On July 22nd, 2025, the Ukrainian government undertook a blitzkrieg against Ukrainian anti-corruption infrastructure established during the reforms of 2014-2015. A new law deprives these institutions of their independence and makes them subordinate to the Prosecutor General, who is a political appointee. The bill was first submitted to the parliament in January 2025 as a law on procedures for locating missing persons. After its adoption in the first reading, the draft law flew under the radar until July 22nd, when it was suddenly amended for the second reading, adopted, and signed by President Zelensky within a few hours. 

The law not only severely damages Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure but also was adopted without following the correct parliamentary procedures. It was signed by the speaker without due consideration of existing decrees blocking the law, which must be upheld or overriden by the parliament before the speaker can sign. Moreover, amendments to the second drafts of laws cannot completely overhaul them (as was the case with this law, which originally concerned missing persons). No wonder Ukrainians immediately took to the streets to protest the law and protect anti-corruption institutions. 

This is not the first time that Ukrainian institutions have come under attack. The government tried to sabotage the creation of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in 2018, while the Constitutional Court canceled the electronic asset declaration (e-declaration) system in 2020. It also forced the resignation of the governor of the National Bank of Ukraine in 2020, and tried to block the appointment of the head of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office (SAPO) in 2021-2022. More recently, it didn’t appoint the properly selected head of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU).

We know how most of these cases eventually ended: the HACC was launched, e-declarations were restored, the National Bank of Ukraine now operates quite successfully, and the SAPO head was appointed (this was one of the conditions for starting Ukraine-EU accession negotiations in 2022). We don’t know how the situation with the July 22nd law or the ESBU head will end. However, we can be sure that this blitzkrieg will fail in the same way as Putin’s attempt to “take Kyiv in three days.” Ukrainians repelled former President Yanukovych’s attempt to thwart its European future in 2013, and they will not allow anyone to undermine the country’s most successful institutions, expand the powers of the state, or make Ukraine more akin to Russia. The international community can help them in the following ways:

1. First, remember that the existential threat is Russia. Therefore, the supply of weapons for the Ukrainian army should be increased. Weapons can be supplied either directly from EU or US producers to military units, or they can be procured from Ukrainian manufacturers via the “Danish model.” In fact, Ukraine’s donors would gain more leverage to negotiate “money in exchange for reforms” if they gave less to finance humanitarian causes and more to support the military, while allowing the Ukrainian government to provide pensions and other social benefits from the taxes it collects (this would not change the total amount of international support, but could incentivise Ukraine’s government to seek more efficient solutions).  
2. Second, refrain from perpetuating an oversimplified stereotype of Ukraine as “a very corrupt country.” While corruption cannot be justified, especially during the war, it is not what characterizes Ukraine. Ukraine has a very rich culture, developed horizontal networks and civil society, and a strong capacity to self-organize. Many Ukrainians not only live according to European values but actually die for them. As we noted above, Ukraine’s recent political history proves that any attempt to circumvent the people’s will or hinder democratic and anti-corruption institutions will fail time and again. If anything, Ukrainians mobilize faster and more aggressively against any perceived threat to democratic institutions than their peers in many Western democracies.
3. Third, take action against the “endpoints” of corruption. Very often, dubious transactions are enabled by banks that are lax on Know Your Customer or Anti-Money Laundering regulations. People who know for certain that their unlawfully acquired money cannot be stored in a safe haven will be less likely to try to acquire money unlawfully in the first place.
4. Fourth, insist on reforms. At the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, EU officials tried to avoid these “sensitive” topics. However, reforms are needed first and foremost for the benefit of Ukraine: more efficient government and regulations combined with less pressure on businesses are prerequisites for a strong economy, which is necessary to win the war.

The Ukrainian government made a mistake yesterday, as it has many times in the past. However, the Ukrainian people, together with Ukraine’s international partners, can convince the government to correct it (specifically, to cancel the law in question). The events of July 22nd have shown us that the parliament and the president can adopt laws very quickly. Now it’s time to create incentives for them to use this skill to adopt reforms that are actually needed.

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