Ukraine Research Repository

Economists for Ukraine has compiled a repository of research papers on topics related to Russia’s war on Ukraine. To submit a paper that’s not on our list, please fill out this form.

Table of Contents

Finance & Business

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
Safe haven between European ESG and energy sector under Russian-Ukraine war: Role of sustainable investments for portfolio diversification.
Ahad, M., Imran, Z. A., & Shahzad, K. (2024).
Energy Economics
Safe haven between European ESG and energy sector under Russian-Ukraine war: Role of sustainable investments for portfolio diversification.Business & Finance, Energy & EnvironmentAhad, M., Imran, Z. A., & Shahzad, K. (2024). Safe haven between European ESG and energy sector under Russian-Ukraine war: Role of sustainable investments for portfolio diversification. Energy Economics, 138, 107853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107853The shortage of oil and gas supply to Europe during the Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered a price hike in the European energy sector. To mitigate the impact of higher energy prices on consumers, the EU introduced a price ceiling mechanism to curb gas prices from exceeding market norms. This interplay between supply shortages and price controls further heightened volatility in energy market prices. Consequently, our study aims to explore the efficacy of ESG indices as a safe haven against the highly volatile European oil and gas sectors to reduce portfolio losses during conflict. Using advanced analytical techniques such as cross-quantilogram to predict directional predictability, we find that bullish ESG markets are a safe haven against the bearish oil and gas markets in short, medium, and long-term investment horizons. Further, to identify the net receiver/transmitter of spillover between ESG indices and oil and gas sectors, our quantile time-frequency connectedness analysis shows ESG is a net receiver of spillover before the conflict and during wartime. Additionally, we explored the indicator of uncertainty that influences quantile spillover between ESG indices and European oil and gas sectors. We find that uncertainty's role in quantile spillover is significant and asymmetric, and it becomes more volatile during wartime. This feature tends to be amplified during short and long-term spillovers. Finally, the portfolio rebalance strategy suggests that a safe haven portfolio based on a one-month investment horizon yields positive returns during wartime. Hence, this study suggests investors include ESG indices as safe haven assets at times of crisis and for policymakers to understand the role of uncertainties in reducing price volatility and risk contagion among ESG and energy markets.
The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on European Union currencies: A high-frequency analysis.
Akarsu, M. Z., & Gharehgozli, O. (2024).
Policy Studies
The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on European Union currencies: A high-frequency analysis.Business & Finance, MacroeconomicsAkarsu, M. Z., & Gharehgozli, O. (2024). The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on European Union currencies: A high-frequency analysis. Policy Studies, 45(3–4), 353–376. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2268543This article examines how the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war has affected the valuation of five European Union currencies: the Polish Zloty, Hungarian Forint, Czech Koruna, Swedish Krone, and Romanian Leu. Using high-frequency time series data and advanced statistical models, we analyze a 522-week period from 1 January 2013, to 24 February 2023, with 24 February 2022, as a key focal point. The Russia-Ukraine war had varying effects on the currencies of non-Eurozone countries. Poland, Hungary, and Sweden experienced significant impacts, while Czechia and Romania remained relatively stable. Our research also highlights the stability of the Euro as a reserve currency, which attracts investors during times of crisis and protects participating economies from currency fluctuations. Additionally, our analysis underscores the distinct impact of war on these currencies, influenced by their unique political, economic, and financial structures and strengths.
Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions.
Auer, C., Bosello, F., Bressan, G., Delpiazzo, E., Monasterolo, I., Otto, C., Parrado, R., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2025).
Communications Earth & Environment
Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions.Business & Finance, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityAuer, C., Bosello, F., Bressan, G., Delpiazzo, E., Monasterolo, I., Otto, C., Parrado, R., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2025). Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions. Communications Earth & Environment, 6, Article 194. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02119-1Disruptions in global food and energy trade can trigger cascading socio-economic losses. Financial markets can amplify such losses and generate systemic cross-sectoral effects, e.g. food insecurity. Our methodology links the real economy and financial markets to quantify cascading impacts across sectors and regions and to capture amplification effects by financial markets. Although applicable to any shock on global key commodity trade, we test its effectiveness with the Russia-Ukraine war, which reveals pronounced, regionally and sectorally diverse impacts. Comparing with real data confirms that our approach captures several key impacts of the crisis: the energy price increase in Europe, the strong reaction of European commodity future markets with large benefits for fossil companies (equity values up to +54%) and losses for companies most exposed to the belligerents (up to−6%), and the worsening of food affordability especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America (additionally 10 million people at risk of hunger). Our analysis shows the importance of accounting for cascading risks and amplification effects to strengthen economic, financial, and food system resilience.
Does supporting Ukraine pay well? The performance of companies that suspended their business in Russia.
Ayoub, M., & Qadan, M. (2023).
Research in International Business and Finance
Does supporting Ukraine pay well? The performance of companies that suspended their business in Russia.Business & FinanceAyoub, M., & Qadan, M. (2023). Does supporting Ukraine pay well? The performance of companies that suspended their business in Russia. Research in International Business and Finance, 66, 102071. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102071Using recent data about US companies that announced they were suspending their business activities in Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, we test how their decision affected their stock prices and forward-looking volatility. Using the event-study approach as well as the difference-in-difference model, we find that these firms, on average, experienced a reduction (increase) in their value (implied volatility). However, this reduction (increase) did not last more than one to two weeks. We explain the results using the classic financial paradigm and the counterbalancing impact of social responsibility. Our results are robust to a battery of robustness checks and empirical designs.
The impacts of Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy in the frame of digital banking networks and cyber attacks.
Balbaa, M. E., Eshov, M. P., & Ismailova, N. (2022).
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Future Networks & Distributed Systems
The impacts of Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy in the frame of digital banking networks and cyber attacks.Business & FinanceBalbaa, M. E., Eshov, M. P., & Ismailova, N. (2022). The impacts of Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy in the frame of digital banking networks and cyber attacks. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Future Networks & Distributed Systems (ICFNDS '22) (pp. 1–11). ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3584202.3584223Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 heightened geopolitical tensions between the Western countries and Russia, lowering global growth expectations due to uncertainty about the effects of the conflict, especially on the global supply chain. In addition, the sanctions imposed on Russia by Western nations have a spillover effect on the global economy. Conflicts have led to energy supply shocks, commodities and trade supply shocks, rising energy, food and commodities prices, thereby causing global inflation in many countries. This paper examines the global economic impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the month following the war.
Divesting under pressure: U.S. firms’ exit in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine
Balyuk, T., & Fedyk, A. (2023)
Journal of Comparative Economics
Divesting under pressure: U.S. firms’ exit in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine.Business & FinanceBalyuk, T., & Fedyk, A. (2023). Divesting under pressure: U.S. firms’ exit in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Journal of Comparative Economics, 51(4), 1253–1273. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.08.001
The rise of partisan CSR: Corporate responses to the Russia–Ukraine war.
Bamiatzi, V., Brieger, S. A., Karakulak, Ö., Kinderman, D., & Manning, S. (2025).
Journal of Business Ethics
The rise of partisan CSR: Corporate responses to the Russia–Ukraine war.Business & FinanceBamiatzi, V., Brieger, S. A., Karakulak, Ö., Kinderman, D., & Manning, S. (2025). The rise of partisan CSR: Corporate responses to the Russia–Ukraine war. Journal of Business Ethics, 198(2), 263–291. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05795-9The Russia–Ukraine war has challenged our understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Whereas CSR is traditionally associated with business self-regulation that benefts business and society, the confict has revealed new forms of what we call “partisan CSR.” Based on comprehensive data from Fortune Global 500 frms, this study discovers that in particular Western, but also some non-Western, corporations have engaged in partisan CSR activities, ranging from (1) strengthening Ukraine’s economy, to (2) enhancing security and protection for Ukrainian citizens, (3) providing military support, (4) weakening Russia’s economy, and (5) supporting Ukraine in symbolic ways. By comparison, several mostly non-Western frms, e.g. from Asian countries, have chosen to be “neutral”, while, in some cases, exploiting economic opportunities arising from the confict. This study also discusses major drivers of these CSR responses, including political climate, resource availability and economic dependency, isomorphism, and regulatory requirements. Our fndings suggest a shift from political CSR to partisan CSR, which we expect to become more important with growing geopolitical divides and territorial conficts.
Fiscal incidence in Ukraine: A Commitment to Equity analysis
Bornukova, K., Leshchenko, N., & Matytsin, M. (2019)
Policy Research Working Paper No. 8765
Fiscal incidence in Ukraine: A Commitment to Equity analysis (Policy Research Working Paper No. 8765).Business & FinanceBornukova, K., Leshchenko, N., & Matytsin, M. (2019). Fiscal incidence in Ukraine: A Commitment to Equity analysis (Policy Research Working Paper No. 8765). World Bank, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/463211551809784312/fiscal-incidence-in-ukraine-a-commitment-to-equity-analysis The paper employs the Commitment to Equity framework to present a first attempt at a comprehensive fiscal incidence analysis for Ukraine, encompassing the revenue and expenditures components of the fiscal system, including direct and indirect taxes, as well as direct, indirect, and in-kind transfers. The fiscal system in Ukraine has high redistribution effects, decreasing the Gini inequality index by 21 percentage points, and the official measure of poverty incidence by 27.6 percentage points (considering all fiscal interventions including in-kind transfers). As in many other countries in the region, pensions are the main contributor to the redistribution effect of fiscal policy. However, Ukraine stands out due to the relatively high equalizing effect of direct transfers. Fiscal policy in Ukraine is pro-poor, with the lowest income decile benefiting the most. Overall, 60 percent of the population of Ukraine are net recipients from the fiscal system, the main categories of recipients being households with two or more children, single-parent households, and retirees.
The impact of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns.
Boungou, W., & Yatié, A. (2022).
Economics Letters
The impact of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns.Business & FinanceBoungou, W., & Yatié, A. (2022). The impact of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns. Economics Letters, 215, 110516. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110516Using stock returns from a sample of 94 countries over the period from 22 January to 24 March 2022, we document a negative relationship between the Ukraine–Russia war and world stock market returns. We thus provide the first empirical evidence
Uncertainty, stock and commodity prices during the Ukraine-Russia war.
Boungou, W., & Yatié, A. (2024).
Policy Studies
Uncertainty, stock and commodity prices during the Ukraine-Russia war.Business & FinanceBoungou, W., & Yatié, A. (2024). Uncertainty, stock and commodity prices during the Ukraine-Russia war. Policy Studies, 45(3–4), 336–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2024.2302440This article mainly investigates whether the war in Ukraine-Russia induces uncertainties and how this affects the returns of world stock market indices and commodity prices. To do so, we use the Economic Policy Uncertainty index (EPU), 96 stock market indices and the price of 67 commodities worldwide over the period from January 2022 to April 2023. Our empirical results show that the war between Ukraine and Russia increases uncertainties, and which negatively affect the performance of global financial markets and lead to higher commodity prices. These negative shocks tend to be smaller the longer the war persists. We also observe that responses to war-induced uncertainties are stronger in Europe and America. Overall, we provide unique evidence of the impact of war on uncertainties and how this is transmitted to stock market performance and commodity prices.
Sustainability decision‐making in times of crisis: An empirical study in Italy under the lens of the Russian‐Ukraine war.
Dorrego Viera, J. I., Santolin, R. B., Lazzarotti, V., & Urbinati, A. (2024).
Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management
Sustainability decision‐making in times of crisis: An empirical study in Italy under the lens of the Russian‐Ukraine war.Energy & Environment, Business & FinanceDorrego Viera, J. I., Santolin, R. B., Lazzarotti, V., & Urbinati, A. (2024). Sustainability decision‐making in times of crisis: An empirical study in Italy under the lens of the Russian‐Ukraine war. Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management, 31(5), 3988–4006. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.2788 This research examines the impact of the Russian‐Ukraine war on the decisions made by managers regarding the three dimensions of the triple bottom line (TBL) of sustainability. Specifically, it investigates how managers in the Lombardy region of Italy adapted their approaches towards sustainability during this crisis. The descriptive statistics and PCA analyses demonstrate that managers adjusted their decisions regarding the social dimension of sustainability in response to the prevailing circumstances. The Russian‐Ukraine war has led to a convergence of the social and economic dimensions within firms. However, the study also reveals that the social dimension is often considered secondary to the core business, making it the weakest aspect of the TBL approach. Nonetheless, external disruptions, such as in the case of the Russian‐Ukraine war, can influence this approach, leading to a repositioning of the social dimension as a focal point in business strategies. By emphasizing the importance of considering social aspects in sustainability decision‐making during crises, this research contributes valuable insights to the existing literature. The findings can inform the development of strategies to address challenges posed by the Russian‐Ukraine war and enhance the integration of social criteria in sustainability decision‐making.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict and volatility risk of commodity markets.
Fang, Y., & Shao, Z. (2022).
Finance Research Letters
The Russia-Ukraine conflict and volatility risk of commodity markets.Business & FinanceFang, Y., & Shao, Z. (2022). The Russia-Ukraine conflict and volatility risk of commodity markets. Finance Research Letters, 50, 103264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.103264We construct a new index to measure the intensity of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and use it to examine to what extent and through which channels does this conflict affect the volatility risk of commodity markets. Our results suggest that the intensification of the Russia-Ukraine conflict significantly increases the volatility of agricultural, metal, and energy markets. The conflict affects these markets through both economic and financial channels. Regarding economic channels, after the escalation of conflict, the higher the global market share of a commodity exported by Russia, the higher the volatility risk for that commodity. Regarding financial channels, investor panic and the monetary policy of the major central banks amplify the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Commodity markets are more volatile when the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalates during periods when Russia's foreign exchange reserves are high.
When doing the right thing doesn’t pay: Impact of corporate decisions on Russian market participation in the wake of the Ukraine-Russia war.
French, J. J., Gurdgiev, C., & Shin, S. (2023).
Finance Research Letters
When doing the right thing doesn’t pay: Impact of corporate decisions on Russian market participation in the wake of the Ukraine-Russia war.Business & FinanceFrench, J. J., Gurdgiev, C., & Shin, S. (2023). When doing the right thing doesn’t pay: Impact of corporate decisions on Russian market participation in the wake of the Ukraine-Russia war. Finance Research Letters, 58, Article 104468. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104468This study investigates how the stock returns of firms that took corporate action against Russia following the onset of Ukraine-Russian war were impacted. We use traditional event-study methodologies to analyze the data. The findings indicate that the firms that opted to act against Russia in the wake of the onset of Ukraine-Russian war experienced a downward trend in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on average. Furthermore, we find that the stronger the action taken against Russia the more negative the average CARs. These findings are contrary to the idea that investors reward strong firm-level ESG actions and are robust to the choice of firms and event windows.
High inflation during Russia–Ukraine war and financial market interaction: Evidence from C-Vine Copula and SETAR models.
Hamza, T., Ben Haj Hamida, H., Mili, M., & Sami, M. (2024).
Research in International Business and Finance
High inflation during Russia–Ukraine war and financial market interaction: Evidence from C-Vine Copula and SETAR models.Business & FinanceHamza, T., Ben Haj Hamida, H., Mili, M., & Sami, M. (2024). High inflation during Russia–Ukraine war and financial market interaction: Evidence from C-Vine Copula and SETAR models. Research in International Business and Finance, 70(B), 102384. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2024.102384This paper examines the interaction between three financial markets: energy and non-energy commodities, bonds and equities, in a particular context of high inflation worldwide, that of Russia–Ukraine war. Our data cover the period January 2016-October 2022. Using a SETARGARCH C-Vine Copula model, we provide evidence of two inflation breakouts within COVID pandemic and shortly before Russia–Ukraine war, for all assets considered, and particularly for US 10-Year bond, as an inflation-indexed asset. Over the Russia–Ukraine war period, both linear and nonlinear models explain the studied assets’ behavior faced with high inflation. C-Vine Copula analysis shows that oil prices (WTI), as an inflation-producing assets, impact the volatility of financial markets (VIX) in times of war. This analysis indicates also that the NASDAQ index, as an inflation-exposed assets, is sensitive to commodities and energy prices that drive inflation. Furthermore, we find a high positive Kendall’s tau for all combinations between US 10-Year and all other assets. These results provide strong evidence of the association between US 10-Year futures, as a vehicle of inflation, and all studied assets. Lastly, our findings confirm the evidence that Russia–Ukraine war generated two significant shocks, Gas (NG) prices and financial markets’ volatility (VIX). This study is of crucial interest to policy and decision makers to the extent that it provides a framework for understanding, in a context of high inflation, the mechanisms linked to the vehicles for transmitting this inflation, its pricing process, and its impact on the equity market.
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on global financial markets.
Izzeldin, M., Muradoğlu, Y. G., Pappas, V., Petropoulou, A., & Sivaprasad, S. (2023).
International Review of Financial Analysis
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on global financial markets.Business & FinanceIzzeldin, M., Muradoğlu, Y. G., Pappas, V., Petropoulou, A., & Sivaprasad, S. (2023). The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on global financial markets. International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102598 On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded the Ukraine. In this paper, we analyze the response of European and global stock markets alongside a representative sample of commodities. We compare the war response against the recent Covid-19 pandemic and the not-too-distant 2008 global financial crisis. Applying a Markov-switching HAR model on volatility proxies, estimates are made of synchronization, duration and intensity measures for each event. In broad terms, stock markets and commodities respond most rapidly to the Russian invasion; and post-invasion crisis intensity is noticeably smaller compared to both the Covid-19 and the GFC. Wheat and nickel are the most affected commodities due to the prominent exporter status of the two countries.
On the protective effects of European sustainable stocks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Kick, A., & Rottmann, H. (2024)
Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden
