a very “cold shower.”
The good news is that, with decisive leadership, you – and other EU leaders – can still turn things around.
First, Europe has the resources necessary to defeat Russian aggression, and Moscow is much weaker than many observers think. Russia’s economy is just one-tenth of the EU GDP. It is weakened by domestic corruption and foreign sanctions and overheated by military spending. Ukrainian missile and drone strikes, however limited, considerably weaken Russian production capacity, and this could be further accelerated with Taurus missiles. Prigozhyn’s march on Moscow could have toppled the regime – there was no counteraction from Russia’s special forces.
Ukrainian armed forces have deeply wounded the Russian war machine: since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia has lost over 10,000 tanks, 370 airplanes, 330 helicopters, over a thousand anti-aircraft systems, and practically the entire Black Sea fleet. It even lost a part of its sovereign territory in the Kursk region. All of this has been achieved by the Ukrainian army, which is smaller than Russia’s and equipped with homemade drones and a hodgepodge of Western weapons, many of which are quite old. More and better military kit, delivered in a timely manner, would make the war untenable for Russia.
Second, building a stronger military force in Germany and Ukraine would secure Germany and other EU member states a seat at the table for key negotiations on security and economic matters but also help Germany to regain its economic strength. For example, German industrial production is in a difficult spot, but you can give it a boost with new defence contracts. This will create jobs, reduce strategic dependencies, forge links with other European nations, and fund innovation; the objectives also outlined in the Draghi report. Of course, you will need to increase public spending, and money is tight, but you can spare your taxpayers by seizing $300 billion of frozen Russian money (the only credible reason not to seize this money would be the intention to return it to Putin, which hopefully is not the case).
Third, we know that Russia retreats when it faces force. Recall George Kennan’s long telegram written in 1946: “Impervious to logic of reason, [USSR/Russia] is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason [USSR/Russia] can easily withdraw – and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point.” This still applies to Russia today. Sensing weakness and indecision, Russia attacks (Moldova in 1991, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and then in 2022). Confronted with credible force and deterrence, Russia withdraws. For instance, Russia did nothing when Finland and Sweden joined NATO despite Putin’s repeated complaints about NATO expansion. When Turkiye shot down a Russian military plane, Russia banned the imports of Turkish tomatoes. When Assad’s regime was toppled in 11 days, Russia just watched. This is the variable you can control: more defense spending and more military aid to Ukraine, coupled with tougher sanctions on Russia, will make the rhetoric about taking German security into German hands credible.
Finally, it should be clear by now that incremental tweaks will not address the existential threat from Russia. But the piecemeal, delayed response was largely self-imposed. You can lift this constraint and join other European countries who call for bolder actions. Your leadership is vital for making decisions that will affect your country and Europe for decades to come.
There are also immense challenges and pitfalls ahead.
The war in Ukraine is a direct and existential threat to the European project, to European security, and to the very ideals of democracy around the world. It is high time to recognize that Russia is waging a broader war against Europe: energy blackmail, cutting cables, blowing up factories, using migrants to violate borders and carry out acts of terror in order to bring ultra-right pro-Russian parties to power. This is only the tip of the iceberg of what can happen. For instance, what if tomorrow some people in Belarussian army uniforms occupy a Lithuanian village? Will NATO’s article 5 be enacted? Does the EU have the muscle to protect its members? Or will Eastern Europe be recognized as Russia’s “sphere of influence” again, thus effectively destroying NATO?
You may hear that Russia will use nuclear weapons if it’s defeated. Bob Woodward’s latest book revealed that the Biden administration slowed down shipments of weapons to Ukraine in 2022 – when there was a high chance of defeating Russia – because they were scared by Putin’s nuclear blackmail. Do not cave in. Doing so would only increase the probability of future wars. Instead, calling Russia’s bluff would push it back (in fact, there is no guarantee that Russia’s strategic missiles work; for instance, a Sarmat missile recently exploded in the launching silo).
Remember that Ukraine crossed many imaginary “red lines” (including going into the Kursk region), and nuclear weapons were never used. In 1961, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had a clear message for the Kremlin: “[nuclear threats] directed from time to time against one or other of the NATO partners are …dangerous, [but] the Soviet government must know that by any such blow, it would touch off a counter-blow by which it would be annihilated.” Russian elites want to live (especially in Europe, where they have mansions and children), and they are not ready to commit suicide. A more alarming nuclear threat is Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and Russia’s attack on the Chornobyl NPP.