On the protective effects of European sustainable stocks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Weidener Diskussionspapiere No. 88).Business & Finance, Energy & EnvironmentKick, A., & Rottmann, H. (2024). On the protective effects of European sustainable stocks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Weidener Diskussionspapiere No. 88). Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden, https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283004 Sustainable investments remain popular, attracting investors and researchers alike. Especially the tail-risk properties seem to differ between sustainable stocks and common stocks. Empirically, this can be observed in particular during extreme events. On February 24, 2022 Russian forces invaded Ukraine, thereby marking the beginning of a major historical event. Using standard event study methodology, we analyze if and how Refinitiv’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, as well as carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity, influence cumulative abnormal returns during different event windows. We find that the abnormal returns of companies with high ecological scores exhibit a protective effect in the pre- and post-event windows. However, this effect did not materialize in all observed event windows. Therefore, our results do not fully support the hypothesis of an ‘ESG hedge’ against such extreme events. 
Empirical effects of sanctions and support measures on stock prices and exchange rates in the Russia–Ukraine war.
Klose, J. (2024).
Global Finance Journal
Empirical effects of sanctions and support measures on stock prices and exchange rates in the Russia–Ukraine war.Business & FinanceKlose, J. (2024). Empirical effects of sanctions and support measures on stock prices and exchange rates in the Russia–Ukraine war. Global Finance Journal, 59, 100925. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfj.2023.100925What are the effects of sanctions and economic support on stock prices and exchange rates during the Russia–Ukraine war? We address this question using a panel-vectorautoregressions (VAR) model incorporating data from 23 countries besides Russia and Ukraine, spanning from 02/01/2022 to 02/24/2023. Our analysis relies on a detailed database to capture the nuances of sanctions and economic support. The results are presented from three distinct perspectives: first, in relation to global economies; second, regarding Russia; and third, concerning Ukraine. The findings reveal that the overall impact of economic support provided to Ukraine is generally limited. In contrast, sanctions imposed by countries have minimal effects on the sanctioning country itself but can have significant consequences for the targeted nation. This is particularly evident when financial sanctions are implemented. However, it is important to note that such sanctions also exert effects on the opposing party in the war—in this case, Ukraine. Furthermore, if the sanctions originate from G7 or developed countries, the effects on Russia tend to be more pronounced.
Are high-income and innovative nations resilient to the Russia-Ukraine war?
Kumari, V., Hassan, M., & Pandey, D. K. (2024)
International Review of Economics & Finance
Are high-income and innovative nations resilient to the Russia-Ukraine war?Business & FinanceKumari, V., Hassan, M., & Pandey, D. K. (2024). Are high-income and innovative nations resilient to the Russia-Ukraine war? International Review of Economics & Finance, 93(Part A), 1268–1287. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2024.04.006Using an event study analysis on daily closing prices of 83 stock market indices from February 10, 2021 to March 14, 2022, we find that the Russia-Ukraine war negatively impacts stock returns, affecting the high-income nations the most. However, the impact varies from country to country, with some experiencing significant positive or negative abnormal returns during different event windows. Cross-sectional results indicate that the income group of nations, innovation index, net-oil exports, trade-to-GDP ratio, military expenditure, inflation, past returns, and volatility significantly impact the cumulative abnormal returns during different event windows. While countries with a higher innovation index, higher net oil exports, higher military expenditure and lower trade-to-GDP ratios experience positive returns, high-income countries experience significant negative returns. Concomitantly, higher past returns and volatility predict abnormal returns during the war.
Commodity market during post-Russia–Ukraine conflict: evidence from a dynamic frequency connectedness approach.
Ma, X., Wang, S., Xu, R., & Ye, S. (2025).
Applied Economics Letters
Commodity market during post-Russia–Ukraine conflict: evidence from a dynamic frequency connectedness approach.Business & FinanceMa, X., Wang, S., Xu, R., & Ye, S. (2025). Commodity market during post-Russia–Ukraine conflict: evidence from a dynamic frequency connectedness approach. Applied Economics Letters, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2025.2499650We explore how the Russia–Ukraine war has affected the global commodity markets by constructing static and dynamic time-frequency volatility connectedness networks. Statically, we find strong clustering effects in commodity markets. Compared with the dominant role of metals in the short-term connectedness, energy is stronger in explaining the medium- and long-term connectedness. Dynamically, total connectedness exhibits a sharp change post the war, mainly as a result of the medium- and long-term components. Further structural change tests reveal that the war has a significant impact on the dynamic total directional connectedness of energy, metal, and wheat, and its effects are both strong and far-reaching.
Financing Ukraine's victory.
Nell, J., Bilan, O., Becker, T., Gorodnichenko, Y., Mylovanov, T., & Shapoval, N. (2022).
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Financing Ukraine's victory.Business & FinanceNell, J., Bilan, O., Becker, T., Gorodnichenko, Y., Mylovanov, T., & Shapoval, N. (2022). Financing Ukraine's victory. Centre for Economic Policy Research, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/173803-policy_insight_118_financing_ukraine_s_victory.pdf?utm_campaign=Brussels%20Peil&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20newsletter
Global trade and finance turmoil: the Ukraine–Russia war’s impact.
Nemat, M., Rahat, B., Rossi, M., & Salloum, C. (2025).
Journal of Risk Finance (Emerald Group Publishing Limited)
Global trade and finance turmoil: the Ukraine–Russia war’s impact.Business & Finance, Sanctions & TradeNemat, M., Rahat, B., Rossi, M., & Salloum, C. (2025). Global trade and finance turmoil: the Ukraine–Russia war’s impact. Journal of Risk Finance (Emerald Group Publishing Limited), 26(3), 516–529. https://doi.org/10.1108/JRF-02-2025-0091Purpose: This study examines the economic and financial impacts of the Ukraine–Russia conflict on global trade, focusing on supply chain disruptions, financial market volatility and shifts in trade policies. The research evaluates how geopolitical instability reshapes trade networks, financial stability and risk management strategies. Design/methodology/approach: A qualitative approach is employed, analyzing secondary data from international trade and financial institutions. Thematic coding identifies key trends in trade disruptions, financial volatility, policy adaptations and resilience strategies. The study integrates the Gravity Model of Trade to contextualize systemic shifts in trade patterns and financial stability. Findings: The conflict has significantly disrupted global trade, particularly in energy and agricultural sectors, leading to increased commodity prices and logistical challenges. Financial markets experienced heightened volatility, with sharp currency fluctuations and increased risk premiums. Governments responded with policy adaptations such as regionalization and trade diversification, while businesses implemented resilience strategies, including supply chain diversification and technological innovation. Research limitations/implications: The study relies on secondary data, which may limit broader applicability. Future research should incorporate quantitative modeling to measure long-term trade and financial impacts. Practical implications: Findings inform policymakers on mitigating geopolitical trade risks and guide businesses in adopting proactive resilience strategies. Social implications: Strengthening global supply chains and financial stability mechanisms can enhance economic security and reduce socio-economic consequences of geopolitical conflicts. Originality/value: This study extends the Gravity Model of Trade by incorporating geopolitical disruptions and financial market responses. It provides empirical insights into the interplay between trade policies, financial stability and business adaptation strategies, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding global economic resilience in times of conflict.\
How business pivots during war: Lessons from Ukrainian companies’ responses to crisis.
Obłój, K., & Voronovska, R. (2024).
Business Horizons
How business pivots during war: Lessons from Ukrainian companies’ responses to crisis.Business & FinanceObłój, K., & Voronovska, R. (2024). How business pivots during war: Lessons from Ukrainian companies’ responses to crisis. Business Horizons, 67(1), 93–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2023.09.001This article explores how large companies in Ukraine have been responding to the crisis caused by the war. We find that the core theories of managerial reaction to crisis—the threat-rigidity and contingency theories—aptly describe companies’ responses to the war, with the first theory explaining companies’ initial reactions, and the latter theory explaining the subsequent behaviors of companies as the war continued. The most surprising findings here were the value of the pandemic as an experience in dealing with war, and the way in which, when war becomes the new normal, managers seek to take advantage of opportunities to build resilience and redundancy. The shift in perception and attitude this entails exemplifies the adaptability companies display in the face of such difficult situations as a full-fledged war. Our research yields four suggestions for managerial responses to crises: (1) view every crisis as a learning opportunity in preparation for future crises, (2) use business continuity plans as a means of reducing initial threat-rigidity reactions, (3) prioritize crucial over nonrelevant corrective actions, and (4) recognize that crisis-generated discontinuities may last longer than expected, thereby requiring long-term plans that respond both to emerging threats and to novel opportunities.
Shock contagion, asset quality and lending behaviour: The case of war in Eastern Ukraine.
Pham, T., Talavera, O., & Tsapin, A. (2021).
Kyklos
Shock contagion, asset quality and lending behaviour: The case of war in Eastern Ukraine.Business & FinancePham, T., Talavera, O., & Tsapin, A. (2021). Shock contagion, asset quality and lending behaviour: The case of war in Eastern Ukraine. Kyklos, 74(2), 243–269. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12261Focusing on the current geopolitical conflict in Eastern Ukraine, this paper examines the economic impact of military intervention on the banking sector and the contagion which is triggered by this type of negative shock. Our study reveals that banks which issued more loans within conflict areas during the pre‐conflict period were subsequently left with a higher level of non‐performing loans in the non‐conflict markets following the onset of the dispute. This impact can be seen most clearly in the regional markets which are closer geographically to the conflict zone. There is also evidence of the “flight to headquarters” effect in local lending. While banks tend to reduce their credit supply, it is within the regional markets located farther from head offices where the most significant reduction in lending can be observed. Further examination shows that the degree of lending reduction is lesser for politically connected banks and for larger banks. Finally, the negative economic effects of the conflict are long‐lasting but less profound once the ceasefire agreements are reached.
The Ukraine/Russia conflict: Geopolitical and international business strategies.
Ratten, V. (2022).
Thunderbird International Business Review
The Ukraine/Russia conflict: Geopolitical and international business strategies.Business & FinanceRatten, V. (2022). The Ukraine/Russia conflict: Geopolitical and international business strategies. Thunderbird International Business Review, 65, 265–271. https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.22319The Ukraine and Russian conflict is one of the most pressing current global business issues. It has become a political and social issue that is influencing business practices around the world. While the topic is popular in the mainstream business press, there has been relatively little academic work on the topic. To address this gap, this article discusses the impact of the conflict on international business in terms of the perception by society about Ukrainian or Russian business activities. This means highlighting how a conflict can involve direct military intervention but also social interaction. This article reveals that there are many effects on global business stemming from the Ukraine–Russian conflict many of which are currently known, but others will be known in the future. Managerial implications are stated in the article that highlights the cultural and social impact of the crisis as well as future research suggestions for international business researchers that stress the importance of the conflict
Effects of Russia-Ukraine war.
Shah, P., & Gedamkar, P. (2022).
International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management
Effects of Russia-Ukraine war.Macroeconomics, Business & FinanceShah, P., & Gedamkar, P. (2022). Effects of Russia-Ukraine war. International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management, 6(3), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.55041/IJSREM11973 The Ukraine crisis can be understood as one of the most controversial events in the today’s global political debate. The ongoing conflict has come to affect and influence Europe’s as well as the rest of the world’s foreignand security policies. From a historical perspective Ukraine has been torn between East and West ever since the country became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. The International Monetary Fund warned Russia’s war with Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions imposed upon President Vladimir Putin’s country will have a “severe impact” on the global economy. Having built up a large military presence on the border from late 2021, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which is ongoing. Price shocks will have an impact worldwide, especially on poor households for whom food and fuel are a higher proportion of expenses. Russia’s ultrarich who rank among the world’s 500 wealthiest people have now lost a combined $83 billion this year. The war resulted economic loss which has a huge impact on the global economy
Damaged collateral and firm-level finance: Evidence from Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Shpak, S., Earle, J. S., Gehlbach, S., & Panga, M. (2023).
Journal of Comparative Economics
Damaged collateral and firm-level finance: Evidence from Russia’s war in Ukraine.Business & FinanceShpak, S., Earle, J. S., Gehlbach, S., & Panga, M. (2023). Damaged collateral and firm-level finance: Evidence from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Journal of Comparative Economics, 51(4), 1334–1343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.06.010How much has Russia’s war in Ukraine damaged the collateral of Ukrainian firms, and how much damage has that caused the Ukrainian financial system? We address this question using unusually rich high-frequency supervisory data of Ukrainian banks combined with a survey of banks on the location and condition of corporate borrowers’ collateral between February and November 2022. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in collateral value resulting from damage to collateral, we find that a 10-percent reduction in the collateral-loan ratio lowers the probability of getting any new loan by nearly eight percentage points; new lending falls by over two percentage points. Our results additionally imply that the same reduction in collateral value raises default rates and banks’ assessment of firms’ probability of default by approximately eight and four percentage points, respectively. The results imply that, in the absence of sufficient aid to repair the damage, Ukraine may experience reduced investment and lower economic growth in the future.
Impact pathways: unhooking supply chains from conflict zones—reconfiguration and fragmentation lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war.
Srai, J. S., Graham, G., Van Hoek, R., Joglekar, N., & Lorentz, H. (2023).
International Journal of Operations & Production Management
Impact pathways: unhooking supply chains from conflict zones—reconfiguration and fragmentation lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war.Sanctions & Trade, Business & FinanceSrai, J. S., Graham, G., Van Hoek, R., Joglekar, N., & Lorentz, H. (2023). Impact pathways: unhooking supply chains from conflict zones—reconfiguration and fragmentation lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 43(13), 289–301. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-08-2022-0529Purpose:The new geopolitical context being created by the Ukraine–Russia war highlights the need for structured approaches to planning and implementing unhooking strategies and developing associated supply chain reconfigurations.Design/methodology/approach:The authors have interviewed six supply chain executives to begin the investigation of the key supply chain risks and disruptions caused by the Ukraine–Russia war.Findings:Initial corporate responses to the Ukraine–Russia conflict were significant, perhaps unprecedented. However, as institutional, corporate and consumer sentiment influence reconfiguration responses, the authors have identified three supply chain pathways that underpin unhooking actions.Research limitations/implications:The authors selected respondents from each different type of supply chain interaction with the conflict zone (inbound, outbound and within), covering both components/intermediate products and finished goods. Therefore the sample size was small and designed to fit in with the spirit of the pathway initiative.Practical implications:The authors reinforce the key role of procurement and supply chain management in not just supply but also in downstream markets that can accelerate decoupling and mitigate the associated supply chain disruptions.Social implications:The authors observe that supply chains are increasingly being weaponized, as external institutional and consumer influences necessitate companies to unhook from conflict zones, countries, or regimes. They are becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign policy.Originality/value:The novelty of the contribution to the associated discourse is the perspective that after decades of increasing globalization and geographic dispersion of supply chains, the unhooking effort is not limited to a firm and its internal operations but involves multiple stakeholders. For instance, the full extent of the complex linkages of supply chains, networks and relationships that touch conflict zone geographies must be considered, particularly those that are incompatible with the firm's values and aims, including those of their stakeholders.
Financial sanctions and global stock market reaction: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Tee, C.-M., Wong, W.-Y., & Hooy, C.-W. (2023).
Finance Research Letters
Financial sanctions and global stock market reaction: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Business & Finance, Sanctions & TradeTee, C.-M., Wong, W.-Y., & Hooy, C.-W. (2023). Financial sanctions and global stock market reaction: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Finance Research Letters, 58(B), 104398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104398Drawing from recent studies on the effect of Russia-Ukraine war on stock markets, this study examines global stock markets’ reactions to sanctions at the beginning of the war. Using the event study methodology, this study finds that investors place higher valuation for firms located in countries that sanction Russia, in comparison with stock markets located in countries which did not sanction Russia. In addition, the higher valuation is stronger, if firms are politically connected or located in countries with lower geopolitical risks.
Repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war.
Tong, E. (2024).
International Review of Economics & Finance
Repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war.Macroeconomics, Business & FinanceTong, E. (2024). Repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war. International Review of Economics & Finance, 89(Part A), 366–390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.064Using the heteroscedasticity-based estimator of Rigobon and Sack (2005) to identify daily shocks of the Russia–Ukraine war, I assess and quantify the dynamic impact of the conflict on 86 open economies from January 2021 to November 2022. Within local projections, I show that war shocks caused considerable effects on macroeconomic conditions, financial markets, and global financial stability. Following a shock, weekly GDP fell significantly while inflation expectations and commodity prices soared, verifying the war’s nature as a contractionary supply shock. While global stock prices fell, the long-term government bond yields remained stable, implying the crisis had not triggered a flight of capital to the US, and governments remained able to borrow at the pre-war costs of funding. More concerning, a range of indicators – implied volatility, credit default swap spread, cross-currency basis – suggest a significant and sustained increase in systemic financial stress. Through a state-dependent model, I show that energy importers and nations that share borders or have close trade and military ties with the belligerents were more affected by war shocks. Taken together, these findings may inform policy responses and assist households and firms in preparing for possible contingencies arising from the war.
Corporate decisions in times of war: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Tosun, O. K., & Eshraghi, A. (2022).
Finance Research Letters
Corporate decisions in times of war: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Business & FinanceTosun, O. K., & Eshraghi, A. (2022). Corporate decisions in times of war: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Finance Research Letters, 48, 102920. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.102920Despite sanctions and public demand for companies to exit the Russian market due to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, several firms chose to keep their businesses operating in Russia. We investigate the financial market reaction to announcements of companies remaining in Russia during the eventful two weeks following the invasion. Our findings show that a portfolio of remainers underperforms the leavers and the market benchmark. Investors impose a significant market penalty on the remainers. There is evidence of higher trading volume and selling pressure on remainers, suggesting equity markets are acutely sensitive to corporate decisions in times of political conflict.

Sanctions & Trade

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
Possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, scenarios for sanctions, and likely economic impact on Russia, Ukraine, and the EU
Astrov, V., Grieveson, R., Kochnev, A., Landesmann, M., & Pindyuk, O. (2022)
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw)
Possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, scenarios for sanctions, and likely economic impact on Russia, Ukraine, and the EU.Sanctions & TradeAstrov, V., Grieveson, R., Kochnev, A., Landesmann, M., & Pindyuk, O. (2022). Possible Russian invasion of Ukraine, scenarios for sanctions, and likely economic impact on Russia, Ukraine, and the EU. wiiw Policy Note/Policy Report No. 55. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). https://wiiw.ac.at/possible-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-scenarios-for-sanctions-and-likely-economic-impact-on-russia-ukraine-and-the-eu-p-6044.htmlIt remains unclear whether or not Russia will actually invade Ukraine, and if it does so, what form this invasion will take. In this note, we outline two broad scenarios: targeted strikes by Russia in Ukraine accompanied by further non-military destabilisation efforts, or a full invasion, and we analyse the implications of both. In the first scenario, we would expect a more limited sanctions response, particularly from the EU, while a full invasion would entail major sanctions from the West as a whole. Applying a stylized VARX model on Russian quarterly time series, we find no statistically significant impact of sanctions on either Russian GDP or the FX rate. However, we find that Russia is extremely vulnerable to a reduction in the price or volume of its energy exports. This truly nuclear sanctions option—that of restricting energy trade between Russia and the EU —is unlikely given the sizeable negative impact it would have on both sides. Aside from energy, the most painful sanctions would include cutting Russian banks off from the SWIFT system and dollar markets, and bans on exports of high-tech goods to Russia. While Russia has become increasingly insulated from the dollar-based global system, and has built up substantial buffers which it can deploy in the case of sanctions, under the adverse scenario the state would have to make large-scale interventions to maintain economic and financial stability. Under both scenarios, the Ukrainian economy would suffer, and would require major Western support to maintain macro-financial stability. Over the medium run, the current crisis will further isolate Russia economically, leading to a continuation of its very mediocre growth performance since 2014. It will also likely accelerate EU moves towards energy diversification away from Russia. However, the economic impact of this on Russia will be likely mitigated by even closer energy ties between Russia and China
Time for a complete ban on economic ties with Russia (Policy Brief).
Becker, T. & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2024).
Economic Studies at Brookings
Time for a complete ban on economic ties with Russia (Policy Brief).Sanctions & TradeBecker, T. & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2024). Time for a complete ban on economic ties with Russia (Policy Brief). Economic Studies at Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/20240701_BeckerGorodnichenko_Sanctions.pdf
Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union.
Blanchard, O., & Pisani-Ferry, J. (2022).
Bruegel
Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeBlanchard, O., & Pisani-Ferry, J. (2022). Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union. Policy Contribution 06/2022. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/fiscal-support-and-monetary-vigilance-economic-policy-implications-russia-ukraine-warFor Europe, the war in Ukraine is a first-order economic shock. While the direct fiscal implications of taking care of refugees, increasing military spending and strengthening energy autonomy remain limited, the impact of elevated energy and food prices on national income and its distribution is potentially significant. This raises three macroeconomic challenges for policymakers: • How best to use sanctions to deter Russia while limiting adverse effects on the European Union economy: in this respect, it is important to distinguish between oil and gas. For oil, Russia can diversify away from the EU market and, despite sanctions, sell on the world market where it operates as a price taker. For gas, the European Union has substantial leverage because Russia depends on the pipeline infrastructure linking it to the European market. However, gas supply from other sources is relatively inelastic. • How to deal with cuts to real income because of the increase in the energy import bill: if governments want to protect buyers, they must decide on mechanisms and how to finance the extra spending. Fiscal support and thus some additional deficit finance may be needed, though debt should remain sustainable. • How to deal with the increase in inflation as a result of higher energy and food prices: there is a need to avoid a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, which is even more challenging than usual given that inflation had already substantially increased before the war. Preventing this risk would call for a tightening of monetary policy. However, the loss of real income is likely to lead to weaker aggregate demand, implying a need to loosen policy. Policymakers must cope with these conflicting objectives, ensuring that policy instruments complement each other. A combination of well- designed fiscal support to households and tripartite wage discussions may help soften the trade-off the central bank faces. However, the outcomes of the war in Ukraine are unpredictable, and policy must be able to respond quickly to changing circumstances.
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.
Boashash, A. (2023).
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & Trade, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityBoashash, A. (2023). The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management, Business, and Economy, 6(1), 64–79. https://journals.ekb.eg/article_361369_81698de878eb16e49f040831731e2bf1.pdfThe conflict between Russia and Ukraine has had extensive repercussions on the world economy, impacting energy markets, supply chains, financial stability, and food security. Sanctions on Russian energy exports have led to a spike in energy prices, while disruptions in the supply of agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia have worsened global food shortages. Financial markets have experienced heightened volatility and uncertainty, influencing investment and economic expansion. Furthermore, the war has prompted shifts in global trade patterns and alliances, necessitating collaborative international measures to stabilize markets, guarantee food security, and advocate for sustainable economic strategies.
Impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy.
Bodan, K. (2023).
Journal of International Relations
Impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy.Sanctions & Trade, Energy & EnvironmentBodan, K. (2023). Impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy. Journal of International Relations, 3(1), 29–39. https://doi.org/10.47604/jir.1867Purpose: The study sought to investigate the impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy. Methodology: The study adopted a desktop methodology. Desk research refers to secondary data or that which can be collected without fieldwork. Desk research is basically involved in collecting data from existing resources hence it is often considered a low cost technique as compared to field research, as the main cost is involved in executive’s time, telephone charges and directories. Thus, the study relied on already published studies, reports and statistics. This secondary data was easily accessed through the online journals and library. Findings: The study concluded that wars and military conflicts drastically reduce the trade among adversaries via embargos or consumers' patriotism, however, after the cessation of immediate military threats and no tension predicted in the future, the trade will slowly recover. Moreover the current Russia Ukraine war is set to dramatically alter the trade of energy, oil, raw supplies and, components and raise the hesitancy of Western consumers. The increased imposition of sanctions has impacted the supply significantly. The opportunity cost of military investment, the humanitarian loss of the financial system, and the burden of repairing post-war damage are vast Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study was informed by relative n theory, future studies could benefit from this theory especially in other research context. The study recommended that, Ukraine needs an integrated approach in order to solve all economic and social problems in the country. Only integrated approach will allow to use available Ukrainian resources and advanced European experience to provide economic and social stability of the country.
The Russia–Ukraine war and global trade reallocations.
Borin, A., Conteduca, D., Mancini, M., & Vergara Caffarelli, F. (2023).
Economics Letters
The Russia–Ukraine war and global trade reallocations.Sanctions & TradeBorin, A., Conteduca, D., Mancini, M., & Vergara Caffarelli, F. (2023). The Russia–Ukraine war and global trade reallocations. Economics Letters, 224, 111265. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111265This paper uses a product-level empirical model of bilateral trade to examine the global trade implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results show that imports from Ukraine were 47.3% below the counterfactual between February and August 2022. The Russia–Ukraine war led to significant trade diversion for Russia, primarily benefiting Russian mineral oil and gas exports to Europe and Asia. The analysis also reveals that the trade adjustments operate mainly through import price hikes, with notable heterogeneity across product groups and regions. The findings indicate that the Ukraine–Russia war had significant trade implications for Ukraine and Russia but only limited ones for other countries.
Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian–Ukrainian war.
Chen, Y., Jiang, J., Wang, L., Wang, R. (2023).
Energy Reports
Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian–Ukrainian war.Sanctions & Trade, Energy & EnvironmentChen, Y., Jiang, J., Wang, L., Wang, R. (2023). Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian–Ukrainian war. Energy Reports, 9, 3082–3095. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2023.01.124Since the geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Western countries led by the United States and the European Union have launched several energy sanctions against Russia. How will sanctions and countersanctions on energy trade affect the EU-Russia and the world’s energy trade pattern? This paper sets six energy trade scenarios based on the degree of energy sanctions and counter-sanction measures imposed by the EU and Russia. We use the global multi-region comparative static CGE model to simulate the changes in macroeconomic indicators in major countries worldwide. The diversion effect of energy trade and the impact on the national economy caused by geographical risks quantitatively analyzes. The results show: (1) Energy sanctions will cause economic damage to both sides, in the worst-case scenario, the EU economic loss reaches 1.488%, the Russian loss reaches 4.8%, and worldwide inflation will rise; (2) Russia’s counter-sanctions will have a direct economic impact on the EU, but will not improve its economic situation; (3) Energy sanctions will bring about a direct energy trade transfer effect, the EU’s energy imports will be diverted to non-Russian markets, and Russian energy exports will also shift to Asian markets, and energy trade between the two economies will be significantly reduced; (4) Energy supply will have a profound impact on the world’s economy and society, leading to social instability and a decline in total output of 2.895%. Energy games will have a negative impact on the world’s carbon emission reduction and energy consumption structure transformation. Through quantitative analysis of the impact of energy sanctions on the world economy and society, the energy game caused by the geopolitical crisis will harm both parties involved in the game and the world economy. The world pattern will return from the development pattern of cooperative division of labor to a situation of conflict and confrontation, which is not conducive to the transformation of energy trade and consumption structure under market rules.
How trade composition affects sensitivity to foreign shocks: Applying a global VAR model to Ukraine.
Faryna, O., & Simola, H. (2019).
Visnyk of the National Bank of Ukraine
How trade composition affects sensitivity to foreign shocks: Applying a global VAR model to Ukraine.Sanctions & TradeFaryna, O., & Simola, H. (2019). How trade composition affects sensitivity to foreign shocks: Applying a global VAR model to Ukraine. Visnyk of the National Bank of Ukraine, 247(1), 4–18. https://journal.bank.gov.ua/download/article/2019/247/01/enThis paper studies the transmission of foreign output shocks to real activity in Ukraine through international trade. We employ a global vector auto regressive (GVAR) model that captures about 80% of the world economy and incorporates time-varying trade and financial weights. According to our estimates, a mild recession in the US of a 1% drop in output generates a substantial recession in Ukraine of about 2.2%. A similar drop of output in the euro area and Russia translates to a drop in output of about 1.7% in Ukraine. Finally, the same drop of output in CEE, China, or the CIS leads to an output decline of about 0.4% in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s response to euro area output shock has been steadily increasing over the last couple of decades due to changes in global trade flows. Ukraine’s sensitivity to shocks in the US and euro area is notably strengthened by indirect trade effects, while the response to shocks from emerging economies, i.e., China, CEE, the CIS, and partially Russia, is mainly determined by bilateral trade linkages.
Economic consequences and implications of the Ukraine-Russia war.
Khudaykulova, M., Yuanqiong, H., & Khudaykulov, A. (2022).
International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration
Economic consequences and implications of the Ukraine-Russia war.Sanctions & Trade, MacroeconomicsKhudaykulova, M., Yuanqiong, H., & Khudaykulov, A. (2022). Economic consequences and implications of the Ukraine-Russia war. International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration, 8(4), 44–52. https://doi.org/10.18775/ijmsba.1849-5664-5419.2014.84.1005Since the end of the Cold War, the sanctions against Russia have been the harshest and most costly imposed on a major economy. They appear to be unprecedented in terms of speed, breadth, and global coordination. The latest situation heightens the sense of danger that comes with cross-border financial and operational vulnerability. Even if future oil and gas embargoes are imposed, the economy of Russia will rest on its current export strategy, which may be tough to weaken. The important factors to take into account at the onset of the war are the opportunity cost of military investment, the humanitarian loss of the financial system, and the burden of repairing post-war damage. In this paper we review the economic impact of war, and discuss the potential implications of the Russia Ukraine war on the local economies and global economy. There are human costs of war along with the adverse economic implications related to devastation, inflation, limitation of services debt increase, and daily economic life.
The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil prices
Kilian, L., Rapson, D., & Schipper, B. (2025)
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil prices.Energy & Environment, Sanctions & TradeKilian, L., Rapson, D., & Schipper, B. (2025). The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil prices (Working Paper No. 2401). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, https://doi.org/10.24149/wp2401r1This paper documents the effect of the oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil exports in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. We show that the embargo forced Russia to accept a $32/bbl discount on its Urals crude in March 2023 relative to January 2022, nearly half of which is directly attributable to the higher cost of shipping crude oil over longer distances, as Russia diverted much of its crude oil exports to India. Based on a calibrated model of global oil supply and demand, the remainder ($17/bbl) can be explained by increased Indian bargaining power. We also provide a similar analysis for the ESPO price discount on exports to China. In contrast, the price cap deprived Russia of the financial resources it spent on assembling a “shadow” fleet of tankers, but its effect on the Russian oil export price was negligible once the adoption of the price cap had facilitated the use of Western services to transport Russian oil to Asia.
The impact of Russian sanctions on the return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU.
Klomp, J. (2020).
Research in International Business and Finance
The impact of Russian sanctions on the return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU.Sanctions & Trade, Agriculture & Food SecurityKlomp, J. (2020). The impact of Russian sanctions on the return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU. Research in International Business and Finance, 51, 101073. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101073During the last conflict between Russia and the Ukraine in 2014, the EU imposed various multilateral sanctions on Russia. As a response, Russia retaliated these measures by banning the agricultural imports from the EU. This study explores whether the retaliation sanctions taken by Russia were already expected by investors or came as a complete surprise. For this purpose, I compare the impact of sanction-related news before and after the official announcement of these sanctions by president Putin in August 2014 on the weekly return of a number of agricultural commodity futures traded at two European commodity exchanges. A newly created indicator on sanction-related news is used that is based on the number of articles that have been published in the major European newspapers containing information about the import ban. The main findings clearly point out that before the imposition of the boycott it was already partly anticipated. The publication of sanction-related news caused a significant drop in the futures return of a number of banned agricultural commodities in the weeks prior to the formal announcement.
Russian-Ukraine 2022 war: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe.
Mbah, R. E., & Wasum, D. F. (2022).
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal
Russian-Ukraine 2022 war: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeMbah, R. E., & Wasum, D. F. (2022). Russian-Ukraine 2022 war: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(3), 144–153. https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.93.12005The popular belief worldwide is that the global financial sanctions unleashed on Russia, the seizure of assets and properties of the oligarch friends to President Putin for Russia’s current attack on Ukraine will cripple the Russian economy and hinder any further attack on Ukraine. This is logical reasoning, however, the impact of this crisis extends to the global economy. Thus, the purpose of this study is to review the economic impact of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war on key global economic actors, specifically, countries that have unleashed financial sanctions on Russia as punishment like the USA, Canada, UK, and EU. This study uses the Social Contract and the Interest Group Theories to explain the rationale behind this crisis from its origin. Evidence from reviewed literature shows that although the consequences of this crisis have had a fatal impact on Russia’s economy, the world economy has begun to feel the impact of this crisis. Inflation which is already ravaging most global economies is steadily rising due to the sharp increase in oil, natural gas, and food prices just a few days into this crisis. Experts expect a negative impact on household consumption, increase uncertainty, unpredictable stock swings, supply chain disruptions, bulging utility bills, decreased investment due to political risks, and economic growth impediments. It is therefore vital for policymakers worldwide to seek alternative means of survival if Russia decides to react by restricting its export of vital global commodities of which it is a significant export leader like oil, natural gas, wheat, neon, titanium, palladium, and ammonium nitrate.
The importance of deep integration in preferential trade agreements: The case of a successfully implemented Ukraine–Turkey free trade agreement.
Movchan, V., Rutherford, T. F., Tarr, D. G., & Yonezawa, H. (2023).
Review of World Economics
The importance of deep integration in preferential trade agreements: The case of a successfully implemented Ukraine–Turkey free trade agreement.Sanctions & TradeMovchan, V., Rutherford, T. F., Tarr, D. G., & Yonezawa, H. (2023). The importance of deep integration in preferential trade agreements: The case of a successfully implemented Ukraine–Turkey free trade agreement. Review of World Economics, 159(1), 1–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-022-00462-5We construct a 45-sector model of Ukraine with Turkey and seven other regions to estimate the impacts on Ukraine of effectively implementing the deep Free Trade Agreement (FTA) it concluded with Turkey on February 3, 2022. Econometric evidence shows that the impacts of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are much greater than can be explained by tariffs alone. Consequently, we include deep integration in our model, which includes reduction of: (i) Barriers against suppliers of business services including by FDI; (ii) Non-tariff barriers in goods; and (iii) Time-in-trade costs. We innovatively estimate the ad valorem equivalents of the three types of deep integration instruments; and we construct an updated and disaggregated input–output table of Ukraine. Our central model contains foreign direct investment (FDI) in business services with endogenous productivity effects from additional varieties of goods or services in imperfectly competitive sectors. We estimate that a successfully implemented FTA will increase welfare in Ukraine by 2.72 percent, with the deep integration aspects responsible for about 56 percent of the gains; but preferential tariff reduction alone by Ukraine contributes almost nothing. The deep integration and imperfect competition features produce estimated gains 3.5 times larger than a model of perfect competition limited to tariff elimination. Permanent exclusion or very limited access in sensitive sectors, however, reduce the estimated welfare gains to 1.51 percent. Reduction of non-discriminatory barriers against both FDI and Ukrainian investment in business services would add an additional 2.0 percent of real household income to the estimated gains.
The Effect of Ukraine-Russia War on the Economies of Ukraine’s Top Trading Partners.
Nagapudi, A. (2024).
International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research
The Effect of Ukraine-Russia War on the Economies of Ukraine’s Top Trading Partners.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeNagapudi, A. (2024). The Effect of Ukraine-Russia War on the Economies of Ukraine’s Top Trading Partners. International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.46609/ijsser.2024.v09i09.014 This research paper studies the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war on the economies of Ukraine’s top trading partners. Several earlier studies have examined the implications of the war for global trade and development, and how countries highly dependent on exports from the conflict region have responded. In our paper, we focused only on Ukraine, analyzed both import and export partners of Ukraine, and developed a framework to assess the impact of the war on various macroeconomic indicators for these partner countries. In particular, we established Difference-in-Difference based statistical models for Gross Domestic Product (GDP), food inflation, manufacturing production, gasoline prices and changes in inventories the for partner and non-partner countries over the pre-war and post-war years from 2021 through 2023. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the devastating and far-reaching economic effects of the Ukraine-Russia war that serve as a cautionary tale for world citizens and leaders alike.
Does abolishing tariffs in bilateral trade matter for a country’s economic growth? The impact of the EU–Ukraine DCFTA.
Nekhay, O., Delgado, M. C., & Cardenete, M. A. (2020).
Europe-Asia Studies
Does abolishing tariffs in bilateral trade matter for a country’s economic growth? The impact of the EU–Ukraine DCFTA.Sanctions & TradeNekhay, O., Delgado, M. C., & Cardenete, M. A. (2020). Does abolishing tariffs in bilateral trade matter for a country’s economic growth? The impact of the EU–Ukraine DCFTA. Europe-Asia Studies, 73(7), 1257–1278. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1807468In the present study, a GTAP CGE model is used to assess three proposed scenarios for the DCFTA between the EU and Ukraine, one for unilateral trade liberalisation, another for bilateral trade liberalisation with exemptions from free trade and a third for bilateral trade liberalisation without exemptions from free trade. The main point of distinction of this study is the inclusion of exemptions from free trade in the first two simulated scenarios and the possibility of a quantitative evaluation of exemptions from free trade through the differences between scenarios 3 and 2.
Global trade and finance turmoil: the Ukraine–Russia war’s impact.
Nemat, M., Rahat, B., Rossi, M., & Salloum, C. (2025).
Journal of Risk Finance (Emerald Group Publishing Limited)
Global trade and finance turmoil: the Ukraine–Russia war’s impact.Business & Finance, Sanctions & TradeNemat, M., Rahat, B., Rossi, M., & Salloum, C. (2025). Global trade and finance turmoil: the Ukraine–Russia war’s impact. Journal of Risk Finance (Emerald Group Publishing Limited), 26(3), 516–529. https://doi.org/10.1108/JRF-02-2025-0091Purpose: This study examines the economic and financial impacts of the Ukraine–Russia conflict on global trade, focusing on supply chain disruptions, financial market volatility and shifts in trade policies. The research evaluates how geopolitical instability reshapes trade networks, financial stability and risk management strategies. Design/methodology/approach: A qualitative approach is employed, analyzing secondary data from international trade and financial institutions. Thematic coding identifies key trends in trade disruptions, financial volatility, policy adaptations and resilience strategies. The study integrates the Gravity Model of Trade to contextualize systemic shifts in trade patterns and financial stability. Findings: The conflict has significantly disrupted global trade, particularly in energy and agricultural sectors, leading to increased commodity prices and logistical challenges. Financial markets experienced heightened volatility, with sharp currency fluctuations and increased risk premiums. Governments responded with policy adaptations such as regionalization and trade diversification, while businesses implemented resilience strategies, including supply chain diversification and technological innovation. Research limitations/implications: The study relies on secondary data, which may limit broader applicability. Future research should incorporate quantitative modeling to measure long-term trade and financial impacts. Practical implications: Findings inform policymakers on mitigating geopolitical trade risks and guide businesses in adopting proactive resilience strategies. Social implications: Strengthening global supply chains and financial stability mechanisms can enhance economic security and reduce socio-economic consequences of geopolitical conflicts. Originality/value: This study extends the Gravity Model of Trade by incorporating geopolitical disruptions and financial market responses. It provides empirical insights into the interplay between trade policies, financial stability and business adaptation strategies, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding global economic resilience in times of conflict.\
Public sentiment towards economic sanctions in the Russia–Ukraine war.
Ngo, V. M., Huynh, T. L. D., Nguyen, P. V., & Nguyen, H. H. (2022).
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Public sentiment towards economic sanctions in the Russia–Ukraine war.Sanctions & Trade, Political EconomyNgo, V. M., Huynh, T. L. D., Nguyen, P. V., & Nguyen, H. H. (2022). Public sentiment towards economic sanctions in the Russia–Ukraine war. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 69(5), 564–573. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12331This paper introduces novel data on public sentiment towards economic sanctions based on nearly 1 million social media posts in 108 countries during the Russia–Ukraine war by using machine learning. We show the geographical heterogeneity between government stances and public sentiment. Finally, we show how political regimes, trading relationships and political instability can predict how people perceive this war.
The effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on global trade.
Orhan, E. (2022).
Journal of International Trade
The effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on global trade.Sanctions & TradeOrhan, E. (2022). The effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on global trade. Journal of International Trade, Logistics and Law, 8(1), 141–146. https://www.jital.org/index.php/jital/article/view/277Orhan, E. (2022). The effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on global trade. Journal of International Trade, Logistics and Law, 8(1), 141–146. https://www.jital.org/index.php/jital/article/view/277The Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a catastrophic humanitarian crisis and threatened the stability of geopolitical relations. The war has added to mounting concerns about a sharp slowdown in global growth, a rise in inflation and debt and a surge in poverty. The economic impact of conflict has rippled through various global channels, including commodity and financial markets, trade and migration links and confidence. The aim of this research is to reveal the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on the global economy. While examining the economic impacts of the war in the research, the reports of organizations such as OECD, World Trade Organization, World Bank, UN, IMF, UNCTAD were used. According to the reports, it is possible to say that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will affect the global economy via three main channels: financial sanctions, increase of commodity prices and supply chain disruptions.
Global economic consequence of Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Ozili, P. K. (2024).
In Dealing with regional conflicts of global importance
Global economic consequence of Russian invasion of Ukraine.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeOzili, P. K. (2024). Global economic consequence of Russian invasion of Ukraine. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064770This paper explores the global economic consequence of the Russian-Ukraine war in the month of invasion. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. As a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, multiple international sanctions were imposed on Russia to compel Russia to de-escalate the crisis. The sanctions imposed on Russia, although intended to hurt Russia, had spillover effects to the global economy mainly through global supply chain disruption. Using global data and data from the Euro Area, Ukraine and Russia, the findings show that there was an increase in the global PMI and an increase in the world price of food and food ingredients. The index of global stock markets plunged on the day of invasion. The Euro Area manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) declined in the month of the invasion. Also, the transportation component of the consumer price index rose in the month of the invasion due to shortage of energy and fuel supplies which led to a rise in the price of gasoline for transportation in the Euro Area. Ukraine experienced a more devastating effect from the invasion than Russia and the entire Euro Area. Core consumer prices in Ukraine and the Euro Area were highly correlated during the invasion. Food inflation was highly correlated in the Euro Area and in Russia. Also, there is a positive and high correlation between world food price index, world oils price index, world diary price index and world cereals price index during the month of the invasion. The conflict led to a global rise in prices leading to a rise in global inflation. Although conflict resolution between Russia and Ukraine was brokered by Israel, the economic effect of the crisis still lingered on in many parts of Europe and beyond Europe.
Ukraine war-induced sanctions against Russia: Consequences on transition economies.
Sedrakyan, G. S. (2022).
Journal of Policy Modeling
Ukraine war-induced sanctions against Russia: Consequences on transition economies.Sanctions & TradeSedrakyan, G. S. (2022). Ukraine war-induced sanctions against Russia: Consequences on transition economies. Journal of Policy Modeling, 44(5), 863–885. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2022.08.003We analyze the spillovers of Western economic sanctions against Russia into twenty-seven transition economies of the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe. These spillovers are measured in terms of their impact on bilateral trade and direct investments for the period of 2014–2018. We construct a new dataset to quantify each episode of Western/US sanctions against Russia. The gravity models of bilateral trade and direct investment are used and the data analysis is conducted using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood econometric technique. We estimate that the Western and U.S. sanctions against Russia spilled over into third-party small countries. These sanctions resulted in the significant decline of exports from transition economies, Russian imports to transition economies, and Russian direct investments to transition economies. Interestingly, the direct investments to Russia from transition economies sharply increased during the same period. The quantitative estimates of the spillovers suggest the following cumulative changes. Due to an imposed sanction type (e.g., against an individual, entity or sector) each episode of Western/U.S. sanction resulted in the decline of aforementioned indicators in the range of 10.9–30.5-million-dollar/5.6–16.9-million-dollar of exports from transition economies, 6.3–17.7-million-dollar/3.3–9.8-million-dollar of Russian imports to transition economies, and 3.4–9.4-million-dollar/1.7–5.2-million-dollar of Russian direct investments to transition economies. The direct investments to Russia from transition economies increased by 10.9–30.6-million-dollar/5.7–17-million-dollar, respectively.
Planning for economic integration: addressing trade challenges posed by the Ukraine-Russia conflict in Europe.
Shah, Z., Zaman, K., & Khan, G. F. (2024).
Theoretical & Applied Economics
Planning for economic integration: Addressing trade challenges posed by the Ukraine-Russia conflict in Europe.Sanctions & TradeShah, Z., Zaman, K., & Khan, G. F. (2024). Planning for economic integration: Addressing trade challenges posed by the Ukraine-Russia conflict in Europe. Theoretical & Applied Economics, 31(3), 79–98. https://www.ectap.ro/planning-for-economic-integrationaddressing-trade-challenges-posedby-the-ukraine-russia-conflict-in-europe-zar-shah_khalid-zaman_gul-faraz-khan/a1767/
Assessing the impact of oil sanctions on Russia.
Spiro, D., Wachtmeister, H., & Gars, J. (2024).
SSRN
Assessing the impact of oil sanctions on Russia.Sanctions & Trade, Energy & EnvironmentSpiro, D., Wachtmeister, H., & Gars, J. (2024). Assessing the impact of oil sanctions on Russia. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4860148The West has imposed significant sanctions on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the most impactful being energy sanctions targeting Russia’s oil exports. This paper evaluates the effects of the two most important oil sanctions—the EU import embargo and the G7 price cap. Using data on prices, discounts, trade patterns and transport, the analysis simplifies and assesses the relationship between these sanctions as well as their individual and combined impacts. We conclude that the import embargo is likely the most consequential sanction, it reduces Russian crude oil income through the buyer’s discount. In addition, the import embargo yields significantly higher transportation costs for Russian Urals crude oil. We also conclude that the price cap does not primarily function as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo, and plays an important role in reinforcing the effect that the import embargo has on Russia’s transport costs. The analysis finds that Russian oil revenues are determined by three factors. First, the world oil price is determined by the global supply and demand for oil. Then, the buyer’s discount is deducted, which gives the price of Russian oil at the buyer’s port. Finally, transportation cost is deducted, which provides the selling price in Russian ports, i.e. Russia’s oil revenue. Importantly, while all these three factors are in theory determined as one equilibrium, we conclude that in practice they can be treated separately. To reduce Russian oil income, policies can thus aim to lower the global oil price, increase the buyers’ discount on Russian oil and increase its transportation cost. The paper provides several practical policy options to achieve these goals. Russia, on the other hand, has the opposite three aims and employs policies towards this end. Many of the Western policies we outline are therefore aimed at countering the Russian countermeasures.
Impact pathways: unhooking supply chains from conflict zones—reconfiguration and fragmentation lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war.
Srai, J. S., Graham, G., Van Hoek, R., Joglekar, N., & Lorentz, H. (2023).
International Journal of Operations & Production Management
Impact pathways: unhooking supply chains from conflict zones—reconfiguration and fragmentation lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war.Sanctions & Trade, Business & FinanceSrai, J. S., Graham, G., Van Hoek, R., Joglekar, N., & Lorentz, H. (2023). Impact pathways: unhooking supply chains from conflict zones—reconfiguration and fragmentation lessons from the Ukraine–Russia war. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 43(13), 289–301. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOPM-08-2022-0529Purpose:The new geopolitical context being created by the Ukraine–Russia war highlights the need for structured approaches to planning and implementing unhooking strategies and developing associated supply chain reconfigurations.Design/methodology/approach:The authors have interviewed six supply chain executives to begin the investigation of the key supply chain risks and disruptions caused by the Ukraine–Russia war.Findings:Initial corporate responses to the Ukraine–Russia conflict were significant, perhaps unprecedented. However, as institutional, corporate and consumer sentiment influence reconfiguration responses, the authors have identified three supply chain pathways that underpin unhooking actions.Research limitations/implications:The authors selected respondents from each different type of supply chain interaction with the conflict zone (inbound, outbound and within), covering both components/intermediate products and finished goods. Therefore the sample size was small and designed to fit in with the spirit of the pathway initiative.Practical implications:The authors reinforce the key role of procurement and supply chain management in not just supply but also in downstream markets that can accelerate decoupling and mitigate the associated supply chain disruptions.Social implications:The authors observe that supply chains are increasingly being weaponized, as external institutional and consumer influences necessitate companies to unhook from conflict zones, countries, or regimes. They are becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign policy.Originality/value:The novelty of the contribution to the associated discourse is the perspective that after decades of increasing globalization and geographic dispersion of supply chains, the unhooking effort is not limited to a firm and its internal operations but involves multiple stakeholders. For instance, the full extent of the complex linkages of supply chains, networks and relationships that touch conflict zone geographies must be considered, particularly those that are incompatible with the firm's values and aims, including those of their stakeholders.
Financial sanctions and global stock market reaction: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Tee, C.-M., Wong, W.-Y., & Hooy, C.-W. (2023).
Finance Research Letters
Financial sanctions and global stock market reaction: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Business & Finance, Sanctions & TradeTee, C.-M., Wong, W.-Y., & Hooy, C.-W. (2023). Financial sanctions and global stock market reaction: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Finance Research Letters, 58(B), 104398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104398Drawing from recent studies on the effect of Russia-Ukraine war on stock markets, this study examines global stock markets’ reactions to sanctions at the beginning of the war. Using the event study methodology, this study finds that investors place higher valuation for firms located in countries that sanction Russia, in comparison with stock markets located in countries which did not sanction Russia. In addition, the higher valuation is stronger, if firms are politically connected or located in countries with lower geopolitical risks.
Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Xin, B., & Zhang, M. (2023).
Energy Economics
Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Energy & Environment, Sanctions & TradeXin, B., & Zhang, M. (2023). Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Energy Economics, 125, 106827. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106827The Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered the global energy crisis and been one wrench in global energy markets. A surge in global energy prices is sent inflation soaring worldwide. Where are global energy markets heading? To address the wrench, we construct a tripartite energy evolutionary game including Russia, Part A countries (mainly those imposing sanctions on Russia), and Part B countries (mainly those not imposing sanctions on Russia) to depict the international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The results show that: (i) Part A countries' optimal economic strategy can not affect the Russian and Part B countries' strategies, and they choose to import Russian energy; (ii) All participants' strategies converge to stable states, and Russia's strategy converges faster; (iii) Russian and Part B countries' strategies are more stable than Part A countries'; (iv) Installing price caps will aggravate Part A countries' energy crises. A diplomatic effort is the best way for all participants to avert an escalation of the energy crisis.
The global sanctions data base – Release 4: The heterogeneous effects of the sanctions on Russia
Yalcin, E., Felbermayr, G., Kariem, H., Kirilakha, A., Kwon, O., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V. (2024).
WIFO Working Papers
The global sanctions data base – Release 4: The heterogeneous effects of the sanctions on Russia (CESifo Working Paper No. 10756).Sanctions & TradeYalcin, E., Felbermayr, G., Kariem, H., Kirilakha, A., Kwon, O., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V. (2024). The global sanctions data base – Release 4: The heterogeneous effects of the sanctions on Russia (CESifo Working Paper No. 10756). CESifo. https://www.cesifo.org/en/publications/2024/working-paper/global-sanctions-data-base-release-4-heterogeneous-effects-sanctionsThis paper introduces the fourth release of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDBR4). Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases, including the new ones against Russia. The GSDB-R4 comes in two versions, a case-specific and a dyadic one, both freely available upon request at [email protected]. To highlight one of the new features of the GSDB-R4, we combine it with trade data until 2023, and we investigate the effects of the recent sanctions on Russia’s trade within an econometric gravity model. We find that, on average, the effects on trade between Russia and the sanctioning countries are negative and statistically significant, but relatively small. We also find that the effects are very heterogeneous across senders, including across the EU members. Finally, our estimates suggest a possible decrease in the direct bilateral trade costs in Russia’s bilateral trade with India, China, and Turkey, even after controlling for all possible general equilibrium effects. The implication is that such trade cost decreases may be sufficient to offset the effects of Western sanctions on Russia and even generate net benefits for Russia.