Therefore, Russia can and, in fact, must be defeated in Ukraine. It is the best chance of a strong democratic future for the Russian state. For as long as the Russian state apparatus is highly militarised, autocratic, and aggressively pursuing military partnerships with countries such as North Korea, Iran, and China, it will dampen European growth, and undermine global security. It is important to recognize that this may involve direct European engagement against Russian troops in the interests of not fighting that same war on the back foot in the heart of Europe against an unconstrained Russian military machine. These discussions must be brought to the fore, as a deterrent, and as a real imminent possibility.
Lastly, it could be tempting to promise a quick resolution, but you should prepare for a long haul. Avoid the mistakes of Putin (who promised to capture Kyiv in 3 days; we are at the 3-year mark of the full-scale war) or Trump (who promised to stop the war in one day; we are in the 4th week of his presidency, and despite the rhetoric there is no credible plan in sight).
You should be looking for a just and therefore lasting peace in Ukraine. Dividing Europe a la Yalta 1945 – or Munich 1938 – would make the continent less secure and pave a way for more future wars but this time possibly on German soil or with German soldiers as Trump appears ready to throw the entire European continent under Russian tanks. A battle-ready, strong military force that follows European values and interests is critical for enforcing security in Ukraine and the rest of Europe.
We want to conclude by reminding you that every day of the war takes lives, destroys homes, and inflicts unbearable pain in Ukraine. There is no time to lose. We are at your service to help you defeat Russian aggression and restore security and prosperity in Europe.
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Kind regards,
Tatyana Deryugina, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Anastassia Fedyk, University of California at Berkeley
Yuriy Gorodnichenko, University of California at Berkeley
James Hodson, AI for Good Foundation
Ilona Sologoub, VoxUkraine
Andreas Umland, Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies
Andreas Eisele, European Commission
Andrew Atkeson, University of California Los Angeles
Anna Alberini, University of Maryland
Arnaud Dyevre, MIT
Artur Doshchyn, University of Bristol
Asen Ivanov, Queen Mary University of London
Bartosz Bartkowski , Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ
Benjamin Moll, London School of Economics
Chris Cunningham, Citinomics
Christina Felfe, Universität Konstanz
Clifton Mast, Fishers, inc
Dan Bernhardt, University of Illinois and University of Warwick
Daniel Heyen, RPTU Kaiserslautern-Landau
Daniel Borowczyk-Martins, Copenhagen Business School
Daniel Hromada, Junior professor, Digital Education
Daniel Schaefer, Johannes Kepler University Linz
d’Artis Kancs, European Commission, DG Joint Research Centre
David McCarthy, University of Hong Kong
Derek Horstmeyer, George Mason University
Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
Dmitriy Sergeyev, Bocconi University
Dora Costa , University of California, Los Angeles
Fabian Lange, McGill University
Fabio Ghironi, University of Washington
Felix Dwinger, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
Felix Kubler, University of Zurich
François Joinneau, Tuvalu 51/Seaquatoria
Gauthier Vermandel , École polytechnique
Georg Weizsäcker, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Gunther Fehlinger-Jahn, Austrian Committee for NATO membership of Ukraine, Austria, Kosovo and Bosnia
Gunther Glenk, University of Mannheim
Ilaria Mariotti, Politecnico di milano
Jesse Perla, University of British Columbia
Joël Cariolle, Ferdi & CERDI-UCA
Julia Coronado, MacroPolicy Perspectives
Justus Ohlhaver, Unternehmer
Kevin Costa, Massachusetts Democratic State Committeeman, Representing the First Bristol and Plymouth District (Fall River, Freetown, Lakeville, Rochester, Somerset, Swansea, and Westport)
Lars Vilhuber, Cornell University
Luca Alfieri, University of Tartu\Politecnico di Milano
Lukas Mergele, BSS, Switzerland
Maksym Polyakov, Manaaki Whenua – Landcare Research, New Zealand
Mariia Panga, George Mason University
Martin Aust , University of Bonn
Mats Marcusson , Retired EC official
Matt Holian, San Jose State University
Michael Alexeev, Indiana University – Bloomington
Monika Junicke, VŠE Praha
Oleg Gredil, Tulane University
Oleksandr Shepotylo, Aston University
Olena Havrylchyk, University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne
Olga Rud, University of Stavanger
Olha Khymych , Environmental Institute s.r.o.