Energy & Environment

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
Safe haven between European ESG and energy sector under Russian-Ukraine war: Role of sustainable investments for portfolio diversification.
Ahad, M., Imran, Z. A., & Shahzad, K. (2024).
Energy Economics
Safe haven between European ESG and energy sector under Russian-Ukraine war: Role of sustainable investments for portfolio diversification.Business & Finance, Energy & EnvironmentAhad, M., Imran, Z. A., & Shahzad, K. (2024). Safe haven between European ESG and energy sector under Russian-Ukraine war: Role of sustainable investments for portfolio diversification. Energy Economics, 138, 107853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107853The shortage of oil and gas supply to Europe during the Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered a price hike in the European energy sector. To mitigate the impact of higher energy prices on consumers, the EU introduced a price ceiling mechanism to curb gas prices from exceeding market norms. This interplay between supply shortages and price controls further heightened volatility in energy market prices. Consequently, our study aims to explore the efficacy of ESG indices as a safe haven against the highly volatile European oil and gas sectors to reduce portfolio losses during conflict. Using advanced analytical techniques such as cross-quantilogram to predict directional predictability, we find that bullish ESG markets are a safe haven against the bearish oil and gas markets in short, medium, and long-term investment horizons. Further, to identify the net receiver/transmitter of spillover between ESG indices and oil and gas sectors, our quantile time-frequency connectedness analysis shows ESG is a net receiver of spillover before the conflict and during wartime. Additionally, we explored the indicator of uncertainty that influences quantile spillover between ESG indices and European oil and gas sectors. We find that uncertainty's role in quantile spillover is significant and asymmetric, and it becomes more volatile during wartime. This feature tends to be amplified during short and long-term spillovers. Finally, the portfolio rebalance strategy suggests that a safe haven portfolio based on a one-month investment horizon yields positive returns during wartime. Hence, this study suggests investors include ESG indices as safe haven assets at times of crisis and for policymakers to understand the role of uncertainties in reducing price volatility and risk contagion among ESG and energy markets.
Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions.
Auer, C., Bosello, F., Bressan, G., Delpiazzo, E., Monasterolo, I., Otto, C., Parrado, R., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2025).
Communications Earth & Environment
Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions.Business & Finance, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityAuer, C., Bosello, F., Bressan, G., Delpiazzo, E., Monasterolo, I., Otto, C., Parrado, R., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2025). Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions. Communications Earth & Environment, 6, Article 194. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02119-1Disruptions in global food and energy trade can trigger cascading socio-economic losses. Financial markets can amplify such losses and generate systemic cross-sectoral effects, e.g. food insecurity. Our methodology links the real economy and financial markets to quantify cascading impacts across sectors and regions and to capture amplification effects by financial markets. Although applicable to any shock on global key commodity trade, we test its effectiveness with the Russia-Ukraine war, which reveals pronounced, regionally and sectorally diverse impacts. Comparing with real data confirms that our approach captures several key impacts of the crisis: the energy price increase in Europe, the strong reaction of European commodity future markets with large benefits for fossil companies (equity values up to +54%) and losses for companies most exposed to the belligerents (up to−6%), and the worsening of food affordability especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America (additionally 10 million people at risk of hunger). Our analysis shows the importance of accounting for cascading risks and amplification effects to strengthen economic, financial, and food system resilience.
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.
Boashash, A. (2023).
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & Trade, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityBoashash, A. (2023). The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management, Business, and Economy, 6(1), 64–79. https://journals.ekb.eg/article_361369_81698de878eb16e49f040831731e2bf1.pdfThe conflict between Russia and Ukraine has had extensive repercussions on the world economy, impacting energy markets, supply chains, financial stability, and food security. Sanctions on Russian energy exports have led to a spike in energy prices, while disruptions in the supply of agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia have worsened global food shortages. Financial markets have experienced heightened volatility and uncertainty, influencing investment and economic expansion. Furthermore, the war has prompted shifts in global trade patterns and alliances, necessitating collaborative international measures to stabilize markets, guarantee food security, and advocate for sustainable economic strategies.
Impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy.
Bodan, K. (2023).
Journal of International Relations
Impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy.Sanctions & Trade, Energy & EnvironmentBodan, K. (2023). Impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy. Journal of International Relations, 3(1), 29–39. https://doi.org/10.47604/jir.1867Purpose: The study sought to investigate the impact of Russia and Ukraine war on the global economy. Methodology: The study adopted a desktop methodology. Desk research refers to secondary data or that which can be collected without fieldwork. Desk research is basically involved in collecting data from existing resources hence it is often considered a low cost technique as compared to field research, as the main cost is involved in executive’s time, telephone charges and directories. Thus, the study relied on already published studies, reports and statistics. This secondary data was easily accessed through the online journals and library. Findings: The study concluded that wars and military conflicts drastically reduce the trade among adversaries via embargos or consumers' patriotism, however, after the cessation of immediate military threats and no tension predicted in the future, the trade will slowly recover. Moreover the current Russia Ukraine war is set to dramatically alter the trade of energy, oil, raw supplies and, components and raise the hesitancy of Western consumers. The increased imposition of sanctions has impacted the supply significantly. The opportunity cost of military investment, the humanitarian loss of the financial system, and the burden of repairing post-war damage are vast Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study was informed by relative n theory, future studies could benefit from this theory especially in other research context. The study recommended that, Ukraine needs an integrated approach in order to solve all economic and social problems in the country. Only integrated approach will allow to use available Ukrainian resources and advanced European experience to provide economic and social stability of the country.
Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian–Ukrainian war.
Chen, Y., Jiang, J., Wang, L., Wang, R. (2023).
Energy Reports
Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian–Ukrainian war.Sanctions & Trade, Energy & EnvironmentChen, Y., Jiang, J., Wang, L., Wang, R. (2023). Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian–Ukrainian war. Energy Reports, 9, 3082–3095. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2023.01.124Since the geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Western countries led by the United States and the European Union have launched several energy sanctions against Russia. How will sanctions and countersanctions on energy trade affect the EU-Russia and the world’s energy trade pattern? This paper sets six energy trade scenarios based on the degree of energy sanctions and counter-sanction measures imposed by the EU and Russia. We use the global multi-region comparative static CGE model to simulate the changes in macroeconomic indicators in major countries worldwide. The diversion effect of energy trade and the impact on the national economy caused by geographical risks quantitatively analyzes. The results show: (1) Energy sanctions will cause economic damage to both sides, in the worst-case scenario, the EU economic loss reaches 1.488%, the Russian loss reaches 4.8%, and worldwide inflation will rise; (2) Russia’s counter-sanctions will have a direct economic impact on the EU, but will not improve its economic situation; (3) Energy sanctions will bring about a direct energy trade transfer effect, the EU’s energy imports will be diverted to non-Russian markets, and Russian energy exports will also shift to Asian markets, and energy trade between the two economies will be significantly reduced; (4) Energy supply will have a profound impact on the world’s economy and society, leading to social instability and a decline in total output of 2.895%. Energy games will have a negative impact on the world’s carbon emission reduction and energy consumption structure transformation. Through quantitative analysis of the impact of energy sanctions on the world economy and society, the energy game caused by the geopolitical crisis will harm both parties involved in the game and the world economy. The world pattern will return from the development pattern of cooperative division of labor to a situation of conflict and confrontation, which is not conducive to the transformation of energy trade and consumption structure under market rules.
Conflict vs sustainability of global energy, agricultural and metal markets: A lesson from Ukraine-Russia war.
Chishti, M. Z., Khalid, A. A., & Sana, M. (2023).
Resources Policy
Conflict vs sustainability of global energy, agricultural and metal markets: A lesson from Ukraine-Russia war.Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityChishti, M. Z., Khalid, A. A., & Sana, M. (2023). Conflict vs sustainability of global energy, agricultural and metal markets: A lesson from Ukraine-Russia war. Resources Policy, 84, 103775. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103775This article endeavors to reveal the asymmetric effects of the Ukraine-Russia War (URW) on various markets, including energy, metals, and agriculture. To do so, the study deploys the cross-quantilogram technique while utilizing the daily data from February 22, 2022, to October 21, 2022. The results for metal commodities determine that, owing to the war, the aluminum, copper, and gold markets have to face significant losses across the various quantiles, except for silver, which demonstrates a mixed response. Meanwhile, the case of energy commodities discloses that war markedly deteriorates the crude and Brent oil markets throughout the different quantiles. However, the gas market gains significant benefits during the URW. In the case of agricultural markets, all the commodities are crippled with significant losses throughout the entire quantile spectrum due to the war. In addition, the novel rolling window multiple correlation (RWMC) technique supports the main findings by affirming the significant effects of URW across the various time horizons. The findings of this study may assist policymakers in reducing geopolitical risks through attempts to end war and suggest the diversification of energy and agricultural commodities to reduce the reliance on specific countries for trading.
Threats to sustainability in face of post-pandemic scenarios and the war in Ukraine.
da Costa, J. P., Silva, A. L., Barcelò, D., Rocha-Santos, T., & Duarte, A. (2023).
Science of The Total Environment
Threats to sustainability in face of post-pandemic scenarios and the war in Ukraine.Energy & Environmentda Costa, J. P., Silva, A. L., Barcelò, D., Rocha-Santos, T., & Duarte, A. (2023). Threats to sustainability in face of post-pandemic scenarios and the war in Ukraine. Science of The Total Environment, 892, 164509. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2023.164509As the World slowly emerged from the then-ongoing pandemic, War broke out in Europe with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The enduring military conflict in Ukraine has had sweeping consequences at the human, social, economic, and environmental levels, not only for the nations involved but across Europe and globally. Damaged infrastructures, severe disruption of economic activity, and forced migration have led to negative impacts on sustainability. The COVID-19 pandemic has added another layer of complexity to this already challenging situation, as the virus has further disrupted economic activity and strained healthcare systems. Herein, we examine how the intersection of war and COVID-19 affect the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. How these intersecting challenges have impacted efforts to build a more sustainable future, and how these impacts have a global reach are also assessed. The broader implications of this case for understanding the linkages between conflict, pandemics, and sustainability more generally are also considered, relating these with the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Agenda for 2030.
Sustainability decision‐making in times of crisis: An empirical study in Italy under the lens of the Russian‐Ukraine war.
Dorrego Viera, J. I., Santolin, R. B., Lazzarotti, V., & Urbinati, A. (2024).
Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management
Sustainability decision‐making in times of crisis: An empirical study in Italy under the lens of the Russian‐Ukraine war.Energy & Environment, Business & FinanceDorrego Viera, J. I., Santolin, R. B., Lazzarotti, V., & Urbinati, A. (2024). Sustainability decision‐making in times of crisis: An empirical study in Italy under the lens of the Russian‐Ukraine war. Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management, 31(5), 3988–4006. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.2788 This research examines the impact of the Russian‐Ukraine war on the decisions made by managers regarding the three dimensions of the triple bottom line (TBL) of sustainability. Specifically, it investigates how managers in the Lombardy region of Italy adapted their approaches towards sustainability during this crisis. The descriptive statistics and PCA analyses demonstrate that managers adjusted their decisions regarding the social dimension of sustainability in response to the prevailing circumstances. The Russian‐Ukraine war has led to a convergence of the social and economic dimensions within firms. However, the study also reveals that the social dimension is often considered secondary to the core business, making it the weakest aspect of the TBL approach. Nonetheless, external disruptions, such as in the case of the Russian‐Ukraine war, can influence this approach, leading to a repositioning of the social dimension as a focal point in business strategies. By emphasizing the importance of considering social aspects in sustainability decision‐making during crises, this research contributes valuable insights to the existing literature. The findings can inform the development of strategies to address challenges posed by the Russian‐Ukraine war and enhance the integration of social criteria in sustainability decision‐making.
Green inclusive leadership, green policy, and pursuit of sustainability in natural resources: A firm-level analysis in context of Ukraine-Russia war.
Hu, K., Chen, Y., Mu, S., & Tan, Z. (2024).
Resources Policy
Green inclusive leadership, green policy, and pursuit of sustainability in natural resources: A firm-level analysis in context of Ukraine-Russia war.Energy & EnvironmentHu, K., Chen, Y., Mu, S., & Tan, Z. (2024). Green inclusive leadership, green policy, and pursuit of sustainability in natural resources: A firm-level analysis in context of Ukraine-Russia war. Resources Policy, 89, Article 104607. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.104607China is one of the major trading partners of Russia and Ukraine. The country depends upon Russia and China to import a few of the key strategic products from the mining, agriculture, and energy sectors. This study explores the association between green inclusive leadership, green policy, and the pursuit of sustainability in the iron-ore mining industry in China, against the backdrop of the Ukraine-Russia war. This also examines the role of green policy robustness in the relationship between green inclusive leadership and the pursuit of sustainability. Further, our study determines the magnitude of green inclusive leadership in sustainability. We used the cross-sectional data of 102 firms from the Iron-Ore Mining sector of the People Republic of China. This study employed hierarchal regression for empirical analysis. Our findings of hierarchal regression analysis highlight that green inclusive leadership significantly impacts the sustainability of the iron-ore mining firms, whereas green policies positively reinforce those impacts on the sustainability of the firms. Our findings substantiate the significant moderating role of green policy in reinforcing the impacts of green inclusive leadership on the sustainability of the firms. Our findings suggest that the presence of well well-enacted green policy can help firms to augment the impacts of green innovation leadership on sustainability. In a nutshell, our research offers insights into how the iron ore mining industry can navigate the possibility of using green innovation leadership to achieve sustainable development.
Russia–Ukraine war: A note on short-run production and labour market effects of the energy crisis.
Hutter, C., & Weber, E. (2023).
Energy Policy
Russia–Ukraine war: A note on short-run production and labour market effects of the energy crisis.Refugees & Labor Markets, Energy & EnvironmentHutter, C., & Weber, E. (2023). Russia–Ukraine war: A note on short-run production and labour market effects of the energy crisis. Energy Policy, 183, 113802. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113802We provide first causal evidence of effects of the energy crisis on Germany, the largest economy in Europe. Combining cost structure data, national accounts and administrative labour market data, we identify effects in a sectoral panel setting using sector-specific energy intensity as a “bite” variable. The results show that through the channel of energy intensity, monthly production and real turnover decreased by 4.1 and 2.6 per cent, respectively, after the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war. Instead of layoffs, firms safeguarded employment by means of short-time work, with a 24.1 per cent increase in notifications. Vacancy posting was reduced by 10.3 per cent.
Analyzing fossil fuel commodities' return spillovers during the Russia and Ukraine crisis in the energy market.
Kayani, U., Hasnaoui, A., Khan, M., Zahoor, N., & Nawaz, F. (2024).
Energy Economics
Analyzing fossil fuel commodities' return spillovers during the Russia and Ukraine crisis in the energy market.Energy & EnvironmentKayani, U., Hasnaoui, A., Khan, M., Zahoor, N., & Nawaz, F. (2024). Analyzing fossil fuel commodities' return spillovers during the Russia and Ukraine crisis in the energy market. Energy Economics, 135, 107651. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107651During the Russia and Ukraine crises, the energy market, including fossil fuel commodities, experienced significant global shocks. This research paper investigates the phenomenon of return spillover across the energy market amid the Russia and Ukraine conflict, utilizing the Diebold and Yilmaz Spillover Framework and EGRACH Model. The study examines daily frequency data from 24 February 2022 to 30 June 2023, focusing on the interconnectedness between various energy commodities: Brent Oil, Carbon Emissions, Crude Oil WTI, Gasoline, Heating Oil, and Natural Gas. The result of the study reports a total spillover index of 36%, indicating a significant spillover during the Russia and Ukraine conflict. Furthermore, the highest dynamic gross directional return spillovers have been reported in Brent Oil compared to the others. However, carbon emissions and natural gas have the lowest spillovers. The study significantly contributes to a deeper understanding of energy commodities by confirming the volatility persistence across the energy market based on the E-GARCH model.
Critical metals in uncertainty: How Russia-Ukraine conflict drives their prices?
Khurshid, A., et al. (2023)
Resources Policy
Critical metals in uncertainty: How Russia-Ukraine conflict drives their prices?Energy & EnvironmentKhurshid, A., et al. (2023). Critical metals in uncertainty: How Russia-Ukraine conflict drives their prices? Resources Policy, 85(Part B), 104000. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.104000Critical minerals bring new challenges to energy security in the transition to clean energy, so their supply and prices are a spectacle of global uncertainties. This research investigates the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on critical metal prices and the extent to which it affects them. The study will also highlight the price trends in the absence of this geopolitical event. The results outline that the Russia-Ukraine conflict drives critical metals prices. The outcomes show rapid divergence from counterfactual predictions, and the critical metals prices are consistently higher than expected without conflict. The curves suggest a reconvening pattern in metals prices around April 2022. The point-wise causal effect displays an estimate of the critical metal prices increased following the conflict. In relative terms, the prices of critical metals, namely cobalt, nickel, lithium, copper, and aluminum, experienced increases of 2%, 36%, 14.97%, 3%, and less than 1%, respectively. In comparison, the price of lead exhibited a decrease of 8%. The highest increase was observed in nickel, followed by lithium, indicating that these two metals are more responsive to such variations. However, it is noteworthy that prices tend to stabilize and return to pre-event levels from May to September, depending on the respective metal's sensitivity. Moreover, outcomes emphasize that global dependencies, lack of resources and investments, and intentional conflict of crucial minerals exporting nations lead to the conflagration.
On the protective effects of European sustainable stocks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
Kick, A., & Rottmann, H. (2024)
Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden
On the protective effects of European sustainable stocks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Weidener Diskussionspapiere No. 88).Business & Finance, Energy & EnvironmentKick, A., & Rottmann, H. (2024). On the protective effects of European sustainable stocks during the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Weidener Diskussionspapiere No. 88). Ostbayerische Technische Hochschule Amberg-Weiden, https://hdl.handle.net/10419/283004 Sustainable investments remain popular, attracting investors and researchers alike. Especially the tail-risk properties seem to differ between sustainable stocks and common stocks. Empirically, this can be observed in particular during extreme events. On February 24, 2022 Russian forces invaded Ukraine, thereby marking the beginning of a major historical event. Using standard event study methodology, we analyze if and how Refinitiv’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, as well as carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity, influence cumulative abnormal returns during different event windows. We find that the abnormal returns of companies with high ecological scores exhibit a protective effect in the pre- and post-event windows. However, this effect did not materialize in all observed event windows. Therefore, our results do not fully support the hypothesis of an ‘ESG hedge’ against such extreme events. 
The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil prices
Kilian, L., Rapson, D., & Schipper, B. (2025)
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil prices.Energy & Environment, Sanctions & TradeKilian, L., Rapson, D., & Schipper, B. (2025). The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil prices (Working Paper No. 2401). Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, https://doi.org/10.24149/wp2401r1This paper documents the effect of the oil embargo and price cap on Russian oil exports in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. We show that the embargo forced Russia to accept a $32/bbl discount on its Urals crude in March 2023 relative to January 2022, nearly half of which is directly attributable to the higher cost of shipping crude oil over longer distances, as Russia diverted much of its crude oil exports to India. Based on a calibrated model of global oil supply and demand, the remainder ($17/bbl) can be explained by increased Indian bargaining power. We also provide a similar analysis for the ESPO price discount on exports to China. In contrast, the price cap deprived Russia of the financial resources it spent on assembling a “shadow” fleet of tankers, but its effect on the Russian oil export price was negligible once the adoption of the price cap had facilitated the use of Western services to transport Russian oil to Asia.
The influence of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on renewable and fossil energy price cycles.
Maneejuk, P., Kaewtathip, N., & Yamaka, W. (2024).
Energy Economics
The influence of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on renewable and fossil energy price cycles.Energy & EnvironmentManeejuk, P., Kaewtathip, N., & Yamaka, W. (2024). The influence of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on renewable and fossil energy price cycles. Energy Economics, 129, 107218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.107218This study investigates the impact of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on energy cycles by extending a business cycle-based approach in the energy sector. We employ the Markov Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (MS-BVAR) model to derive filtered probabilities that represent energy cycles. By utilizing the Russia Economic Policy Uncertainty Index and dummy variables derived from Google search data as conflict indicators, we conduct regression analysis and examine the generalized impulse response function to assess the effects of the conflict on energy cycles. Our research reveals notable differences in renewable and fossil energy price cycles. The renewable price cycle exhibits greater persistence, indicating a limited response to the conflict shock. In contrast, the fossil energy price cycle exhibits more significant and enduring adjustments in high- and low-volatility regimes. These findings highlight the heterogeneous impacts of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on the fossil energy market, indicating potential disruptions in supply chains and market sensitivities. Notably, fossil energy prices demonstrate higher responsiveness to the Ukraine-Russia conflict across market conditions.
Environmental damages due to war in Ukraine: A perspective.
Rawtani, D., Gupta, G., Khatri, N., Rao, P. K., & Hussain, C. M. (2022).
Science of The Total Environment
Environmental damages due to war in Ukraine: A perspective.Energy & EnvironmentRawtani, D., Gupta, G., Khatri, N., Rao, P. K., & Hussain, C. M. (2022). Environmental damages due to war in Ukraine: A perspective. Science of The Total Environment, 850, 157932. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2022.157932The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war is the most prominent conflict in Europe since the Second World War and has several geopolitical, economic, infrastructure, and health implications. The war has serious negative consequences on people and the planet. The damage to industrial and commercial infrastructure can contaminate water sources, which can be hazardous for human and ecosystem health. Water shortages and deteriorating sanitary conditions are already evident since water supply and sanitary infrastructure have been hit. Air quality is adversely affected due to troop movement and constant bombarding. Chances of radiation leakage from nuclear sites also remain. The physical, chemical and biological characteristics of soil have been impacted due to shelling and explosions, as a result of which, agriculture has been severely affected. Military actions have caused large-scale deforestation and even wildfires. There is also fear of biodiversity loss and species extinction in the long term. The war of such nature may directly hamper efforts to deal with aspects such as climate change, sustainable development goals (SDGs), conservation and protection of biodiversity, and pollution control at local and global levels. Besides this, the repercussions of this war on essential services such as healthcare, education, social security, and public amenities will be felt for a long. As a result of important interruptions in the supply of energy and raw materials throughout the world, prices for commodities, oil, and food have risen dramatically. To avert such damages in the future and make the offenders accountable, in the long term, reforms in the mandate of the International Criminal Court are required to include environmental crimes. New international norms to safeguard the environment during conflict are urgently needed. The environment should not be considered an unavoidable war casualty. Environmental and human security are inextricably linked. The international community's reaction to the crisis must include addressing this as a priority.
Medium-term macroeconomic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how it affects energy security and global emission targets
Rojas-Romagosa, H. (2024)
International Monetary Fund
Medium-term macroeconomic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how it affects energy security and global emission targets (IMF Working Paper No. 2024/039).Macroeconomics, Energy & EnvironmentRojas-Romagosa, H. (2024). Medium-term macroeconomic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how it affects energy security and global emission targets (IMF Working Paper No. 2024/039). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/02/14/Medium-Term-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-Russias-War-in-Ukraine-and-How-It-Affects-Energy-541643Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted the supply of natural gas for many European countries, triggering an energy crisis and affecting energy security. We simulate the medium-term effects of these trade disruptions and find that most European countries have limited GDP losses but those more dependent on Russian natural gas face moderate losses. European fossil fuel consumption and emissions are reduced and after accounting for the war impacts, achieving Europe’s emission targets becomes slightly less costly. In terms of energy security, the war eliminates European energy dependency from Russian imports, but most of the natural gas and oil imports will be substituted by other suppliers. We also find that constructing a new Russian pipeline to China does not provide significant macroeconomic benefits to either country.
The imbalance of food and biofuel markets amid Ukraine-Russia crisis: A systems thinking perspective.
Shams Esfandabadi, Z., Ranjbari, M., & Scagnelli, S. (2022).
Biofuel Research Journal
The imbalance of food and biofuel markets amid Ukraine-Russia crisis: A systems thinking perspective.Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityShams Esfandabadi, Z., Ranjbari, M., & Scagnelli, S. (2022). The imbalance of food and biofuel markets amid Ukraine-Russia crisis: A systems thinking perspective. Biofuel Research Journal, 9(2), 1640–1647. https://doi.org/10.18331/BRJ2022.9.2.5The Ukraine war has immensely affected both food and energy systems due to the significant role of Russia in supplying natural gas and fertilizers globally and the extensive contribution of both Russia and Ukraine in exporting grains and oilseeds to the international markets. Hence, the Ukraine-Russia conflict has resulted in a shortage of crops and grains in the food market, especially in Europe, causing speculations if these resources should still be used for biofuel production (1st Generation). However, the International Energy Agency has warned that lowering biofuel mandates could result in rising petroleum demand and supply concerns. In light of these unfolding events, a systems thinking approach is required to monitor and analyze the implications of this crisis for food and biofuel markets as a whole to alleviate the concerns faced and plan sustainably. In this vein, based on the trade-offs between food system elements and the biofuel supply chain, as well as the potential effects of the war on the food and energy systems worldwide, a causal loop diagram is developed in the present work. According to the insights provided, the key to preventing food insecurity and keeping biofuel mandates on an increasing trend simultaneously amid the Ukraine war is to switch from the 1st Generation biofuels to higher generations. This transition would reduce not only the pressure on the food market to move toward zero hunger (SDG 2) but also pave the way to move towards a circular economy and clean and affordable energy (SDG 7) during the post-war era
The End of Russian Gas Transit via Ukraine: Immediate Impact and Implications for the European Gas Market in 2025.
Sharples, J. (2025).
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
The End of Russian Gas Transit via Ukraine: Immediate Impact and Implications for the European Gas Market in 2025.Energy & EnvironmentSharples, J. (2025). The End of Russian Gas Transit via Ukraine: Immediate Impact and Implications for the European Gas Market in 2025. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep67289-
Assessing the impact of oil sanctions on Russia.
Spiro, D., Wachtmeister, H., & Gars, J. (2024).
SSRN
Assessing the impact of oil sanctions on Russia.Sanctions & Trade, Energy & EnvironmentSpiro, D., Wachtmeister, H., & Gars, J. (2024). Assessing the impact of oil sanctions on Russia. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4860148The West has imposed significant sanctions on Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with the most impactful being energy sanctions targeting Russia’s oil exports. This paper evaluates the effects of the two most important oil sanctions—the EU import embargo and the G7 price cap. Using data on prices, discounts, trade patterns and transport, the analysis simplifies and assesses the relationship between these sanctions as well as their individual and combined impacts. We conclude that the import embargo is likely the most consequential sanction, it reduces Russian crude oil income through the buyer’s discount. In addition, the import embargo yields significantly higher transportation costs for Russian Urals crude oil. We also conclude that the price cap does not primarily function as a binding price cap, but as a partial transport embargo, and plays an important role in reinforcing the effect that the import embargo has on Russia’s transport costs. The analysis finds that Russian oil revenues are determined by three factors. First, the world oil price is determined by the global supply and demand for oil. Then, the buyer’s discount is deducted, which gives the price of Russian oil at the buyer’s port. Finally, transportation cost is deducted, which provides the selling price in Russian ports, i.e. Russia’s oil revenue. Importantly, while all these three factors are in theory determined as one equilibrium, we conclude that in practice they can be treated separately. To reduce Russian oil income, policies can thus aim to lower the global oil price, increase the buyers’ discount on Russian oil and increase its transportation cost. The paper provides several practical policy options to achieve these goals. Russia, on the other hand, has the opposite three aims and employs policies towards this end. Many of the Western policies we outline are therefore aimed at countering the Russian countermeasures.
Russia-Ukraine war perspective of natural resources extraction: A conflict with impact on sustainable development.
Wang, S., Xu, L., Yu, S., & Wang, S. (2023).
Resources Policy
Russia-Ukraine war perspective of natural resources extraction: A conflict with impact on sustainable development.Energy & EnvironmentWang, S., Xu, L., Yu, S., & Wang, S. (2023). Russia-Ukraine war perspective of natural resources extraction: A conflict with impact on sustainable development. Resources Policy, 85(Part A), 103689. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103689The natural resources-economic growth nexus is extensively debated in the previous literature, and many studies are available. Nonetheless, the studies on the uncertainties created by post-pandemic recovery and Russian-Ukrainian conflict hovering around Russia's natural resource growth nexus; hence, this study contributed to the literature by probing the nexus of natural resource rents and economic growth in Russia from 1990 to 2021. The study also included controlling variables which include FDI and REO. Relevant time series methods are deployed, including NG and Perron, ADF unit root tests for determining the stationarity of the data, ARDL bound tests, and diagnostics tests. The outcomes exhibit that oil rents significantly improve economic growth in Russia. In contrast, mineral rents decrease economic growth in Russia in the study's short-run and long-run dynamics. The results also conclude that FDI and REO significantly enhance the economic growth of Russia, specifically in the long run. The robustness check analysis also supports the results of ARDL estimates. The results of the diagnostic tests indicate that there are no issues of heteroscedasticity or serial correlation, and they provide evidence that the model is stable. This study's conclusions have practical implications for policy regarding Russia's natural resources and their role in economic growth.
Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Xin, B., & Zhang, M. (2023).
Energy Economics
Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Energy & Environment, Sanctions & TradeXin, B., & Zhang, M. (2023). Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Energy Economics, 125, 106827. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106827The Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered the global energy crisis and been one wrench in global energy markets. A surge in global energy prices is sent inflation soaring worldwide. Where are global energy markets heading? To address the wrench, we construct a tripartite energy evolutionary game including Russia, Part A countries (mainly those imposing sanctions on Russia), and Part B countries (mainly those not imposing sanctions on Russia) to depict the international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The results show that: (i) Part A countries' optimal economic strategy can not affect the Russian and Part B countries' strategies, and they choose to import Russian energy; (ii) All participants' strategies converge to stable states, and Russia's strategy converges faster; (iii) Russian and Part B countries' strategies are more stable than Part A countries'; (iv) Installing price caps will aggravate Part A countries' energy crises. A diplomatic effort is the best way for all participants to avert an escalation of the energy crisis.
Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the global energy and food security.
Zhou, X.-Y., Lu, G., Xu, Z., Yan, X., Khu, S.-T., Yang, J., & Zhao, J. (2023).
Resources
Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the global energy and food security.Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityZhou, X.-Y., Lu, G., Xu, Z., Yan, X., Khu, S.-T., Yang, J., & Zhao, J. (2023). Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the global energy and food security. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 188, 106657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106657The Russian- Ukraine War has and further influence the global energy and food security. However, the detailed influence degree, key weak points and influence process is still unclear in the current. Therefore, this study established a newly improved under-load cascading failure model with consideration of overload limitation, and used it to evaluate influence of Russian- Ukraine War on the global energy and food security. This study also proposed a method to assess the network structure characteristic including robustness and resilience through model simulation under different scenarios. The main results include: The upper limitation of node load has the dominant function on the global energy and food security, while the influence of lower limitation parameter of node load has limited function. All of the networks have relative consistent recover and anti-damage ability against Russian and Ukraine War and the global panic except barley network. A key phenomenon we should concern is that the largest trade flow amounts are not occurred in the failure nodes. The failure nodes are always the countries with low economic scale and political status. The results tell us that we should further strengthen the importance of enhance production ability and energy types to resist the risk of Russian and Ukraine War. The global international organizations are also required to strengthen the function of balance the global security demand of energy and food between big countries and small countries. We should pay more attention to the little countries in the Africa and Asia to handle the risk.
The impact of energy imports on green innovation in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Zhu, Z., Zhao, J., & Liu, Y. (2024).
Journal of Environmental Management
The impact of energy imports on green innovation in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.Energy & EnvironmentZhu, Z., Zhao, J., & Liu, Y. (2024). The impact of energy imports on green innovation in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Journal of Environmental Management, 349, 119591. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.119591This research paper examines the implications of energy imports on green innovation within the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. It utilizes panel data spanning EU countries from 1999 to 2022. Initially, the study explores the influence of natural gas and oil imports on the advancement of green innovation. Specifically, it reveals that the importation of natural gas facilitates progress in this area, whereas the importation of oil can impede such advancement. Following the Russia-Ukraine war, the role of gas imports in fostering green innovation within EU countries has grown, simultaneously exacerbating the adverse effects of oil imports on green innovation. Secondly, by employing a panel threshold model, the study identifies that higher energy prices make natural gas and oil imports unfavorable for the progress of green innovation in EU nations. Thirdly, an analysis of heterogeneity demonstrates that, as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, natural gas imports have a more significant detrimental effect on the development of green innovation in EU nations with a natural gas dependency ranging from 10% to 90%. In the case of oil imports, EU nations with a dependence on Russian oil exceeding 50% experience a more pronounced negative impact on the development of green innovation. Fourthly, a mechanistic study elucidates that natural gas imports indirectly stimulate green innovation through the mechanism of energy transition, while oil imports hinder the development of green innovation by exacerbating carbon emissions. The empirical findings of this paper carry substantial policy implications for EU nations, urging the acceleration of energy transition in response to the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on green innovation. Moreover, these findings have broader implications for global environmental management and the collective endeavor to combat climate change.

Agriculture & Food Security

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
The Russia–Ukraine war: Implications for global and regional food security and potential policy responses.
Abay, K., Breisinger, C., Glauber, J., Kurdi, S., Laborde, D., & Siddig, K. (2023).
Purdue University
The Russia–Ukraine war: Implications for global and regional food security and potential policy responses.Agriculture & Food SecurityAbay, K., Breisinger, C., Glauber, J., Kurdi, S., Laborde, D., & Siddig, K. (2023). The Russia–Ukraine war: Implications for global and regional food security and potential policy responses. Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN: Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). Retrieved from https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=6827This paper analyzes the implications of the Russian-Ukraine war on global and regional food security. We start with a global vulnerability analysis to identify most vulnerable regions and countries. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is particularly vulnerable to trade shocks because of its high food import dependence. Thus, we provide descriptive evidence characterizing how food systems and policies impact vulnerability to the price shock in selected MENA countries: Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen. Within these countries, we show that the crisis will differentially impact poor and non-poor households as well as rural and urban households. Although the absolute level of food insecurity may still be higher in rural areas where larger numbers of poor households are located, urban poor are likely to suffer most because of the Russia-Ukraine crisis and associated hikes in food prices, especially in those countries where social protection and food subsidies are missing. We review lessons from previous food crises and identify actions needed to take (and to avoid) to protect most vulnerable countries and households in the short-term while also highlighting long-term policy options to diversify food, fertilizer and energy production and trade.
Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions.
Auer, C., Bosello, F., Bressan, G., Delpiazzo, E., Monasterolo, I., Otto, C., Parrado, R., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2025).
Communications Earth & Environment
Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions.Business & Finance, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityAuer, C., Bosello, F., Bressan, G., Delpiazzo, E., Monasterolo, I., Otto, C., Parrado, R., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2025). Cascading socio-economic and financial impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war differ across sectors and regions. Communications Earth & Environment, 6, Article 194. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-025-02119-1Disruptions in global food and energy trade can trigger cascading socio-economic losses. Financial markets can amplify such losses and generate systemic cross-sectoral effects, e.g. food insecurity. Our methodology links the real economy and financial markets to quantify cascading impacts across sectors and regions and to capture amplification effects by financial markets. Although applicable to any shock on global key commodity trade, we test its effectiveness with the Russia-Ukraine war, which reveals pronounced, regionally and sectorally diverse impacts. Comparing with real data confirms that our approach captures several key impacts of the crisis: the energy price increase in Europe, the strong reaction of European commodity future markets with large benefits for fossil companies (equity values up to +54%) and losses for companies most exposed to the belligerents (up to−6%), and the worsening of food affordability especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America (additionally 10 million people at risk of hunger). Our analysis shows the importance of accounting for cascading risks and amplification effects to strengthen economic, financial, and food system resilience.
Impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war on global food security: Towards more sustainable and resilient food systems?
Ben Hassen, T., & El Bilali, H. (2022)
Foods
Impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war on global food security: Towards more sustainable and resilient food systems?Agriculture & Food SecurityBen Hassen, T., & El Bilali, H. (2022). Impacts of the Russia–Ukraine war on global food security: Towards more sustainable and resilient food systems? Foods, 11(15), 2301. https://doi.org/10.3390/foods11152301As a conflict between two major agricultural powers, the Russia–Ukraine war has various negative socioeconomic impacts that are now being felt internationally and might worsen, notably, for global food security. If the war deepens, the food crisis will worsen, posing a challenge to many countries, especially those that rely on food imports, such as those in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Simultaneously, the war came at a bad time for global food markets because food prices were already high due to disruptions in the supply chain caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, strong global demand, and poor harvests in some countries. Understanding how conflict-related disruptions in global food and fertilizer markets might affect price and availability is critical for understanding the overall impact on global food security. Further, four months into the war, its implications for food security suggest that this review is timely, urgent, and highly needed. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the Russia–Ukraine war’s direct and indirect impact on global food security. The paper highlights that the war resulted in immediate and far-reaching cascading consequences on global food security: Ukrainian exports have stopped, conscription and population displacement have caused labor shortages, access to fertilizers is restricted, and future harvests are uncertain. First, Ukraine’s export capacity has been hampered. Secondly, conscription and population displacement caused labor shortages. Thirdly, access to vital agricultural products such as fertilizers is also constrained. The war may delay spring planting and winter crop harvesting. Further, the war has indirect and cascading effects. Indeed, rising fertilizer costs may reduce their use and crop yields. Moreover, as seen during the 2007–2008 food crisis, export restrictions and speculation are driving up international prices and worsening the situation. Furthermore, the war triggered a panic buying movement at country and individual levels. Finally, the war may jeopardize the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), notably SDG 1 (No poverty), SDG 2 (Zero hunger), and DG 12 (Responsible consumption and production). However, the consequences of the war on food security are being exacerbated by a variety of underlying rigidities, vulnerabilities, and inefficiencies in global food systems. Accordingly, the transition toward healthy, equitable, and ecologically sustainable food systems must be strengthened by adopting urgent and long-term reforms and policies.
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.
Boashash, A. (2023).
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & Trade, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityBoashash, A. (2023). The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management, Business, and Economy, 6(1), 64–79. https://journals.ekb.eg/article_361369_81698de878eb16e49f040831731e2bf1.pdfThe conflict between Russia and Ukraine has had extensive repercussions on the world economy, impacting energy markets, supply chains, financial stability, and food security. Sanctions on Russian energy exports have led to a spike in energy prices, while disruptions in the supply of agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia have worsened global food shortages. Financial markets have experienced heightened volatility and uncertainty, influencing investment and economic expansion. Furthermore, the war has prompted shifts in global trade patterns and alliances, necessitating collaborative international measures to stabilize markets, guarantee food security, and advocate for sustainable economic strategies.
The Impact of Crisis Events in Ukraine on the Export of Agricultural Products to EU Countries and the World.
Buiak, L., Harmatiy, N., Fedyshyn, I. & Pryshliak, K. (2023).
Management Theory and Studies for Rural Business and Infrastructure Development
The Impact of Crisis Events in Ukraine on the Export of Agricultural Products to EU Countries and the World.Agriculture & Food SecurityBuiak, L., Harmatiy, N., Fedyshyn, I. & Pryshliak, K. (2023). The Impact of Crisis Events in Ukraine on the Export of Agricultural Products to EU Countries and the World. Management Theory and Studies for Rural Business and Infrastructure Development, 45(2), 2023. 193-201. https://doi.org/10.15544/mts.2023.19The article examines the impact of crisis events in Ukraine on the export of agricultural products to EU countries and the world. The purpose of the research was the development, substantiation, and optimization of theoretical and methodological provisions as well as practical recommendations for estimating main indicators to forecast the future of the Ukrainian economy, in particular, determining through the use of economic and mathematical modeling, the influence of the level of the national trade turnover on the level of GDP and the correlation between the level of exports and the level of Ukraine's GDP. After almost thirty years of development, the Ukrainian economy faced a serious challenge and an unprecedented shock in its history due to hostilities and the escalation of the conflict in the East of the country. In particular, it was found that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the sharp rise in commodity prices have created a threat to the food security around the world. In turn, before the full-scale war, one of the largest shares of Ukraine's export and import partnership agreements was occupied by EU countries. The conducted research using economic and mathematical modeling showed a direct correlation between commodity circulation of Ukraine and the GDP of the country. Thus, main results witness the Ukraine`s necessity to increase the level of exports and increase its trade turnover. The reconstruction of production facilities must be in accordance with European and global production norms, in compliance with environmental and other normative standards, so that Ukrainian products can compete on European and global markets.
Conflict vs sustainability of global energy, agricultural and metal markets: A lesson from Ukraine-Russia war.
Chishti, M. Z., Khalid, A. A., & Sana, M. (2023).
Resources Policy
Conflict vs sustainability of global energy, agricultural and metal markets: A lesson from Ukraine-Russia war.Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityChishti, M. Z., Khalid, A. A., & Sana, M. (2023). Conflict vs sustainability of global energy, agricultural and metal markets: A lesson from Ukraine-Russia war. Resources Policy, 84, 103775. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103775This article endeavors to reveal the asymmetric effects of the Ukraine-Russia War (URW) on various markets, including energy, metals, and agriculture. To do so, the study deploys the cross-quantilogram technique while utilizing the daily data from February 22, 2022, to October 21, 2022. The results for metal commodities determine that, owing to the war, the aluminum, copper, and gold markets have to face significant losses across the various quantiles, except for silver, which demonstrates a mixed response. Meanwhile, the case of energy commodities discloses that war markedly deteriorates the crude and Brent oil markets throughout the different quantiles. However, the gas market gains significant benefits during the URW. In the case of agricultural markets, all the commodities are crippled with significant losses throughout the entire quantile spectrum due to the war. In addition, the novel rolling window multiple correlation (RWMC) technique supports the main findings by affirming the significant effects of URW across the various time horizons. The findings of this study may assist policymakers in reducing geopolitical risks through attempts to end war and suggest the diversification of energy and agricultural commodities to reduce the reliance on specific countries for trading.
Impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian farmers’ productivity, rural welfare, and food security
Deininger, K., Ali, D. A., & Fang, M. (2023)
World Bank
Impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian farmers’ productivity, rural welfare, and food security (Policy Research Working Paper No. 10464).Agriculture & Food SecurityDeininger, K., Ali, D. A., & Fang, M. (2023). Impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian farmers’ productivity, rural welfare, and food security (Policy Research Working Paper No. 10464). World Bank, https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-10464Data from 2,251 small and medium-size farms for 2021 and 2022 show that area reductions in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine remained limited. However, worsening terms of trade reduced farm profitability, implying that 46 percent of farms had a negative cash flow and 54 percent (67 percent in the 50–120 hectare group) were credit constrained in 2022, implying that longer term effects may be more adverse. Total factor productivity varies significantly across size groups but is not significantly different between formal and informal farms in the same size group. This suggests that limited transferability of land use rights that are disproportionately used by smaller farms may be one reason for low productivity. Improving transferability of land, digital access to markets, and mortgage lending could thus trigger investment and growth in higher value products by small and medium-size farms to solidify Ukraine’s comparative advantage in agriculture and improve rural living conditions in the context of reconstruction.
Quantifying war-induced crop losses in Ukraine in near real time to strengthen local and global food security.
Deininger, K., Ali, D. A., Kussul, N., Shelestov, A., Lemoine, G., & Yailimova, H. (2023).
Food Policy
Quantifying war-induced crop losses in Ukraine in near real time to strengthen local and global food security.Agriculture & Food SecurityDeininger, K., Ali, D. A., Kussul, N., Shelestov, A., Lemoine, G., & Yailimova, H. (2023). Quantifying war-induced crop losses in Ukraine in near real time to strengthen local and global food security. Food Policy, 115, 102418. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2023.102418We use a 4-year panel (2019–2022) of 10,125 village councils in Ukraine to estimate effects of the war started by Russia on area and expected yield of winter crops aggregated up from the field level. Satellite imagery is used to provide information on direct damage to agricultural fields; classify crop cover using machine learning; and compute the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) for winter cereal fields as a proxy for yield. Without conflict, winter crop area would have been 9.35 rather than 8.38 million ha, a 0.97 million ha reduction, only 14% of which can be attributed to direct conflict effects. The estimated drop associated with the conflict in NDVI for winter wheat, which is particularly pronounced for small farms, translates into an additional reduction of output by about 1.9 million tons for a total of 4.84 million tons. Taking area and yield reduction together suggests a war-induced loss of winter wheat output of up to 17% assuming the 2022 winter wheat crop was fully harvested
The impact of Russian sanctions on the return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU.
Klomp, J. (2020).
Research in International Business and Finance
The impact of Russian sanctions on the return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU.Sanctions & Trade, Agriculture & Food SecurityKlomp, J. (2020). The impact of Russian sanctions on the return of agricultural commodity futures in the EU. Research in International Business and Finance, 51, 101073. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101073During the last conflict between Russia and the Ukraine in 2014, the EU imposed various multilateral sanctions on Russia. As a response, Russia retaliated these measures by banning the agricultural imports from the EU. This study explores whether the retaliation sanctions taken by Russia were already expected by investors or came as a complete surprise. For this purpose, I compare the impact of sanction-related news before and after the official announcement of these sanctions by president Putin in August 2014 on the weekly return of a number of agricultural commodity futures traded at two European commodity exchanges. A newly created indicator on sanction-related news is used that is based on the number of articles that have been published in the major European newspapers containing information about the import ban. The main findings clearly point out that before the imposition of the boycott it was already partly anticipated. The publication of sanction-related news caused a significant drop in the futures return of a number of banned agricultural commodities in the weeks prior to the formal announcement.
Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine.
Kvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T., & Bukin, E. (2022).
Land Use Policy
Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine.Agriculture & Food Security, Governance & InstitutionsKvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T., & Bukin, E. (2022). Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine. Land Use Policy, 114, 105983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983 This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.
Potential impacts of Ukraine-Russia armed conflict on global wheat food security: A quantitative exploration.
Mottaleb, K. A., Kruseman, G., & Snapp, S. (2022).
Global Food Security
Potential impacts of Ukraine-Russia armed conflict on global wheat food security: A quantitative exploration.Agriculture & Food SecurityMottaleb, K. A., Kruseman, G., & Snapp, S. (2022). Potential impacts of Ukraine-Russia armed conflict on global wheat food security: A quantitative exploration. Global Food Security, 35, 100659. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2022.100659Violent conflict is a major cause of acute food crises. In 2021, at least 155 million people in 10 countries were severely food insecure and eight of those countries were experiencing armed conflict. On February 24, 2022, an armed conflict between Russian Federation (Russia) and Ukraine escalated. As Russia and Ukraine are major wheat exporters, this will aggravate the already precarious food security situation in many developing countries by disrupting wheat production and export and by accelerating price hikes in import-dependent developing countries. This study examines the potential impacts of this ongoing armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine on wheat price, consumption, and calorie intake from wheat. In doing so, it applies the conditional mixed process estimation procedure using information collected from 163 countries and territories for the years 2016–2019 from online database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The study shows that, on average, a 1% decrease in the global wheat trade could increase the producers' price of wheat by 1.1%, and a 1% increase in the producers' price could reduce the yearly per capita wheat consumption by 0.59%, daily calorie intake by 0.54% and protein intake by 0.64% in the sampled countries. Based on this, the study demonstrates that a 50% reduction in wheat exports by Russia and Ukraine could increase the producers’ price of wheat by 15%, which would induce a reduction in wheat consumption and dietary energy intake by at least 8%. Since wheat export has reduced from both Russia and Ukraine, to avoid a food crisis in developing countries, policies are suggested, including near term improvement of domestic wheat production by promoting improved agronomic practices to close yield gaps to meet a substantial portion of wheat self-sufficiency goals. In the long run, countries in Africa, East Asia and South America can explore expanding wheat into new land area. International donor agencies can play a key role in supporting the ongoing wheat research and development activities.
Assessing the initial impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian agriculture: Challenges, policy responses, and future prospects.
Nehrey, M., & Finger, R. (2024).
Heliyon
Assessing the initial impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian agriculture: Challenges, policy responses, and future prospects.Agriculture & Food SecurityNehrey, M., & Finger, R. (2024). Assessing the initial impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian agriculture: Challenges, policy responses, and future prospects. Heliyon, 10(21), e39208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e39208The war in Ukraine has caused significant losses to the Ukrainian agricultural sector and threatened global food security. This study aims to comprehensively analyse the impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian agriculture in its initial phase, examine the responses of Ukrainian agricultural policy and outline key elements for the post-war development of the Ukrainian agricultural sector. Using a systematic approach that includes thorough data collection and analysis from official sources, the Ukrainian press, relevant legislation and statistical data, our study focuses on the first five months of the conflict, from February 24, 2022 to July 24, 2022, to identify the main challenges during this period. The agricultural policy analysis shows that the Ukrainian government has adopted a reactive approach, including tax simplification, affordable credit, deregulation, financial support for the agricultural sector, reduced prices for inputs and resources to support farmers, and improvements in logistics. Critical factors identified for post-war development include repatriation and agricultural education, support for small and medium-sized farms, integration into global markets, emphasis on organic practices and sustainable development, and digitalization in agriculture. The integration of a systematic overview of the Ukrainian agricultural sector and an analysis of key elements of post-war development provides essential insights for policy-makers and researchers concerned with the impact of war on the agricultural sector and food security.
Needed global wheat stock and crop management in response to the war in Ukraine.
Nóia Júnior, R. de S., Ewert, F., Webber, H., Martre, P., Hertel, T. W., van Ittersum, M. K., & Asseng, S. (2022).
Global Food Security
Needed global wheat stock and crop management in response to the war in Ukraine.Agriculture & Food SecurityNóia Júnior, R. de S., Ewert, F., Webber, H., Martre, P., Hertel, T. W., van Ittersum, M. K., & Asseng, S. (2022). Needed global wheat stock and crop management in response to the war in Ukraine. Global Food Security, 35, 100662. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2022.100662The war in Ukraine threatened to block 9% of global wheat exports, driving wheat prices to unprecedented heights. We advocate, that in the short term, compensating for such an export shortage will require a coordinated release of wheat stocks, while if the export block persists, other export countries will need to fill the gap by increasing wheat yields or by expanding wheat cropping areas by 8% in aggregate. We estimate that a production increase would require an extra half a million tons of nitrogen fertilizer, yet fertilizer prices are at record levels, driven by rising energy prices. Year-to-year variability plus more frequent climate change-induced crop failures could additionally reduce exports by another 5 to 7 million tons in any given year, further stressing global markets. Without stabilizing wheat supplies through judicious management of stocks and continuing yield improvements, food and national security are at risk across many nations in the world.
The economic impacts of Russia–Ukraine War export disruptions of grain commodities.
Rose, A., Chen, Z., & Wei, D. (2023).
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
The economic impacts of Russia–Ukraine War export disruptions of grain commodities.Agriculture & Food SecurityRose, A., Chen, Z., & Wei, D. (2023). The economic impacts of Russia–Ukraine War export disruptions of grain commodities. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 45(2), 645–665. https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13351Using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)computable general equilibrium model, we analyze theeconomic impacts of grain export disruptions caused bythe Russia–Ukraine War during the first year of hostili-ties. The simulation results indicate that these disrup-tions not only affect Ukraine and Russia but alsogenerate significant economic impacts across otherworld regions. Ukraine is projected to experience thelargest impact on its own economy, with a real GDPloss of $859 million. In contrast, Russia's GDP is projec-ted to decline by only $3.8 million, primarily due to itsmuch lower dependence on grain exports and to favor-able terms of trade effects.
The imbalance of food and biofuel markets amid Ukraine-Russia crisis: A systems thinking perspective.
Shams Esfandabadi, Z., Ranjbari, M., & Scagnelli, S. (2022).
Biofuel Research Journal
The imbalance of food and biofuel markets amid Ukraine-Russia crisis: A systems thinking perspective.Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityShams Esfandabadi, Z., Ranjbari, M., & Scagnelli, S. (2022). The imbalance of food and biofuel markets amid Ukraine-Russia crisis: A systems thinking perspective. Biofuel Research Journal, 9(2), 1640–1647. https://doi.org/10.18331/BRJ2022.9.2.5The Ukraine war has immensely affected both food and energy systems due to the significant role of Russia in supplying natural gas and fertilizers globally and the extensive contribution of both Russia and Ukraine in exporting grains and oilseeds to the international markets. Hence, the Ukraine-Russia conflict has resulted in a shortage of crops and grains in the food market, especially in Europe, causing speculations if these resources should still be used for biofuel production (1st Generation). However, the International Energy Agency has warned that lowering biofuel mandates could result in rising petroleum demand and supply concerns. In light of these unfolding events, a systems thinking approach is required to monitor and analyze the implications of this crisis for food and biofuel markets as a whole to alleviate the concerns faced and plan sustainably. In this vein, based on the trade-offs between food system elements and the biofuel supply chain, as well as the potential effects of the war on the food and energy systems worldwide, a causal loop diagram is developed in the present work. According to the insights provided, the key to preventing food insecurity and keeping biofuel mandates on an increasing trend simultaneously amid the Ukraine war is to switch from the 1st Generation biofuels to higher generations. This transition would reduce not only the pressure on the food market to move toward zero hunger (SDG 2) but also pave the way to move towards a circular economy and clean and affordable energy (SDG 7) during the post-war era
Non‐tariff measures and productivity of Ukrainian food‐processing firms.
Shepotylo, O., Vakhitov, V., Movchan, V., & Panga, M. (2022).
Journal of Agricultural Economics
Non‐tariff measures and productivity of Ukrainian food‐processing firms.Agriculture & Food SecurityShepotylo, O., Vakhitov, V., Movchan, V., & Panga, M. (2022). Non‐tariff measures and productivity of Ukrainian food‐processing firms. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 73(1), 234–256. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12451Using detailed data on veterinary, ecological, sanitary, phytosanitary and mandatory certification measures, this paper studies the effect of non‐tariff measures (NTMs) on firm productivity in the food‐processing industry through forward and backward linkages. Using quantity and value of output at product level, we calculate and compare quantity‐ and revenue‐based measures of total factor productivity (TFP). Exploiting the episode of NTM liberalisation in Ukraine in 2008–2012, we find that NTMs on intermediate inputs have a negative effect on quantity‐based TFP. Other trade policy variables, including input tariffs and output NTMs also negatively influence productivity. The effect on the revenue‐based TFP is weaker due to price and quality adjustments. Interacting changes in input NTMs with import intensity prior to trade liberalisation, we find that firms that used imported inputs more intensively tend to have lower long‐run TFP growth.
The Ukraine–Russia War Is Deepening Food Insecurity, Unhealthy Dietary Patterns and the Lack of Dietary Diversity in Lebanon: Prevalence, Correlates and Findings from a National Cross-Sectional Study.
Yazbeck, N., Mansour, R., Salame, H., Chahine, N. B., & Hoteit, M. (2022).
Nutrients
The Ukraine–Russia War Is Deepening Food Insecurity, Unhealthy Dietary Patterns and the Lack of Dietary Diversity in Lebanon: Prevalence, Correlates and Findings from a National Cross-Sectional Study.Agriculture & Food SecurityYazbeck, N., Mansour, R., Salame, H., Chahine, N. B., & Hoteit, M. (2022). The Ukraine–Russia War Is Deepening Food Insecurity, Unhealthy Dietary Patterns and the Lack of Dietary Diversity in Lebanon: Prevalence, Correlates and Findings from a National Cross-Sectional Study. Nutrients, 14(17), Article 3504. https://doi.org/10.3390/nu14173504Yazbeck, N., Mansour, R., Salame, H., Chahine, N. B., & Hoteit, M. (2022). The Ukraine-Russia War Is Deepening Food Insecurity, Unhealthy Dietary Patterns and the Lack of Dietary Diversity in Lebanon: Prevalence, Correlates and Findings from a National Cross-Sectional Study. Nutrients, 14(17), 3504. https://doi.org/10.3390/nu14173504Background: Due to Russia and Ukraine's key roles in supplying cereals and oilseeds, the Russia-Ukraine war intensifies the current food availability and price challenges in Lebanon, which is a major wheat importer. Given these constraints, we conducted this study to assess the prevalence and correlates of food insecurity, low dietary diversity (DD), unhealthy dietary patterns, and the shifts in households' food-related habits in response to the Russia-Ukraine war among a representative sample of Lebanese household's members aged 18 years and above (N = 914).Methods: Data were collected between June and July 2022 using self-administered questionnaires; Results: Findings showed that nearly half of the households consume an undiversified diet (46%), and 55.3% ate fewer than two meals per day. The prevalence of food insecurity among Lebanese households was 74%, with one in every four households being severely food insecure. In addition, the majority of households' members went out shopping and purchased food less than the pre-war period (68.7% and 70.3%, respectively). Furthermore, almost 68.3% of households' members highlighted price increases for cereal products, which were the least available and most stocked items. Findings obtained through binary logistic regression also showed that food insecurity was two times higher among households with low monthly income, 35% higher among females, and three times higher among married participants; Conclusions: The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on food security in Lebanon requires a systems-thinking approach as well as international effort to understand the challenges and find solutions to minimize the war's negative effects.
Impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the international staple agrifood trade networks.
Zhang, Y.-T., Li, M.-Y., & Zhou, W.-X. (2024).
arXiv
Impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the international staple agrifood trade networks.Agriculture & Food SecurityZhang, Y.-T., Li, M.-Y., & Zhou, W.-X. (2024). Impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the international staple agrifood trade networks (arXiv:2403.12496). arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2403.12496The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a growing concern worldwide and poses serious threats to regional and global food security. Using monthly trade data for maize, rice, and wheat from 2016/1 to 2022/12, this paper constructs three international crop trade networks (iCTNs) and an aggregate international food trade network (iFTN). We aim to examine the structural changes following the occurrence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We find significant shifts in the number of edges, average degree, density, efficiency, and natural connectivity in the third quarter of 2022, particularly in the international wheat trade network. Additionally, we have shown that political reasons have caused more pronounced changes in the trade connections between the economies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia than with Ukraine. This paper could provide insights into the negative impact of geopolitical conflicts on the global food system and encourage a series of effective strategies to mitigate the negative impact of the conflict on global food trade.
Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the global energy and food security.
Zhou, X.-Y., Lu, G., Xu, Z., Yan, X., Khu, S.-T., Yang, J., & Zhao, J. (2023).
Resources
Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the global energy and food security.Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityZhou, X.-Y., Lu, G., Xu, Z., Yan, X., Khu, S.-T., Yang, J., & Zhao, J. (2023). Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the global energy and food security. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 188, 106657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106657The Russian- Ukraine War has and further influence the global energy and food security. However, the detailed influence degree, key weak points and influence process is still unclear in the current. Therefore, this study established a newly improved under-load cascading failure model with consideration of overload limitation, and used it to evaluate influence of Russian- Ukraine War on the global energy and food security. This study also proposed a method to assess the network structure characteristic including robustness and resilience through model simulation under different scenarios. The main results include: The upper limitation of node load has the dominant function on the global energy and food security, while the influence of lower limitation parameter of node load has limited function. All of the networks have relative consistent recover and anti-damage ability against Russian and Ukraine War and the global panic except barley network. A key phenomenon we should concern is that the largest trade flow amounts are not occurred in the failure nodes. The failure nodes are always the countries with low economic scale and political status. The results tell us that we should further strengthen the importance of enhance production ability and energy types to resist the risk of Russian and Ukraine War. The global international organizations are also required to strengthen the function of balance the global security demand of energy and food between big countries and small countries. We should pay more attention to the little countries in the Africa and Asia to handle the risk.
Near-real time analysis of war and economic activity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Zhukov, Y. M. (2023).
Journal of Comparative Economics
Near-real time analysis of war and economic activity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.Political Economy, Agriculture & Food SecurityZhukov, Y. M. (2023). Near-real time analysis of war and economic activity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Journal of Comparative Economics, 51(4), 1232–1243. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.06.003aThis paper introduces near-real time data on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and uses these data to investigate the short-term impact of occupation and violence on local economic activity. The data project – VIINA (Violent Incident Information from News Articles) – parses news reports from Ukrainian and Russian media, georeferences them, and classifies them into standard event categories (e.g. artillery shelling) through machine learning. As we show, VIINA is more geographically comprehensive and more thoroughly documented than other open-source event databases on Ukraine, and is the only such effort to track territorial control. We illustrate applications for research on political economy, by utilizing remote sensing data on luminosity and vegetation as proxies for urban economic activity and agricultural land use. We find that economic activity declined most in urban areas that neither side fully controlled, and in places most exposed to artillery shelling. Areas under Russian occupation, however, were more insulated from these negative shocks. Although not causal, these findings are in line with the view that war brings not only economic devastation, but also vast geographic inequalities that are almost immediately observable from space.