Olivier Coibion, UT Austin
Olivier Simard-Casanova, CEREFIGE, University of Lorraine
Oskar Kowalewski, IESEG School of Management
Oxana Shevel, Tufts University
Pavlo Buryi, Harrisburg University of Science and Technology
Payam Alipour, Bank of America
Philip Rothman, East Carolina University
Ruediger Bachmann, University of Notre Dame
Scott Gehlbach, University of Chicago
Simon Gaechter, University of Nottingham
Stefan Krasa, Universität von Illinois
Steffen Altmann, University of Wuerzburg and University of Copenhagen
Tereza Ranosova, Deutsche Bundesbank
Udo Kreickemeier , University of Göttingen
Valentin Klotzbücher, University of Freiburg
Valeria Burdea, LMU Munich
Volodymyr Minin, University of California, Irvine
Roman Matkovskyy, Rennes School of Business
David Godfrey-Thomas, Afina International
Gerald O’Rourke, ICEX DAC
Tatiana Fedyk, University of San Francisco
Linda Tesar, University of Michigan
Dmytro Yablonovskyi, VoxUkraine editor
Gonçalo Pina, ESCP Business School – Berlin Campus
Katerina Lisenkova, NatWest Group
Francesco Paolo Conteduca, Bank of Italy
Dennis Coates, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Anastasia Kalyna, University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
Filippo Pavanello, ifo Institute and LMU Munich
Roman Sheremeta, Case Western Reserve University
Tilman Eichstädt, bbw University
Michael Weber, University of Chicago
Marciano Siniscalchi, Northwestern University
Olga Kupets, Kyiv School of Economics
Alexander Haas, Monash University
Simon Galle, BI Norwegian Business School
Stepan Jurajda, Charles University
Pierre-Yves Geoffard, Paris School of Economics
Knut Einar Rosendahl, Norwegian University of Life Science
Martin Ellison, University of Oxford
Vojtech Bartos, University of Milan
Viktoria Hnatkovska, University of British Columbia
Charles Becker, Duke University
Anna Nagurney, University of Massachusetts – Amherst
Christian Hellwig, Toulouse School of Economics
Aliaksandr Amialchuk, University of Toledo
Monika Piazzesi, Stanford University
Andreas Peichl, ifo Institute, University of Munich
Maksym Mashliakivskyi, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
Christian Bayer, Universität Bonn
Serhiy Stepanchuk, University of Southampton
Bohdan Kukharskyy, City University of New York
Vytautas Valaitis, University of Surrey
Mykola Ryzhenkov, Osnabrück University
Paul Gregory, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Sebastian Buhai, Stockholm University – SOFI
Austin Starkweather, University of Tennessee
Luminita Stevens, University of Maryland
Christian Moser, Columbia University
Alberto Bisin, NYU
Theocharis Grigoriadis, Freie Universität Berlin
Martin Schneider, Stanford University
Benjamin Born, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Klaus Adam, University College London
Valeria Fedyk, Arizona State University
Ludo Visschers, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Oleg Itskhoki, Harvard University
Kevin Berry, University of Alaska Anchorage
Christopher Roth, University of Cologne
Gernot Mueller, University of Tübingen
Ben Schumann, DIW Berlin
Oksana Kuziakiv, IER, Ukraine
Elena Besedina, Kyiv School of Economics
Lena Dräger, Leibniz Universität Hannover & Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft
Oleh Nivievskyi, Kyiv School of Economics
Florin Bilbiie, University of Cambridge
Fausto Panunzi, Bocconi University
Torbjörn Becker, Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
Knut Niemann, University of Tübingen
Oleksandr Talavera, University of Birmingham
Thomas Barrett, Kyiv School of Economics
Olha Halytsia, Kyiv School of Economics
Lorenz Kueng, University of Lugano (USI), Switzerland
Pietro Biroli, University of Bologna
Monika Schnitzer, University of Munich
Christoph Schiller, The Ohio State University – Fisher College of Business
Julian Reif, University of Illinois
Gerard Roland, UC Berkeley
Andrew Kosenko, Marist University
Klaus M. Schmidt, Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich
Konstantin Sonin, University of Chicago
Sebastian Dyrda, University of Toronto
Jonas Dovern, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Miroslaw Popkowski, Capgemini Poland
Yuliia Shapoval, Institute for Economics & Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
Hannes Ullrich, DIW Berlin and University of Copenhagen
Simon Johnson, MIT
Christopher Hartwell, Zurich University of Applied Sciences & Kozminski University
Beatrice Weder di Mauro, CEPR
Ioannis Kospentaris, Athens University of Economics and Business
Giorgio Motta, Lancaster University
Moritz Schularick, Kiel Institute and Sciences Po
Mishel Ghassibe, CREi, UPF and BSE
Leonardo Melosi, University of Warwick
George Loginov, Augustana University
Vira Semenova, UC Berkeley