Macroeconomics

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on European Union currencies: A high-frequency analysis.
Akarsu, M. Z., & Gharehgozli, O. (2024).
Policy Studies
The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on European Union currencies: A high-frequency analysis.Business & Finance, MacroeconomicsAkarsu, M. Z., & Gharehgozli, O. (2024). The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on European Union currencies: A high-frequency analysis. Policy Studies, 45(3–4), 353–376. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2268543This article examines how the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war has affected the valuation of five European Union currencies: the Polish Zloty, Hungarian Forint, Czech Koruna, Swedish Krone, and Romanian Leu. Using high-frequency time series data and advanced statistical models, we analyze a 522-week period from 1 January 2013, to 24 February 2023, with 24 February 2022, as a key focal point. The Russia-Ukraine war had varying effects on the currencies of non-Eurozone countries. Poland, Hungary, and Sweden experienced significant impacts, while Czechia and Romania remained relatively stable. Our research also highlights the stability of the Euro as a reserve currency, which attracts investors during times of crisis and protects participating economies from currency fluctuations. Additionally, our analysis underscores the distinct impact of war on these currencies, influenced by their unique political, economic, and financial structures and strengths.
Assessing the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms in Ukraine
Ari, A., & Pula, G. (2021)
International Monetary Fund
Assessing the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms in Ukraine (IMF Working Paper No. 21/100).MacroeconomicsAri, A., & Pula, G. (2021). Assessing the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms in Ukraine (IMF Working Paper No. 21/100). International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/04/23/Assessing-the-Macroeconomic-Impact-of-Structural-Reforms-in-Ukraine-50345 Ukraine’s economic performance has been anemic since the early 1990s. A major impediment to productivity growth has been low investment, held back by lack of strong and independent institutions. This paper aims to assess the major areas of institutional weakness in Ukraine and quantify the long-term growth impact of catching-up to Poland in terms of the quality of major economic institutions and market development. Our analysis identifies the legal system as the area where the institutional quality is weakest compared to Poland, followed distantly by market competition, openness to trade and financial depth. Using a methodology that accounts for positive spillovers between the structural reform areas, we estimate that even under the most optimistic scenario, where institutional gaps are fully addressed, Ukraine would need 15 years to catch up to Poland’s current income level.
Replacing foreign aid: A macroeconomic plan B for Ukraine (and Europe) (Policy Insight 140).
Becker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., Sologoub, I., Weder di Mauro, B. (2025).
Centre for Economic and Policy Research
Replacing foreign aid: A macroeconomic plan B for Ukraine (and Europe) (Policy Insight 140).MacroeconomicsBecker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., Sologoub, I., Weder di Mauro, B. (2025). Replacing foreign aid: A macroeconomic plan B for Ukraine (and Europe) (Policy Insight 140). Centre for Economic and Policy Research, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d0ed7795d764000017ccc00/t/67da137785869201ed876c92/1742345080045/241621-policy_insight_140_replacing_foreign_aid_a__250318_161934.pdf
Macroeconomic Policies for Wartime Ukraine (Rapid Response Economics 2).
Becker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., Weder di Mauro, B. (2022).
CEPR Press
Macroeconomic Policies for Wartime Ukraine (Rapid Response Economics 2).MacroeconomicsBecker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., Weder di Mauro, B. (2022). Macroeconomic Policies for Wartime Ukraine (Rapid Response Economics 2). CEPR Press, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/171643-macroeconomic_policies_for_wartime_ukraine.pdf
Economic and financial consequences of war in Ukraine: Analysis of development scenarios.
Bida, M., & Ruda, I. (2022).
Financial Internet Quarterly
Economic and financial consequences of war in Ukraine: Analysis of development scenarios.MacroeconomicsBida, M., & Ruda, I. (2022). Economic and financial consequences of war in Ukraine: Analysis of development scenarios. Financial Internet Quarterly, 18(4), 88–101. https://doi.org/10.2478/fiqf-2022-0022The war affects the socio-economic state of Ukraine and is the cause of the deterioration of the economic situation of neighboring countries. Under such conditions, there is a need to carry out assessments of economic losses from the conduct of military operations and forecast the main economic indicators for the nearest period, taking into account the impact of the war. The purpose of the study is to calculate the losses to the economy, the destruction of residential facilities and critical infrastructure facilities in the first 100 days of the war, the assessment of the potential volume of the fall in GDP and the calculation of projected fiscal losses. The calculation of GDP reduction was based on the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and the Government of Ukraine. The expected amount of GDP reduction is calculated using the GAP-analysis method, based on the forecasts made by these institutions in the prewar period, and the calculation of the level of GDP during the war. Based on the results of the conducted research, it was established that the economic losses from the war consist not only of the losses incurred and the reduction of GDP volumes, but also of the lost opportunities for development and unearned profits. In addition to the reduction in GDP, Ukraine's losses are manifested in the increase in the level of public debt, the depreciation of the national currency, the reduction of gold and currency reserves, and the outflow of foreign direct investments3
Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union.
Blanchard, O., & Pisani-Ferry, J. (2022).
Bruegel
Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeBlanchard, O., & Pisani-Ferry, J. (2022). Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union. Policy Contribution 06/2022. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/fiscal-support-and-monetary-vigilance-economic-policy-implications-russia-ukraine-warFor Europe, the war in Ukraine is a first-order economic shock. While the direct fiscal implications of taking care of refugees, increasing military spending and strengthening energy autonomy remain limited, the impact of elevated energy and food prices on national income and its distribution is potentially significant. This raises three macroeconomic challenges for policymakers: • How best to use sanctions to deter Russia while limiting adverse effects on the European Union economy: in this respect, it is important to distinguish between oil and gas. For oil, Russia can diversify away from the EU market and, despite sanctions, sell on the world market where it operates as a price taker. For gas, the European Union has substantial leverage because Russia depends on the pipeline infrastructure linking it to the European market. However, gas supply from other sources is relatively inelastic. • How to deal with cuts to real income because of the increase in the energy import bill: if governments want to protect buyers, they must decide on mechanisms and how to finance the extra spending. Fiscal support and thus some additional deficit finance may be needed, though debt should remain sustainable. • How to deal with the increase in inflation as a result of higher energy and food prices: there is a need to avoid a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, which is even more challenging than usual given that inflation had already substantially increased before the war. Preventing this risk would call for a tightening of monetary policy. However, the loss of real income is likely to lead to weaker aggregate demand, implying a need to loosen policy. Policymakers must cope with these conflicting objectives, ensuring that policy instruments complement each other. A combination of well- designed fiscal support to households and tripartite wage discussions may help soften the trade-off the central bank faces. However, the outcomes of the war in Ukraine are unpredictable, and policy must be able to respond quickly to changing circumstances.
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.
Boashash, A. (2023).
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management
The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & Trade, Energy & Environment, Agriculture & Food SecurityBoashash, A. (2023). The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the global economy. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies on Management, Business, and Economy, 6(1), 64–79. https://journals.ekb.eg/article_361369_81698de878eb16e49f040831731e2bf1.pdfThe conflict between Russia and Ukraine has had extensive repercussions on the world economy, impacting energy markets, supply chains, financial stability, and food security. Sanctions on Russian energy exports have led to a spike in energy prices, while disruptions in the supply of agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia have worsened global food shortages. Financial markets have experienced heightened volatility and uncertainty, influencing investment and economic expansion. Furthermore, the war has prompted shifts in global trade patterns and alliances, necessitating collaborative international measures to stabilize markets, guarantee food security, and advocate for sustainable economic strategies.
The EU's socio-economic development against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine.
Boichenko, K., Ashraf, R. U., Mata, M. N., & Gherghina, Ș. C. (2023).
Central European Economic Journal
The EU's socio-economic development against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine.MacroeconomicsBoichenko, K., Ashraf, R. U., Mata, M. N., & Gherghina, Ș. C. (2023). The EU's socio-economic development against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. Central European Economic Journal, 10(57), 72–89. https://doi.org/10.2478/ceej-2023-0005The war in Ukraine affects the European Union (EU) member states asymmetrically. The purpose of the study is to determine changes in the development of the EU countries in three key directions: ‘economy and environment’, ‘business and trade’, and ‘people and work’; to identify clusters of countries with similar transformations; and to model the impact of the studied indicators on the level of public debt amid the war in Ukraine. The research methodology includes the definition of a complex indicator of changes in the socio-economic development of EU countries, correlation and cluster analysis, and modelling the influence of the studied factors/indicators on the level of public debt. Research of changes in the context of the proposed complex indicators and their components under conditions of war showed that the changes in the areas under review varied for EU countries. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, 17 EU countries faced a slowdown in their socio-economic growth, among which Poland was the most severely affected. Modelling made it possible to determine that, amid the war, the most important factors for the EU public debt are inflation, labour market conditions, and the possibilities of the balance of payments and the international investment position incorporated into GDP. The conducted research proves that the war in Ukraine increases the scale and relevance of general challenges that cannot be addressed at the national level. Strengthening the European defence against external aggression is the entire task of the EU.
Economic consequences and implications of the Ukraine-Russia war.
Khudaykulova, M., Yuanqiong, H., & Khudaykulov, A. (2022).
International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration
Economic consequences and implications of the Ukraine-Russia war.Sanctions & Trade, MacroeconomicsKhudaykulova, M., Yuanqiong, H., & Khudaykulov, A. (2022). Economic consequences and implications of the Ukraine-Russia war. International Journal of Management Science and Business Administration, 8(4), 44–52. https://doi.org/10.18775/ijmsba.1849-5664-5419.2014.84.1005Since the end of the Cold War, the sanctions against Russia have been the harshest and most costly imposed on a major economy. They appear to be unprecedented in terms of speed, breadth, and global coordination. The latest situation heightens the sense of danger that comes with cross-border financial and operational vulnerability. Even if future oil and gas embargoes are imposed, the economy of Russia will rest on its current export strategy, which may be tough to weaken. The important factors to take into account at the onset of the war are the opportunity cost of military investment, the humanitarian loss of the financial system, and the burden of repairing post-war damage. In this paper we review the economic impact of war, and discuss the potential implications of the Russia Ukraine war on the local economies and global economy. There are human costs of war along with the adverse economic implications related to devastation, inflation, limitation of services debt increase, and daily economic life.
Economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war.
Liadze, I., Macchiarelli, C., Mortimer-Lee, P., & Sanchez Juanino, P. (2023).
The World Economy
Economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war.MacroeconomicsLiadze, I., Macchiarelli, C., Mortimer-Lee, P. and Sanchez Juanino, P. (2023). Economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war. World Econ, 46: 874-886. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13336 The unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine by Russiaon 24 February 2022 is imposing a terrible human cost. Inthis paper, we use the National Institute Global Economet-ric Model (NiGEM) to quantify the impact of the war on theglobal economy. The war represents a massive cost, equiv-alent to 1% of global GDP in 2022, or about $1.5 trillionvalued at purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP),compared with our GDP forecast made at the beginningof 2022. Europe is the region affected most, given tradelinks its proximity to Ukraine and Russia and its relianceon energy and food supplies from those countries. GDPin Europe is expected to shrink by more than 1% in 2022compared with our forecast at the beginning of 2022. InWestern Europe, Germany will be worst affected, followedby France and Italy. GDP in ‘Developing Europe’, whereUkraine is the largest representative, is expected to shrinkby 30%. The war will also add about 2% to global inflationin 2022 and 1% in 2023, compared with NIESR's inflationprojection at the beginning of 2022.
Economic consequences of war in Ukraine: A comprehensive analysis.
Lușcan, M.-C. (2024).
Annals of the University of Oradea
Economic consequences of war in Ukraine: A comprehensive analysis.MacroeconomicsLușcan, M.-C. (2024). Economic consequences of war in Ukraine: A comprehensive analysis. Annals of the University of Oradea, Economic Science Series, 33(1), 416–424. https://anale.steconomiceuoradea.ro/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/AUOES.July_.2024.43.pdf The armed conflict that erupted in Ukraine has had profound economic ramifications, not only for the country itself but also for the wider region. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine, exploring its impact on various sectors and long-term development prospects. Drawing upon a range of primary and secondary data sources, the study presents a multifaceted assessment of the economic effects, considering both immediate and long-term implications. The paper examines the direct costs of the conflict, including the destruction of infrastructure, loss of human capital, and disruption of production and trade. It investigates the impact on key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and finance, highlighting the challenges faced by businesses and the labor market. It examines the role of external financial assistance and the effectiveness of economic policies implemented during the crisis. Finally, the study concludes by synthesizing the key findings on the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine. These recommendations encompass both short-term measures to address immediate challenges and long-term strategies to foster sustainable economic development and reconciliation. This comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences of the war in Ukraine contributes to the existing literature by providing a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted impacts of the conflict. It offers valuable insights for policymakers, international organizations, and researchers seeking to comprehend and address the economic challenges arising from war-affected regions.
Russia–Ukraine conflict and its impact on global inflation: An event study-based approach.
Maurya, P. K., Bansal, R., & Mishra, A. K. (2023).
Journal of Economic Studies
Russia–Ukraine conflict and its impact on global inflation: An event study-based approach.MacroeconomicsMaurya, P. K., Bansal, R., & Mishra, A. K. (2023). Russia–Ukraine conflict and its impact on global inflation: An event study-based approach. Journal of Economic Studies, 50(8), 1824–1846. https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-01-2023-0003 Purpose - This study investigates how the conflict between Russia and Ukraine impacts global inflation. Design/methodology/approach - The study uses monthly consumer price index (CPI) data from 60 countries for 30 months, from January 2020 to June 2022. An event study methodology has been employed to check abnormal variation in the CPI, after classifying country-specific monthly data into nine groups. Findings - The outcome revealed that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered inflation globally. However, the severity of inflation in the sample countries is determined by their geographical proximity and trading activity with the countries in conflict. A significant rise in inflation was observed among major European economies during the invasion. As the war continues, the increase in the price of essential commodities is evident worldwide. Originality/value - The war literature till now has concentrated on stock markets, energy markets, exchange rates and precious metals. Since no previous research has attempted to quantify the abnormal effect of the war on domestic and global inflation, the current study will shed much-needed light on the subject.
Russian-Ukraine 2022 war: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe.
Mbah, R. E., & Wasum, D. F. (2022).
Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal
Russian-Ukraine 2022 war: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeMbah, R. E., & Wasum, D. F. (2022). Russian-Ukraine 2022 war: A review of the economic impact of Russian-Ukraine crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(3), 144–153. https://doi.org/10.14738/assrj.93.12005The popular belief worldwide is that the global financial sanctions unleashed on Russia, the seizure of assets and properties of the oligarch friends to President Putin for Russia’s current attack on Ukraine will cripple the Russian economy and hinder any further attack on Ukraine. This is logical reasoning, however, the impact of this crisis extends to the global economy. Thus, the purpose of this study is to review the economic impact of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war on key global economic actors, specifically, countries that have unleashed financial sanctions on Russia as punishment like the USA, Canada, UK, and EU. This study uses the Social Contract and the Interest Group Theories to explain the rationale behind this crisis from its origin. Evidence from reviewed literature shows that although the consequences of this crisis have had a fatal impact on Russia’s economy, the world economy has begun to feel the impact of this crisis. Inflation which is already ravaging most global economies is steadily rising due to the sharp increase in oil, natural gas, and food prices just a few days into this crisis. Experts expect a negative impact on household consumption, increase uncertainty, unpredictable stock swings, supply chain disruptions, bulging utility bills, decreased investment due to political risks, and economic growth impediments. It is therefore vital for policymakers worldwide to seek alternative means of survival if Russia decides to react by restricting its export of vital global commodities of which it is a significant export leader like oil, natural gas, wheat, neon, titanium, palladium, and ammonium nitrate.
The Effect of Ukraine-Russia War on the Economies of Ukraine’s Top Trading Partners.
Nagapudi, A. (2024).
International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research
The Effect of Ukraine-Russia War on the Economies of Ukraine’s Top Trading Partners.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeNagapudi, A. (2024). The Effect of Ukraine-Russia War on the Economies of Ukraine’s Top Trading Partners. International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.46609/ijsser.2024.v09i09.014 This research paper studies the impact of the Ukraine-Russia war on the economies of Ukraine’s top trading partners. Several earlier studies have examined the implications of the war for global trade and development, and how countries highly dependent on exports from the conflict region have responded. In our paper, we focused only on Ukraine, analyzed both import and export partners of Ukraine, and developed a framework to assess the impact of the war on various macroeconomic indicators for these partner countries. In particular, we established Difference-in-Difference based statistical models for Gross Domestic Product (GDP), food inflation, manufacturing production, gasoline prices and changes in inventories the for partner and non-partner countries over the pre-war and post-war years from 2021 through 2023. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the devastating and far-reaching economic effects of the Ukraine-Russia war that serve as a cautionary tale for world citizens and leaders alike.
Global economic consequence of Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Ozili, P. K. (2024).
In Dealing with regional conflicts of global importance
Global economic consequence of Russian invasion of Ukraine.Macroeconomics, Sanctions & TradeOzili, P. K. (2024). Global economic consequence of Russian invasion of Ukraine. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064770This paper explores the global economic consequence of the Russian-Ukraine war in the month of invasion. Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022. As a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, multiple international sanctions were imposed on Russia to compel Russia to de-escalate the crisis. The sanctions imposed on Russia, although intended to hurt Russia, had spillover effects to the global economy mainly through global supply chain disruption. Using global data and data from the Euro Area, Ukraine and Russia, the findings show that there was an increase in the global PMI and an increase in the world price of food and food ingredients. The index of global stock markets plunged on the day of invasion. The Euro Area manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) declined in the month of the invasion. Also, the transportation component of the consumer price index rose in the month of the invasion due to shortage of energy and fuel supplies which led to a rise in the price of gasoline for transportation in the Euro Area. Ukraine experienced a more devastating effect from the invasion than Russia and the entire Euro Area. Core consumer prices in Ukraine and the Euro Area were highly correlated during the invasion. Food inflation was highly correlated in the Euro Area and in Russia. Also, there is a positive and high correlation between world food price index, world oils price index, world diary price index and world cereals price index during the month of the invasion. The conflict led to a global rise in prices leading to a rise in global inflation. Although conflict resolution between Russia and Ukraine was brokered by Israel, the economic effect of the crisis still lingered on in many parts of Europe and beyond Europe.
Economic impact of Russia's war on Ukraine: European Council response
Papunen, A. (2024).
European Parliamentary Research Service
Economic impact of Russia's war on Ukraine: European Council response (PE 757.783).MacroeconomicsPapunen, A. (2024). Economic impact of Russia's war on Ukraine: European Council response (PE 757.783). European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/757783/EPRS_BRI(2024)757783_EN.pdfThursday, 24 February 2022 was a turning point in European history. Overnight, Russia launched a brutalwar of aggression on Ukraine, an independent European nation. Two years after the start of the war, its negative effects have been far-reaching. In addition to the harrowing human cost of the war, the economic impact has been devastating in Ukraine itself, but also substantial for the European Union and the world more widely. In the EU, the economic recoveryfollowing the COVID-19 pandemic has been slower than expected because of the war in Ukraine. The European Commission's 2021Autumn Forecast predicted 4.3% growth in gross domestic product (GDP) for the EU for 2022, and 2.5 % for 2023, but growth finally registered at 3.5 % for 2022 and an estimated 0.5% for 2023. The EU also experienced a severe energy and a cost-of-living crisis in 2022, with ripple effects that are still being felt today. The increasing price of energy resulted in exceptionally high inflation figures in autumn 2022, especially in October 2022. This created difficult framework conditions for both EU citizens and companies. Furthermore, to bring inflation down to the 2% target level, the European Central Bank began to raise its interest rates, with considerable impact, particularly on citizens and companies with large variable-rate loans. This briefing looks at the economic impact Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine has had on the European Union over the last 24months,and analyses how the European Council has responded to limit the negative economic effects of the war. EU leaders followed the developing situation closely and reacted immediately to the Russian attack in February2022. In addition to sanctions prepared in coordination with EU allies, the EU leaders also tasked the European Commission to prepare contingency measures. At an informal meeting in Versailles, EU leaders adopted a declaration in which they stressed the need to strengthen the EU economic base and the single market. They also took steps towards encouraging open strategic autonomy, aimed at allowing the EU to stand on its own two feet in the new and rapidly changing geopolitical situation. Since then, Russia's war of aggression inUkraine and its impact havebeen rolling agenda itemsat European Council meetings. Furthermore, the EU and its Member States have supported Ukraine and Ukrainians with almost €88 billion (figures from January 2024), including financial, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian and military aid. At its December2023 meeting, the European Council decided to open accession talks with Ukraine.
Medium-term macroeconomic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how it affects energy security and global emission targets
Rojas-Romagosa, H. (2024)
International Monetary Fund
Medium-term macroeconomic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how it affects energy security and global emission targets (IMF Working Paper No. 2024/039).Macroeconomics, Energy & EnvironmentRojas-Romagosa, H. (2024). Medium-term macroeconomic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine and how it affects energy security and global emission targets (IMF Working Paper No. 2024/039). International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/02/14/Medium-Term-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-Russias-War-in-Ukraine-and-How-It-Affects-Energy-541643Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted the supply of natural gas for many European countries, triggering an energy crisis and affecting energy security. We simulate the medium-term effects of these trade disruptions and find that most European countries have limited GDP losses but those more dependent on Russian natural gas face moderate losses. European fossil fuel consumption and emissions are reduced and after accounting for the war impacts, achieving Europe’s emission targets becomes slightly less costly. In terms of energy security, the war eliminates European energy dependency from Russian imports, but most of the natural gas and oil imports will be substituted by other suppliers. We also find that constructing a new Russian pipeline to China does not provide significant macroeconomic benefits to either country.
Effects of Russia-Ukraine war.
Shah, P., & Gedamkar, P. (2022).
International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management
Effects of Russia-Ukraine war.Macroeconomics, Business & FinanceShah, P., & Gedamkar, P. (2022). Effects of Russia-Ukraine war. International Journal of Scientific Research in Engineering and Management, 6(3), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.55041/IJSREM11973 The Ukraine crisis can be understood as one of the most controversial events in the today’s global political debate. The ongoing conflict has come to affect and influence Europe’s as well as the rest of the world’s foreignand security policies. From a historical perspective Ukraine has been torn between East and West ever since the country became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. The International Monetary Fund warned Russia’s war with Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions imposed upon President Vladimir Putin’s country will have a “severe impact” on the global economy. Having built up a large military presence on the border from late 2021, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which is ongoing. Price shocks will have an impact worldwide, especially on poor households for whom food and fuel are a higher proportion of expenses. Russia’s ultrarich who rank among the world’s 500 wealthiest people have now lost a combined $83 billion this year. The war resulted economic loss which has a huge impact on the global economy
Repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war.
Tong, E. (2024).
International Review of Economics & Finance
Repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war.Macroeconomics, Business & FinanceTong, E. (2024). Repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine war. International Review of Economics & Finance, 89(Part A), 366–390. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.064Using the heteroscedasticity-based estimator of Rigobon and Sack (2005) to identify daily shocks of the Russia–Ukraine war, I assess and quantify the dynamic impact of the conflict on 86 open economies from January 2021 to November 2022. Within local projections, I show that war shocks caused considerable effects on macroeconomic conditions, financial markets, and global financial stability. Following a shock, weekly GDP fell significantly while inflation expectations and commodity prices soared, verifying the war’s nature as a contractionary supply shock. While global stock prices fell, the long-term government bond yields remained stable, implying the crisis had not triggered a flight of capital to the US, and governments remained able to borrow at the pre-war costs of funding. More concerning, a range of indicators – implied volatility, credit default swap spread, cross-currency basis – suggest a significant and sustained increase in systemic financial stress. Through a state-dependent model, I show that energy importers and nations that share borders or have close trade and military ties with the belligerents were more affected by war shocks. Taken together, these findings may inform policy responses and assist households and firms in preparing for possible contingencies arising from the war.

Refugees & Labor Markets

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
Discrepancies in the European Union’s responses: Syrian versus Ukrainian refugee crises.
Aşkar Karakır, İ., & Akgül Durakçay, F. (2024).
Akdeniz University Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences Faculty Journal
Discrepancies in the European Union’s responses: Syrian versus Ukrainian refugee crises.Refugees & Labor MarketsAşkar Karakır, İ., & Akgül Durakçay, F. (2024). Discrepancies in the European Union’s responses: Syrian versus Ukrainian refugee crises. Akdeniz University Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences Faculty Journal, 24(2), 114–127. https://doi.org/10.25294/auiibfd.1511462Irregular refugee flows have always constituted a serious concern for the European Union (EU). Thirteen years have passed since the starting of the Syrian Civil War and the number of displaced Syrians reached over 14 million (UNHCR 2024). While the Syrian refugee crisis was unfolding, Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to the emergence of an additional refugee crisis: the Ukrainian refugee crisis. The number of displaced Ukrainians reached nearly 6.5 million (UNHCR 2024). In the case of Syrian refugees, the EU have preferred to deliver humanitarian aid to those states hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees and to control irregular Syrian refugee flows rather than providing legal grants. In contrast to the case of Syrian refugees, member states largely provided Ukrainian refugees legal protection in the form of temporary protection. In this regard, while the EU has demonstrated its full commitment to 1951 Refugee Convention (Geneva Convention) regarding Ukrainian refugees, similar adherence cannot be observed in terms of Syrian refugees. The purpose of this study is to identify the responses of the EU institutions and EU member states to Syrian and Ukrainian refugee crises. Through a comparative analysis, this study spotlights the EU’s contrasting policies and the geopolitical, social, and economic considerations influencing the divergent responses towards these two refugee populations.
The economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war: A synthetic control study of (lost) entrepreneurship
Audretsch, D. B., Momtaz, P. P., Motuzenko, H., & Vismara, S. (2023).
arXiv
The economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war: A synthetic control study of (lost) entrepreneurship.Refugees & Labor MarketsAudretsch, D. B., Momtaz, P. P., Motuzenko, H., & Vismara, S. (2023). The economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war: A synthetic control study of (lost) entrepreneurship (arXiv No. 2303.02773). arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2303.02773
Innovation for economic resilience: Strengthening Ukraine's human capital and science sector.
Bezvershenko, Y., Ganguli, I., Talavera, O., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2025).
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Innovation for economic resilience: Strengthening Ukraine's human capital and science sector.Refugees & Labor MarketsBezvershenko, Y., Ganguli, I., Talavera, O., & Gorodnichenko, Y. (2025). Innovation for economic resilience: Strengthening Ukraine's human capital and science sector. Centre for Economic Policy Research, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/235620-policy_insight_138_innovation_for_economic_resilience_strengthening_ukraine_s_human_capital_and_science_sector.pdf
Russian aggression against Ukraine and the making of refugees.
Burtsev, D. (2024).
Innovation in the Social Sciences
Russian aggression against Ukraine and the making of refugees.Refugees & Labor MarketsBurtsev, D. (2024). Russian aggression against Ukraine and the making of refugees. Innovation in the Social Sciences, 2(1), 32–52. https://doi.org/10.1163/27730611-bja10023This article examines the Russian invasion of Ukraine from the perspectives of Russian ideology, the tools used by the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine, and refugee-making. The article uses offensive realism as an approach to understanding the actions of Russia against Ukraine. Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 provoked international crises in numerous dimensions: political, security, humanitarian, and ecological. It became not only a war between countries, but a war between ways of thinking and ideologies. The reasoning and international policies behind this war might have very different and controversial interpretations; however, some explanation can be found by analyzing Russian inner-political discourse during the last two decades and the development of Russian ideology. The key research question of the article concerns the issue of Russian ideology and its role in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Stimulating growth in Ukraine and policies for migrants’ return (Policy Insight 132).
Dombrovskis, V., Obstfeld, M., Sologoub, I., Gorodnichenko, Y., Becker, T., Fedyk, A., Roland, G., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2024).
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Stimulating growth in Ukraine and policies for migrants’ return (Policy Insight 132).Refugees & Labor MarketsDombrovskis, V., Obstfeld, M., Sologoub, I., Gorodnichenko, Y., Becker, T., Fedyk, A., Roland, G., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2024). Stimulating growth in Ukraine and policies for migrants’ return (Policy Insight 132). Centre for Economic Policy Research, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/205927-policy_insight_132_stimulating_growth_in_ukraine_and_policies_for_migrants_return.pdf
The impact of the war on human capital and productivity in Ukraine.
Égert, B., & de la Maisonneuve, C. (2023).
Policy Studies
The impact of the war on human capital and productivity in Ukraine.Refugees & Labor MarketsÉgert, B., & de la Maisonneuve, C. (2023). The impact of the war on human capital and productivity in Ukraine. Policy Studies, 45(3–4), 282–292. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2288687This article explores the long-term macroeconomic impact of the war in Ukraine. Exploiting a new stock measure of human capital combining the quality and quantity of education and adult skills, this article quantifies the long-term effect of the war on aggregate productivity through the human capital channel. Results suggest that losses in long-run aggregate productivity could be at about 7% if the war lasts two years. These adverse effects come from school closure and the resulting decline in student learning outcomes and losses in workers’ skills, which, without remedial policy action, could persist for decades.
Ukraine refugees: From temporary protection to encouraging return to support the Ukrainian economy.
Gorodnichenko, Y. & Gros, D. (2025).
EconPol Forum
Ukraine refugees: From temporary protection to encouraging return to support the Ukrainian economy.Refugees & Labor MarketsGorodnichenko, Y. & Gros, D. (2025). Ukraine refugees: From temporary protection to encouraging return to support the Ukrainian economy. EconPol Forum, ISSN 2752-1184, CESifo GmbH, Munich, Vol. 26, Iss. 1, pp. 38-4. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/310938/1/1916640230.pdf
The effect of the war on human capital in Ukraine and the path for rebuilding
Gorodnichenko, Y., Kudlyak, M., & Şahin, A. (2022)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
The effect of the war on human capital in Ukraine and the path for rebuilding.Refugees & Labor MarketsGorodnichenko, Y., Kudlyak, M., & Şahin, A. (2022). The effect of the war on human capital in Ukraine and the path for rebuilding. IZA Policy Paper, No. 185, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA). https://hdl.handle.net/10419/273694
Russia–Ukraine war: A note on short-run production and labour market effects of the energy crisis.
Hutter, C., & Weber, E. (2023).
Energy Policy
Russia–Ukraine war: A note on short-run production and labour market effects of the energy crisis.Refugees & Labor Markets, Energy & EnvironmentHutter, C., & Weber, E. (2023). Russia–Ukraine war: A note on short-run production and labour market effects of the energy crisis. Energy Policy, 183, 113802. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113802We provide first causal evidence of effects of the energy crisis on Germany, the largest economy in Europe. Combining cost structure data, national accounts and administrative labour market data, we identify effects in a sectoral panel setting using sector-specific energy intensity as a “bite” variable. The results show that through the channel of energy intensity, monthly production and real turnover decreased by 4.1 and 2.6 per cent, respectively, after the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war. Instead of layoffs, firms safeguarded employment by means of short-time work, with a 24.1 per cent increase in notifications. Vacancy posting was reduced by 10.3 per cent.
The war, refugees, and the future of Ukraine's population.
Kulu, H., et al. (2023).
Population
The war, refugees, and the future of Ukraine's population.Refugees & Labor MarketsKulu, H., et al. (2023). The war, refugees, and the future of Ukraine's population. Population, Space and Place, 29, e2656. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2656This study analyses the effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 on the future of Ukraine's population. We conduct a series of population projections with different assumptions on the proportion of refugees that may return to Ukraine. Our projections show that if past demographic trends continue, Ukraine's population is projected to decline by one-sixth over the next two decades and become older. These trends are largely driven by past and current demographic developments: continued very low fertility and large-scale emigration at the turn of the century. With war casualties and a large portion of the Ukrainian population seeking safety abroad from the conflict, the country's population is projected to decline by one-third. The decline would be even larger among the working-age population and children. Russia's invasion has not only led to immense human and economic costs in Ukraine in the present but also carries long-term demographic repercussions.
Ukrainian migrants in Poland: Socio-economic inclusion or exclusion?
Kusek, W. A. (2019)
Local Economy
Ukrainian migrants in Poland: Socio-economic inclusion or exclusion?Refugees & Labor MarketsKusek, W. A. (2019). Ukrainian migrants in Poland: Socio-economic inclusion or exclusion? Local Economy, 34(7), 739–744. https://doi.org/10.1177/0269094219889877 Poland is an important country to study when assessing migration. In fact, many scholars who focus on migration and its impact on the local economy, in relation to Poland, focus on Polish migrants living and working in countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, or Australia. This viewpoint presents a different focus by addressing the need to conduct more work on migrants who are coming to Poland to work to fulfill labor shortages and take advantage of the country’s growing economy. Specifically this paper will look at Ukrainians who are migrating to Poland. The viewpoint will focus on push/pull factors and touch on aspects of the lived experience of Ukrainian migrants in Poland. This paper helps identify some observed trends from interviews to identify future research directions related to socio-economic inclusion or exclusion.
Issues facing the economy: Impact of Ukraine-Russia war in the global economy.
Laab, J. N., Vigonte, F. G., & Abante, M. V. (2023).
SSRN
Issues facing the economy: Impact of Ukraine-Russia war in the global economy.Refugees & Labor MarketsLaab, J. N., Vigonte, F. G., & Abante, M. V. (2023). Issues facing the economy: Impact of Ukraine-Russia war in the global economy. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4444941A severe humanitarian disaster is being brought on by the conflict in Ukraine. Over 13 million people require immediate humanitarian aid, and it is estimated that over 12 million people have been displaced. The economy of Ukraine is in ruins. Population trauma will have long-lasting repercussions. Through a variety of avenues, including commodity markets, trade, financial flows, displaced people, and market confidence, the war is having an impact on the entire world. A significant influx of refugees will strain local basic services in the area. The harm to Russia's economy will have an impact on remittance flows to several of its neighbors. The regional economy will be weakened by disruptions to the financial and supply networks in the region as well as by increased investor risk perceptions.
Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland.
Mykhailyshyna, D., & Zuchowski, D. (2025).
SSRN
Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland.Political Economy, Refugees & Labor MarketsMykhailyshyna, D., & Zuchowski, D. (2025). Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland. SSRN, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5223038 We examine the impact of two massive and unexpected inflows of Ukrainians on voting behavior in Poland. The two migration shocks, caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, allow us to disentangle the effects of conflictinduced labor migration from those of refugee inflows. Using an instrumental variable approach, we find that greater exposure to labor migrants reduces support for conservative parties in the short run and subsequently shifts voter preferences toward pro-redistribution parties. We do not find similar effects for refugees, who, unlike temporary labor migrants, had access to social benefits. However, exposure to both types of Ukrainian migration leads to a decrease in far-right voting. This effect emerges only after the salience of Ukrainian migrants increases due to the escalation of Russia's aggression and the rise of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric from the Polish far-right. The backlash from Polish voters against the far-right rhetoric is ten times stronger in areas exposed to refugees than to labor migrants. Our results are robust to the use of a number of instruments and several sensitivity checks.
Labor markets during war time: Evidence from online job advertisements.
Pham, T., Talavera, O., & Wu, Z. (2023).
Journal of Comparative Economics
Labor markets during war time: Evidence from online job advertisements.Refugees & Labor MarketsPham, T., Talavera, O., & Wu, Z. (2023). Labor markets during war time: Evidence from online job advertisements. Journal of Comparative Economics, 51(4), 1316–1333.This study examines the short- and medium-term impacts of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war on the labor market for Ukrainian workers. Using a unique dataset of 5.4 million online job advertisements for Ukrainian job seekers in Poland and Ukraine over the 2021–2022 period, we show a short-term surge in demand for Ukrainians to work in Poland, while the number of jobs available in Ukraine is relatively stable. Since February 2022, the demand for soft and analytical skills in Ukraine has increased, while the demand for such skills in Poland has remained the same. Moreover, the increase in Polish jobs available to Ukrainian workers is largest for medium/high-skilled jobs and female-oriented jobs. Further analysis suggests a persistent shift (to the left) in wage distribution driven by both the decline of wages within job titles and the change in the composition of jobs across Poland.
The effect of Ukrainian refugees on the local labour markets: The case of Czechia
Postepska, A., & Voloshyna, A. (2024)
IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
The effect of Ukrainian refugees on the local labour markets: The case of Czechia (IZA Discussion Paper No. 16965).Refugees & Labor MarketsPostepska, A., & Voloshyna, A. (2024). The effect of Ukrainian refugees on the local labour markets: The case of Czechia (IZA Discussion Paper No. 16965). IZA – Institute of Labor Economics. https://www.iza.org/en/publications/dp/16965
Support needs of Ukrainian healthcare workers during wartime: A study on trust, legal security, and labor union involvement.
Sydorenko, A. Y., Kubanskyi, S., & Kiel, L. (2025).
Public Health
Support needs of Ukrainian healthcare workers during wartime: A study on trust, legal security, and labor union involvement.Refugees & Labor MarketsSydorenko, A. Y., Kubanskyi, S., & Kiel, L. (2025). Support needs of Ukrainian healthcare workers during wartime: A study on trust, legal security, and labor union involvement. Public Health, 238, 298–302. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2024.12.017Background:As Ukraine enters its third year of war with Russia, healthcare workers (HWs) continue to face significant challenges. This study aimed to evaluate Ukrainian HWs' involvement in and trust in labor unions, assess their perceptions of social and legal security in the workplace, and identify the support they need.Methods:An anonymous online survey of HWs included both closed-ended and open-ended questions.Results:A total of 1442 healthcare professionals participated in the study. Of these, 62.5 % are members of labor unions, yet only 37.2 % trust these unions. Additionally, 34.2 % reported experiencing a violation of their rights at the workplace in the last two years, and 14.1 % had sought legal consultations from labor unions. Regarding social support, 31.1 % of HWs expressed a need for assistance. The most desired forms of support from labor unions were identified in four key areas: advocating higher wages, support for health rehabilitation and rest, legal assistance, and psychological counseling services.Conclusion:Despite the significant level of involvement of HWs in labor unions, there is a pressing need for labor unions to focus on building trust among their members. The notable incidence of rights violations at work underscores the necessity of deeply understanding the underlying reasons for these cases. The most critical support needs identified were financial aid and health-related assistance, highlighting the primary areas where HWs require help.
Migration response to an immigration shock: Evidence from Russia's aggression against Ukraine
Zuchowski, D. (2023)
RWI – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Migration response to an immigration shock: Evidence from Russia's aggression against Ukraine (Ruhr Economic Papers No. 1039).Refugees & Labor MarketsZuchowski, D. (2023). Migration response to an immigration shock: Evidence from Russia's aggression against Ukraine (Ruhr Economic Papers No. 1039). RWI – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, https://doi.org/10.4419/86788924 Russia’s attacks against Ukraine have triggered massive and unexpected migration movements. In this paper, I examine the impact of the inflow of Ukrainians that resulted from Russia’s aggression in 2014 on local migration patterns in Poland. For identification, I use an instrumental variable approach drawing on unique historical data on the forced resettlement of Ukrainians in Poland after World War II. The results show that the regional inflow of immigrants decreases both internal and international out-migration of the Polish population. I provide supportive evidence that the decrease in out-migration is due to the upscaling of local labor markets.

Politics & Governance

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
News and narratives: A cointegration analysis of Russian economic policy uncertainty.
Boitani, A., & Dragomirescu-Gaina, C. (2023).
Economics Letters
News and narratives: A cointegration analysis of Russian economic policy uncertainty.Political EconomyBoitani, A., & Dragomirescu-Gaina, C. (2023). News and narratives: A cointegration analysis of Russian economic policy uncertainty. Economics Letters, 226, 111094. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111094Russia has become more integrated and dependent on global developments over the last decades, despite being ruled by an increasingly autocratic regime. We perform a cointegration analysis on a monthly dataset spanning from 2001 to 2021, with a limited set of variables reflecting both domestic and international developments. Results point to significant interactions between these two dimensions, mostly over the short-term. Kremlin may employ media control as a discretionary policy instrument to influence popular support for the incumbent, but this works slowly and is hardly sustainable in the long-term.
Corruption in Ukraine during the Ukrainian–Russian war: A decalogue of policies to combat it.
Cifuentes-Faura, J. (2024).
Journal of Public Affairs
Corruption in Ukraine during the Ukrainian–Russian war: A decalogue of policies to combat it.Governance & InstitutionsCifuentes-Faura, J. (2024). Corruption in Ukraine during the Ukrainian–Russian war: A decalogue of policies to combat it. Journal of Public Affairs, 24(1), e2905. https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2905Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a major humanitarian catastrophe. The war in Ukraine has also had serious global consequences. During the war, another of Ukraine's major problems, corruption, was also exposed. In response to these cases, the Ukrainian president has tried to crack down on fraud and corruption. Ukraine is a highly corrupt country, as indicated by the Corruption Perceptions Index. This article outlines Ukraine's corruption problem during the war, and the main forms of corruption, analyzes the country's performance in the Corruption Perceptions Index, and presents a 10-point checklist of measures and policies to combat and end corruption in the short and long term.
Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine.
Deininger, K. W., Ali, D. A., & Neyter, R. (2023).
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine.Governance & InstitutionsDeininger, K. W., Ali, D. A., & Neyter, R. (2023). Impacts of a mandatory shift to decentralized online auctions on revenue from public land leases in Ukraine. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 213, 432–450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.07.029We analyze the impact of a 2021 reform in Ukraine that—after earlier digitization efforts did not produce desired results—mandated use of transparent online auctions by local governments rather than a central agency to lease rights to public agricultural land. The shift to a collusion-proof electronic auction system increased lease revenue by 175% for our preferred specification. Had all public land that Ukraine transferred since 2015 been auctioned using post-reform mechanisms, local governments would receive incremental lease revenue of US$500 million per year for the duration of the lease. Where public land is important, reforms to ensure rights to such land are allocated transparently, competitively and in a decentralized way could improve social, economic, and environmental outcomes.
The effects of anti-corruption videos on attitudes toward corruption in a Ukrainian online survey.
Denisova-Schmidt, E., Huber, M., & Prytula, Y. (2019).
Eurasian Geography and Economics
The effects of anti-corruption videos on attitudes toward corruption in a Ukrainian online survey.Political EconomyDenisova-Schmidt, E., Huber, M., & Prytula, Y. (2019). The effects of anti-corruption videos on attitudes toward corruption in a Ukrainian online survey. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 60(3), 304–332. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2019.1667844This paper presents the outcomes of an anti-corruption educational intervention among Ukrainian students based on an online experiment. More than 3,000 survey participants were randomly assigned to one of three different videos on corruption and its consequences (treatment groups) or a video on higher education (control group). The data suggest a high level of academic dishonesty and misconduct among young people, but also a negative attitude toward corruption in general, highlighting the ambivalence of corruption in the country. We find that one video, which presented a thrilling story abut a victim of corruption related to common bribery in an accessible way, was effective in promoting awareness of the negative consequences of corruption. In contrast, the other two treatment videos, which more closely followed the style of TV news or documentaries on corruption, did not generally promote negative attitudes toward corruption. Presenting corruption issues in a catchy way therefore appears to matter for the effectiveness of such interventions.
The Minsk game.
Driscoll, J., & Arel, D. (2025).
Public Choice
The Minsk game.Political EconomyDriscoll, J., & Arel, D. (2025). The Minsk game. Public Choice, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-025-01259-4 Why did the Minsk Accords fail to prevent the current Ukraine War? Standard explanations for the diplomatic failure center on irreconcilable commitment problems between Moscow and Washington: both revisionist with respect to the other, neither able to credibly promise non-involvement in the other’s perceived sphere of influence, and both capable of recruiting local allies within Ukraine. This account omits relevant historical context related to the demographic legacy of the Soviet Union. To shed light on the kinds of policies that would be most effective at “buying peace” in some dimly-visible future, we analyze a simple model of domestic Ukrainian interest group politics.
The economic and political implications of Russia-Ukraine war.
Hirzullah, H. M. I. (2024).
International Journal of Progressive Sciences and Technologies
The economic and political implications of Russia-Ukraine war.Political EconomyHirzullah, H. M. I. (2024). The economic and political implications of Russia-Ukraine war. International Journal of Progressive Sciences and Technologies, 44(1), 94–106. https://ijpsat.org/index.php/ijpsat/article/view/6071The divisions and conflicts between Russians and Ukrainians have deep historical roots. Both sides refer to historical facts, or at least to events they recognize as their own historical facts. Russia, which presented a weak state profile until the 2000s, started to recover after Vladimir Putin came to power at the end of 1999. In August 2008, tensions between Georgia and Abkhazia and Ossetia escalated, and the Russian Federation became involved. Thus, Russia returned to the international arena as an actor that can mobilize its military power at any time. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, along with the support of separatist groups in regions such as Donetsk and Lugansk in eastern Ukraine, further increased the tension between the two countries. On 24 February 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine and war broke out between the two countries. The Russia-Ukraine war has affected many countries of the world, especially the West, politically, socially, economically and militarily. The aim of this study is to examine the historical references of the relations between Russia and Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the reasons for the start and development of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the rebellion of the Russian special military group Wagner during the war, the effects of the war on world politics and economy, the economic indicators in Russia during the war and the aid provided by the West to Ukraine with qualitative research method and descriptive description method.
Public Opinion Research in Ukraine Under Wartime Conditions.
Klein, E., Pleines, H., Volosevych, I., Paniotto, V., Dembitskyi, S., Shapovalov, S., & Sologoub, I. (2024).
Ukrainian Analytical Digest
Public Opinion Research in Ukraine Under Wartime Conditions.Political EconomyKlein, E., Pleines, H., Volosevych, I., Paniotto, V., Dembitskyi, S., Shapovalov, S., & Sologoub, I. (2024). Public Opinion Research in Ukraine Under Wartime Conditions. Ukrainian Analytical Digest, 006. https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/675216/3/UkrainianAnalyticalDigest006.pdf
Marching to good laws: The impact of war, politics, and international credit on reforms in Ukraine
Kochnev, A. (2021)
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw)
Marching to good laws: The impact of war, politics, and international credit on reforms in Ukraine (Working Paper No. 192).Political EconomyKochnev, A. (2021). Marching to good laws: The impact of war, politics, and international credit on reforms in Ukraine (wiiw Working Paper No. 192). The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw), https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240635 The paper investigates determinants of investments in state capacity and institutional change in contemporary Ukraine. After formulating a simple sequential two-stage model of investments in state capacity, the paper estimates autoregressive distributed lag and vector autoregressive models to verify its predictions. The paper finds little evidence for the impact of conflict intensity and access to international credit on the pace of reform progress. It finds a statistically significant effect for the intensity of political competition and changes of real wages, albeit these results are sensitive to robustness checks.
Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine.
Kvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T., & Bukin, E. (2022).
Land Use Policy
Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine.Agriculture & Food Security, Governance & InstitutionsKvartiuk, V., Herzfeld, T., & Bukin, E. (2022). Decentralized public farmland conveyance: Rental rights auctioning in Ukraine. Land Use Policy, 114, 105983. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.105983 This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.
Russia’s War in Ukraine: State Patriotism or Economic Gain?
Lawrence, P. (2023)
Journal of Global Faultlines
Russia’s War in Ukraine: State Patriotism or Economic Gain?Political EconomyLawrence, P. (2023). Russia’s War in Ukraine: State Patriotism or Economic Gain? Journal of Global Faultlines, 9(2), 198–211. https://doi.org/10.13169/jglobfaul.9.2.0198Are the objectives of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 based on Putin’s ideological view of Russia’s history and the place of Ukraine in it in the process re-establishing Russia’s position as a world power challenging US hegemony? Or are there underlying economic objectives shared with Russia’s oligarchs to gain control of Ukraine’s mineral wealth and strategic economic position at the crossroads of Europe and Eurasia? This article compares the economies of Russia and Ukraine and their performance since the end of the Soviet Union and finds that their economic structures and performance are very similar over the last three decades, as is the domination of their respective oligarchs, but that the war has hit Ukraine much more disastrously than sanctions have hit Russia. It concludes that Russia does not need Ukraine’s mineral wealth but that control of Ukraine would bring Russia economic gains. However, the principal reason for the invasion is to push back the potential NATO advance to the Russian border, itself a reaction to US fears of Europe’s increasing dependence on Russia for gas, and in doing so challenge US hegemony not just in Europe by across the world by building bridges to Asia and other parts of the Global South.
A battle for foreign perceptions: Ukraine’s country image in the 2022 war with Russia.
Lee, S. T. (2023).
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy
A battle for foreign perceptions: Ukraine’s country image in the 2022 war with Russia.Political EconomyLee, S. T. (2023). A battle for foreign perceptions: Ukraine’s country image in the 2022 war with Russia. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 19(3), 345–358. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-022-00284-0This paper examines the 2022 War in Ukraine through the conceptual lens of country image within a broader framework of public diplomacy, soft power, and nation branding. It applies integrative and longitudinal perspectives to examine Ukraine’s country image and country image cultivation strategies over a period of three decades from its independence in 1991 to the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War. To understand Ukraine’s country image, or perceptions of Ukraine held by international stakeholders, a case study examined a convergence of multiple sources of evidence and methods. One method focuses on sentiment analysis through Leximancer, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, to evaluate and compare Ukraine’s country image in international news media discourse across three periods of analysis separated by three major events: Ukraine’s independence in 1991, the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, and the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War. The findings suggest that Ukraine’s country image has strengthened over time, and has been effective in delegitimizing the 2022 Russian invasion and securing strong support from the international community.
Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland.
Mykhailyshyna, D., & Zuchowski, D. (2025).
SSRN
Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland.Political Economy, Refugees & Labor MarketsMykhailyshyna, D., & Zuchowski, D. (2025). Migration shocks and voting: Evidence from Ukrainian migration to Poland. SSRN, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5223038 We examine the impact of two massive and unexpected inflows of Ukrainians on voting behavior in Poland. The two migration shocks, caused by Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, allow us to disentangle the effects of conflictinduced labor migration from those of refugee inflows. Using an instrumental variable approach, we find that greater exposure to labor migrants reduces support for conservative parties in the short run and subsequently shifts voter preferences toward pro-redistribution parties. We do not find similar effects for refugees, who, unlike temporary labor migrants, had access to social benefits. However, exposure to both types of Ukrainian migration leads to a decrease in far-right voting. This effect emerges only after the salience of Ukrainian migrants increases due to the escalation of Russia's aggression and the rise of anti-Ukrainian rhetoric from the Polish far-right. The backlash from Polish voters against the far-right rhetoric is ten times stronger in areas exposed to refugees than to labor migrants. Our results are robust to the use of a number of instruments and several sensitivity checks.
The political economy of famine: The Ukrainian famine of 1933.
Naumenko, N. (2021).
The Journal of Economic History
The political economy of famine: The Ukrainian famine of 1933.Political EconomyNaumenko, N. (2021). The political economy of famine: The Ukrainian famine of 1933. The Journal of Economic History, 81(1), 156–197. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050720000625The 1933 Ukrainian famine killed as many as 2.6 million people out of a population of 32 million. Historians offer three main explanations: weather, economic policies, genocide. This paper documents that (1) available data do not support weather as the main explanation: 1931 and 1932 weather predicts harvest roughly equal to the 1924–1929 average; weather explains up to 8.1 percent of excess deaths. (2) Policies (collectivization of agriculture and the lack of favored industries) significantly increased famine mortality; collectivization explains up to 52 percent of excess deaths. (3) There is some evidence that ethnic Ukrainians and Germans were discriminated against.
Public sentiment towards economic sanctions in the Russia–Ukraine war.
Ngo, V. M., Huynh, T. L. D., Nguyen, P. V., & Nguyen, H. H. (2022).
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Public sentiment towards economic sanctions in the Russia–Ukraine war.Sanctions & Trade, Political EconomyNgo, V. M., Huynh, T. L. D., Nguyen, P. V., & Nguyen, H. H. (2022). Public sentiment towards economic sanctions in the Russia–Ukraine war. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 69(5), 564–573. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12331This paper introduces novel data on public sentiment towards economic sanctions based on nearly 1 million social media posts in 108 countries during the Russia–Ukraine war by using machine learning. We show the geographical heterogeneity between government stances and public sentiment. Finally, we show how political regimes, trading relationships and political instability can predict how people perceive this war.
Ukraine’s EU Integration: A long way home.
Sologoub, I. (2022).
Intereconomics
Ukraine’s EU Integration: A long way home.Political EconomySologoub, I. (2022). Ukraine’s EU Integration: A long way home. Intereconomics, 57(4), 218–224. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-022-1066-1
Rallying around the EU flag: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and attitudes toward European integration.
Steiner, N. D., Berlinschi, R., Farvaque, E., Fidrmuc, J., Harms, P., Mihailov, A., Neugart, M., & Stanek, P. (2023).
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Rallying around the EU flag: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and attitudes toward European integration.Political EconomySteiner, N. D., Berlinschi, R., Farvaque, E., Fidrmuc, J., Harms, P., Mihailov, A., Neugart, M., & Stanek, P. (2023). Rallying around the EU flag: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and attitudes toward European integration. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 61(2), 283–301. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13449This article uses a survey amongst students at European universities to explore whether Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected attitudes towards European integration. Some respondents completed the survey just before Russia's assault on 24 February 2022, and some did so just afterwards, thus delivering a quasi-experimental design situation, which we exploit. Our results suggest that the ominous news about the Russian attack increased the participants' interest in EU politics, consolidated their attachment to the EU and made them more mindful and appreciative of the benefits of deeper European integration. In effect, the war so close to the EU Eastern border provoked a rally around the supranational EU flag, with convergence of public opinion towards shared European values.
Accessing to a “Truer Truth”: Conspiracy and figurative reasoning from Covid-19 to the Russia–Ukraine war.
Terracciano, B. (2023).
Media and Communication
Accessing to a “Truer Truth”: Conspiracy and figurative reasoning from Covid-19 to the Russia–Ukraine war.Political EconomyTerracciano, B. (2023). Accessing to a “Truer Truth”: Conspiracy and figurative reasoning from Covid-19 to the Russia–Ukraine war. Media and Communication, 11(2), 64–75. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i2.6396This research hypothesizes that all conspiracy theories have dominating isotopies and images-symbols regardless of ideology or context. As a result, I hypothesized that the common denominator might be discovered in figurative reasoning, which means using the same representations to explain current events, in order to detect an ideal center of the semantic universe of conspiracy where the diverse conspiracist fringes converge. Social media invariant topicalizations of the Covid-19 epidemic and the Russia–Ukraine war are the ideal field to validate this hypothesis. The corpus on which the study was conducted consists of thousands of online items published between February 15, 2020, and October 15, 2022. Within the corpus were chosen posts by QAnon supporters designated as disinformation “superspreaders.”
Decentralization policy in Ukraine: How voluntary amalgamation, inter-municipal cooperation and fiscal incentives impacted the local government system.
Wright, G., & Slukhai, S. (2021).
NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy
Decentralization policy in Ukraine: How voluntary amalgamation, inter-municipal cooperation and fiscal incentives impacted the local government system.Political EconomyWright, G., & Slukhai, S. (2021). Decentralization policy in Ukraine: How voluntary amalgamation, inter-municipal cooperation and fiscal incentives impacted the local government system. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 14(1), 311–343. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2021-0012This paper examines the progress of implementing a comprehensive decentralization program in Ukraine. Ukraine was practically the last country of the former Soviet bloc to undertake a comprehensive decentralization program. The decentralization program was based on three pillars: (1) a reliance on voluntary amalgamation of the local government units, (2) the use of inter-municipal cooperation, and (3) enhanced financial incentives. The authors examine how these policies were implemented as well as the impact on local governments service delivery and fiscal capacity. The analyses are based on available data and the application of statistical tests measuring fiscal resources to the population size and other variables of the local government. The study has revealed some significant flaws in Ukrainian decentralization policy implementation. The voluntary approach eventually had to be abandoned for a mandatory approach. The weak progress in inter-municipal cooperation did not establish improved service delivery across a large number of local government units. The financial incentives with greater sharing of taxes did not provide sufficient additional resources to make the units financially sustainable. Finally, the results of the local government elections held in the amalgamated units did not reveal widespread support for the new units and the decentralization reforms. These issues create significant risks for the final success of the decentralization reform.
Near-real time analysis of war and economic activity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Zhukov, Y. M. (2023).
Journal of Comparative Economics
Near-real time analysis of war and economic activity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.Political Economy, Agriculture & Food SecurityZhukov, Y. M. (2023). Near-real time analysis of war and economic activity during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Journal of Comparative Economics, 51(4), 1232–1243. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2023.06.003aThis paper introduces near-real time data on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and uses these data to investigate the short-term impact of occupation and violence on local economic activity. The data project – VIINA (Violent Incident Information from News Articles) – parses news reports from Ukrainian and Russian media, georeferences them, and classifies them into standard event categories (e.g. artillery shelling) through machine learning. As we show, VIINA is more geographically comprehensive and more thoroughly documented than other open-source event databases on Ukraine, and is the only such effort to track territorial control. We illustrate applications for research on political economy, by utilizing remote sensing data on luminosity and vegetation as proxies for urban economic activity and agricultural land use. We find that economic activity declined most in urban areas that neither side fully controlled, and in places most exposed to artillery shelling. Areas under Russian occupation, however, were more insulated from these negative shocks. Although not causal, these findings are in line with the view that war brings not only economic devastation, but also vast geographic inequalities that are almost immediately observable from space.
NATO and the war in Ukraine: Limited role but reinforced legitimacy?
Zima, A. (2023)
IRSEM
NATO and the war in Ukraine: Limited role but reinforced legitimacy?Political Economy, Defense & SecurityZima, A. (2023). NATO and the war in Ukraine: Limited role but reinforced legitimacy? (Research Paper No. 139). IRSEM, https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/03/nr-139-zima-nato-ukraine.pdf This analysis proposes a new reading of NATO’s role, based on what appears to be a paradox: while the Alliance is playing a very limited role in this war, its attractiveness and legitimacy have been greatly enhanced since the outbreak of war in February 2022. Furthermore, NATO seems to be at the heart of the conflict which is taking place on the organization’s eastern flank, it opposes two countries with partnership programs with the organization, namely Russia and Ukraine; and one of the Russian government’s main misleading narratives is to accuse NATO of being responsible for this conflict because of its enlargement policy. Indeed, NATO’s role is limited to a deterrent posture, which means that it is implementing policies to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states. However, the Alliance’s attractiveness and legitimacy have been greatly enhanced since the outbreak of the conflict, as evidenced by the willingness of two neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, to join NATO. The European Union, on the other hand, has not benefited from this renewed legitimacy, even though it is far more involved in the conflict through its policy of arms supplies to Ukraine (European Peace Facility); through sanctions on Russian individuals and companies; and through aid to Ukrainian refugees

Other

TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
TitleTitleCategoryCitationAbstract
War, international spillovers, and adolescents: Evidence from Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Anger, S., Christoph, B., Galkiewicz, A., Margaryan, S., Peter, F., Sandner, M., & Siedler, T. (2024).
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
War, international spillovers, and adolescents: Evidence from Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.Behavioral EconomicsAnger, S., Christoph, B., Galkiewicz, A., Margaryan, S., Peter, F., Sandner, M., & Siedler, T. (2024). War, international spillovers, and adolescents: Evidence from Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 224, 181–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.009Using novel longitudinal data, this paper studies the short- and medium-term effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 on social trust of adolescents in Germany. Comparing adolescents who responded to our survey shortly before the start of the war with those who responded shortly after the conflict began and applying difference-in-differences (DiD) models over time, we find a significant decline in the outcome after the war started. These findings provide new evidence on how armed conflicts influence social trust and well-being among young people in a country not directly involved in the war.
Financing democracy: Why and how partners should support Ukraine.
Becker, T., Bilan, O., Eichengreen, B., Dombrovskis, V., Fedyk, A., Gorodnichenko, Y., Nagy Mohacsi, P., Mylovanov, T., Nell, J., Shapoval, N., Sologub, I., Roland, G., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2023).
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Financing democracy: Why and how partners should support Ukraine.ReconstructionBecker, T., Bilan, O., Eichengreen, B., Dombrovskis, V., Fedyk, A., Gorodnichenko, Y., Nagy Mohacsi, P., Mylovanov, T., Nell, J., Shapoval, N., Sologub, I., Roland, G., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2023). Financing democracy: Why and how partners should support Ukraine. Centre for Economic Policy Research, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/195072-policy_insight_124_financing_democracy_why_and_how_partners_should_support_ukraine.pdf
A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine (Rapid Response Economics 1).
Becker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., Weder di Mauro, B. (2022).
CEPR Press
A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine (Rapid Response Economics 1).ReconstructionBecker, T., Eichengreen, B., Gorodnichenko, Y., Guriev, S., Johnson, S., Mylovanov, T., Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., Weder di Mauro, B. (2022). A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine (Rapid Response Economics 1). CEPR Press, https://cepr.org/system/files/publication-files/147614-a_blueprint_for_the_reconstruction_of_ukraine.pdf
How to Rebuild Ukraine: A Synthesis and Critical Review of Policy Proposals.
Becker, T., Gorodnichenko, Y., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2024).
Annual Review of Economics: Submitted
How to Rebuild Ukraine: A Synthesis and Critical Review of Policy Proposals.ReconstructionBecker, T., Gorodnichenko, Y., & Weder di Mauro, B. (2024). How to Rebuild Ukraine: A Synthesis and Critical Review of Policy Proposals. Annual Review of Economics: Submitted, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081324-093012
Russia versus the West: Facing the long-term challenge.
Ben-Gad, M. (2022).
Economic Affairs
Russia versus the West: Facing the long-term challenge.Defense & SecurityBen-Gad, M. (2022). Russia versus the West: Facing the long-term challenge. Economic Affairs, 42(2), 385–394. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12535 In late February 2022, the prospect of a quick and efficient decapitation of Ukraine's political leadership, followed by the installation of a puppet government in Kyiv, was greeted in Western capitals with a certain grim resignation. Three days before the invasion, he stated that "modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia" (Putin, 2022) - a clear declaration that Ukraine should be abolished as a sovereign state and (re)incorporated into Russia. Could Russia's military debacle prove so embarrassing, and the sanctions so crippling, that the autocratic regime President Putin has created is forced from power? Russia versus the West: Facing the long-term challenge. 
Impact of Ukrainian- Russian War on Health Care and Humanitarian Crisis.
Dzhus, M., & Golovach, I. (2023).
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness
Impact of Ukrainian- Russian War on Health Care and Humanitarian Crisis.HumanitarianDzhus, M., & Golovach, I. (2023). Impact of Ukrainian- Russian War on Health Care and Humanitarian Crisis. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 17, e340. doi:10.1017/dmp.2022.265Authors explore the influence of Russian aggression on Ukrainian health care and humanitarian crises. On February 24, 2022, Ukraine faced an unprovoked brutal Russian invasion resulting in multiple negative consequences. During the 3 mo of full-scale war, Russians damaged more than 600 hospitals and killed at least 12 medics. Access to health care is severely impacted due to security concerns, restricted mobility, broken supply chains, and mass population displacement. Health care continues to come under attack (including attacks against health facilities, transport, personnel, patients, supplies, and warehouses), with a total of 295 attacks on health care, resulting in 59 injuries and 76 deaths, reported between February 24 and June 15. Ministry of Health reported that 1658 medical workers had been forced to change their residence and became employed in other regions of the country. Russian aggression negatively influenced not only the medical system and economics, but it led to a humanitarian crisis in the whole of Ukraine.
War and Science in Ukraine.
Ganguli, I. & Waldinger, F. (2023).
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
War and Science in Ukraine.AcademiaGanguli, I. & Waldinger, F. (2023). War and Science in Ukraine. NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, volume 3, pages 165-188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. https://www.nber.org/papers/w31449 We discuss the impacts of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian science. Using newly collected data, we show that the war has already had significant effects on science in Ukraine: research papers produced by Ukrainian scientists declined by about 10%, approximately 5% of the most prolific scientists are publishing with a foreign affiliation, 22% of top universities have faced destruction of physical capital, and international collaborations with Russian scientists have declined by more than 40%. Drawing upon the economics of science and innovation literature, we highlight three primary channels through which wars affect science: (1) the loss of human capital, (2) the destruction of physical capital, and (3) reductions in international scientific cooperation. The evidence from the literature on the long-term effects of losing human or physical capital indicates that shocks to physical capital can be remedied more easily than shocks to human capital. Our new data also suggest that human capital shocks are the main drivers of the reduction in Ukrainian research output that has occurred since the beginning of the war. Hence, reconstruction efforts that focus on supporting scientists to continue in the research sector and then return to Ukraine after the war has ended are likely to have the greatest impact on long-term scientific productivity in Ukraine.
Why Russian Studies in the West Failed to Provide a Clue about Russia and Ukraine.
Gorodnichenko, Y., Sologoub, I., & Deryugina, T. (2023).
Ukrainian Analytical Digest
Why Russian Studies in the West Failed to Provide a Clue about Russia and Ukraine.AcademiaGorodnichenko, Y., Sologoub, I., & Deryugina, T. (2023). Why Russian Studies in the West Failed to Provide a Clue about Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian Analytical Digest, 2, 13-17. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000637349
Research productivity during the Russian war in Ukraine.
Guariglia, A., Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, A., Talavera, O., & Zadorozhna, O. (2025).
Public Choice
Research productivity during the Russian war in Ukraine.AcademiaGuariglia, A., Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, A., Talavera, O., & Zadorozhna, O. (2025). Research productivity during the Russian war in Ukraine. Public Choice, 2025, Article 107768. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-025-01258-5We investigate the effect of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the research productivity of scholars affiliated with around 15,000 Ukrainian research institutions. Using the 2014 Russian invasion as a quasi-natural experiment, we apply a difference-in-differences estimator on a sample of half a million journal articles collected from Scopus. Researchers affiliated with institutions located in the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk and the whole of Crimea form our treatment group, and those affiliated with institutions in the unoccupied regions of Ukraine, our control group. We document a significant decline in quantity and quality of research, measured by the average number of papers/citations, produced by authors based in the Donetsk/Luhansk occupied regions with active hostilities. By contrast, we observe a rise in the quantity of papers published by authors based in annexed Crimea. Yet, this pattern, which can be explained by increased funding by Russian authorities towards institutions located in Crimea, is driven by articles published in Russian journals and by scientists with relatively low productivity. Our results are robust when using different control groups and estimation methods, including causal machine learning tools, and when controlling for publication lags.
Entrance into parenthood at the onset of low fertility in Ukraine: The role of family relationships and perceived security.
Hilevych, Y. (2020).
Demographic Research
Entrance into parenthood at the onset of low fertility in Ukraine: The role of family relationships and perceived security.OtherHilevych, Y. (2020). Entrance into parenthood at the onset of low fertility in Ukraine: The role of family relationships and perceived security. Demographic Research, 42(29), 799–826. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2020.42.29Background: In post-Soviet countries, low fertility has been achieved through postponement of second birth, while entrance into parenthood still takes place relatively early in life and within marriage. Studies suggest that grandparental support with childcare drives this reproductive behaviour. However, we still know little about the exact way in which decisions about first parenthood are shaped by family relationships, especially with respect to the expected and actual support they exert.Objective: This paper explores how family relationships – spousal and intergenerational – influenced decisions to enter parenthood in Ukraine between 1950 and 1975, when fertility there declined below the replacement level for the first time.Methods: A total of 66 qualitative life-history interviews were conducted with women and men from the Ukrainian cities of Lviv (west) and Kharkiv (east); age-specific fertility rates and the total fertility rate in 1960 were measured for the two provinces.Results: The informants shared their notions about the right timing for first parenthood, which parents(-in-law) helped them to navigate. This guidance, in turn, created expectations about the provision of help with childcare, which facilitated a feeling of security when entering parenthood in economically insecure circumstances, which are defined as perceived security. The actual provision of childcare by parents(-in-law), however, was contingent on spousal relationships, which differed between the two cities. These differences are important for understanding postponement of second birth and regional variation in achieving low fertility in Ukraine.Contribution: The study argues that perceived security – guided by specific intergenerational and spousal relationships – is crucial for understanding universal and relatively early entrance into parenthood in Ukraine.
A HIMARS in the hand is worth two in the bush: Measuring the real economic value of U.S. support for Ukraine.
Hodson, J., Fedyk, A., Gorodnichenko, Y., Deryugina, T., Marshall, E., & Sologoub, I. (2025).
SSRN
A HIMARS in the hand is worth two in the bush: Measuring the real economic value of U.S. support for Ukraine.Defense & SecurityHodson, J., Fedyk, A., Gorodnichenko, Y., Deryugina, T., Marshall, E., & Sologoub, I. (2025). A HIMARS in the hand is worth two in the bush: Measuring the real economic value of U.S. support for Ukraine. SSRN, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5239621
Conflict and well-being of civilians: The case of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war.
Osiichuk, M., & Shepotylo, O. (2020).
Economic Systems
Conflict and well-being of civilians: The case of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war.Defense & SecurityOsiichuk, M., & Shepotylo, O. (2020). Conflict and well-being of civilians: The case of the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. Economic Systems, 44(1), Article 100736. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2019.100736This paper investigates the contemporaneous effect of conflict on civilians living outside of the conflict zone. Applying a multi-dimensional concept of well-being, it uses two large household surveys over 2012–2016 to analyze how the Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war affected the financial well-being and health of people in both countries. We find that the conflict significantly worsened financial well-being in both countries. The impact mostly operates by worsening expectations about financial well-being and is inversely related to the distance from the conflict zone. Our analysis indicates an increase in chronic diseases in Ukraine over a longer period. Mental health is negatively impacted in both countries at the earlier stages of the conflict. However, in Russia this effect is significant only in the region bordering the conflict zone, while in Ukraine it is significant in regions farther away from the conflict zone.
The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Korean Defense Exports.
Sim, S. (2022).
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade Research
The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Korean Defense Exports. Defense & SecuritySim, S. (2022). The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Korean Defense Exports. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade Research, Paper No. 22/IER/27/5-2, KIET Industrial Economic Review, Vol. 27 No. 5, 23-32, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4315028 On February 24, Russia launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine. Contrary to initial expectations that the war would end early, strong resistance by the Ukrainian army and the incompetence of the Russian army overlapped, and the war is showing signs of prolongation.A long war seems inevitable as Ukraine’s resistance, backed by Western military support, intensifies and the armistice agreement faces difficulties.This paper explores the threats faced the Korean defense industry as well as opportunities for export growth amid a rapidly evolving global security order. A review of relevant defense data finds that, in order for Korean defense exports to take a leap forward, it is necessary to take full advantage of security gaps in Europe that the war in Ukraine has exposed. Especially, it is crucial to establish an export strategy that takes advantage of Europe’s common security and defense policy.
Data on Ukraine in the Context of War.
Sologoub, I. (2024).
Ukrainian Analytical Digest
Data on Ukraine in the Context of War.Academia, OtherSologoub, I. (2024). Data on Ukraine in the Context of War. Ukrainian Analytical Digest, 006. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/94524/ssoar-ukrainad-2024-6-sologoub-Data_on_Ukraine_in_the.pdf
Institutionally constrained drone adoption.
Wood, G. R. (2025).
Public Choice
Institutionally constrained drone adoption.Defense & SecurityWood, G. R. (2025). Institutionally constrained drone adoption. Public Choice, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-025-01262-9 The Russian-Ukrainian war has demonstrated the growing importance of drone warfare, but Ukraine has developed a larger drone fleet and encouraged more production of, and innovation with, these weapons than Russia has. This is surprising given Russia’s larger military budget and greater experience using drones in other conflicts. One of the most important aspects of drone warfare being revealed by this conflict is the advantage conferred by using large quantities of cheap and replaceable drones, an advantage Russia has so far refused to pursue. A theory of institutionally constrained technology adoption is used to argue that Russia cannot fully embrace drone warfare the way that Ukraine has because this could exacerbate internal political insecurity in Russia.

Download the full dataset

Try our new Ukraine explainer-bot, Viktoriia!